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ABSTRACT 
 
How police officers exercise their unique power to use deadly force continues to 
be a topic of interest among academics and, due to recent events, has moved to the 
forefront of public policy concerns. A number of scholars have proposed theories as to 
how police officers make the decision to use deadly force, but arguably the most 
comprehensive deadly force decision-making framework was put forth by Arnold Binder 
and Peter Scharf three and a half decades ago (1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). They 
posit that officers’ decision-making processes during an encounter that either includes 
police use of deadly force, or could have reasonably included police use of deadly force 
but did not, can be broken down into a four-phase model: anticipation, entry and initial 
contact, information exchange, and the final frame. Binder and Scharf believe that 
decisions made by a police officer during prior phases of the encounter have bearing on 
the officer’s final decision regarding whether to use deadly force. Previous work has 
referenced this framework when analyzing the differences in decision-making between 
officers involved in incidents in which they discharged their weapons and officers who 
held fire in incidents wherein no officers shot (Scharf and Binder, 1983; Fridell and 
Binder, 1992). Scholars have yet, however, to study decision-making processes during 
incidents in which multiple officers are involved, but only some chose to discharge their 
weapon. Such an analysis would not only contribute to our understanding of how police 
officers make decisions during this type of encounter, but it may also shed light on why, 
given the same situation, some officers make different decisions regarding the use of 
deadly force. 
Using qualitative data collected during interviews with police officers across the 
United States who were involved in incidents in which at least one officer discharged his 
or her firearm and at least one officer did not, this study assessed the extent to which the 
Binder and Scharf deadly force decision-making framework applied to officers’ decision-
making processes in events where only some officers present chose to shoot. The sample 
used in the analysis consisted of 83 police officers: 46 who chose to use deadly force 
during their incident and 37 who chose not to use deadly force, but were present when 
another officer fired at a suspect.  
Initial coding of the interviews summarized each instance of decision-making 
using the model proposed by Binder and Scharf (1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). The 
initial codes were used to identify when and how decisions were made in each of the four 
phases, as well as the situational context in which decisions were made by the 
participating officers. A constant comparison method was used to assess the decision-
making processes of the police officers in the sample. Comparisons were made between 
shooters and witness officers as two separate groups and among police officers involved 
in the same incident with goal of identifying themes directly related to officers’ decision 
to use or not to use deadly force.  
By focusing on the decision-making processes of police officers participating in 
the same incident, the findings from this study shed light on reasons why, given the same 
situation, some officers decided to use deadly force against citizens, while other officers 
choose to hold fire. In addition, the way in which the data were collected provided an 
opportunity to assess whether and how individual officers’ decision-making processes 
were impacted by the presence and decisions made by other officers involved in the same 
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incident. This is a critical addition to the deadly force literature, as past research on the 
topic has viewed the decision by a police officer to use deadly force as an individual 
choice and not as one potentially influenced by the presence of, or decisions made by, 
other officers on scene. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
As John Goldkamp (1976:169) reminds his readers, “the power to take life exists 
not only at the final stage of the criminal justice process where the state may execute 
prisoners under the sentence of death,” but it also exists “at the earliest stage where 
deadly force may be used by police.” The irreversible nature of the death penalty has led 
to stringent and unwavering requirements that all decisions relating to this sentence be 
carefully made and scrupulously reviewed after the defendant has received due process, 
yet police officers are given the power to make quick decisions to take the life of citizens 
(under certain circumstances with no form of prior review whatsoever) (Fyfe, 1981). 
Adams (1999:14) states that the capacity of the police to use deadly force is “so central to 
understanding police functions” that one could argue it “characterizes the key element of 
the police role.”  
Officer-involved shootings have long garnered “considerable controversy” by the 
media and the public (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008:505). Although the use of deadly 
force by the police has been a contentious topic in the United States for some time, a 
number of recent high profile cases (including incidents in Ferguson, Missouri, 
Cleveland, Ohio, and North Charleston, South Carolina) have moved police use of deadly 
force to the forefront of public policy concerns. Criminal justice researchers and policy 
makers are now seeking to gain a better understanding of how and why police officers 
make the decision to use deadly force against citizens. 
We still know relatively little about how often police in the United States use 
deadly force (Fyfe, 2002; Klinger, 2012; Sherman and Langworthy, 1979). For we lack a 
sound national database for counts of police use of deadly force. While the FBI’s 
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Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system does include some information on police-
caused deaths, it is a mess. Current data from the UCR states that 461 individuals were 
justifiably killed by law enforcement in 2013 (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014). 
Data provided by UCR aggregate counts and additional details about each homicide event 
provided by Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHRs) still fail to capture all homicides 
caused by law enforcement, however. The Bureau of Justice Statistics designed the 
Arrest-Related Deaths (ARD) program in an attempt to capture all deaths that occurred 
during the process of arrest in the United States and a recent evaluation of this program 
sought to compare arrest-related death counts from the ARD program and SHR data. 
Findings from this evaluation revealed that between 2003 and 2009, the ARD program 
only captured, at best, 49 percent of all law enforcement homicides and the SHR only 
captured 46 percent (Banks, Couzens, Blanton, and Cribb, 2015). In addition to issues 
associated with the aforementioned data sources, assessments of justifiable homicide 
counts from another data source, the National Vital Statistics System, also uncovered 
underreporting, undercounting, and inconsistencies in citizen deaths at the hands of law 
enforcement (Loftin, Wiersema, McDowall, and Dobrin, 2003; Sherman and 
Langworthy, 1979).  
Not only do we lack accurate counts of the number of citizens killed by the police, 
but even if we had a sound count of law enforcement-caused homicides, we would still be 
missing a large part of the deadly force picture.  The data collected by the aforementioned 
methods count only deaths and fail to capture cases in which police used deadly force 
that did not result in the death of an individual. This is a big problem because there are 
many instances in which police use of deadly force does not result in the death of a 
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citizen, but rather a wounding of the suspect or a miss altogether (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and 
Scott, 1992; Klinger, 2012). In fact, McManus, Griffin, Wetteroth, Boland, and Hines 
(1970:128) state that “relatively few bullets of all those fired [by police] hit the target at 
which [they are] aimed.” Instances such as these are not captured in data that are limited 
to homicide counts caused by law enforcement. We may not have an accurate count of 
how often police use deadly force in the United States, but best estimates, which include 
instances in which no one is hit by police bullets but police shots were fired, place this 
count at a few thousand per year (Fyfe, 2002; Klinger, 2004).  
While national data are poor, researchers have collected and analyzed the 
available national data and data in a small number of police agencies seeking to provide 
insight into why officers choose to pull the trigger. Scholars have identified individual, 
situational, environmental, and organizational factors that may come into play during an 
encounter in which an officer decides to fire his or her weapon. Some individual officer 
characteristics that have been found to be related to officers’ use of deadly force include 
their gender (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), their 
race (Binder, Scharf, and Galvin, 1982; Fyfe, 1978; 1981; Geller and Karales, 1981; 
Gellar and Scott, 1982; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), their age and rank (Binder et al., 
1982; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), their level of education (McElvain and Kposowa, 
2008), and their assignments (Blumberg, 1983; Fyfe, 1978; Gellar and Karales, 1981).  
Prior studies have also identified a number of situational factors that influence 
officers’ use of deadly force. Characteristics of the suspect involved can have bearing on 
an officer’s decision to fire, including the gender of the suspect (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and 
Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008; Milton, Halleck, Lardner, and Albrecht, 
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1977), the race of the suspect (Fyfe, 1982a; Geller, 1982; Geller and Karales, 1981; 
Goldkamp, 1976; Meyer, 1980; Milton et al., 1982; Robin, 1963, 1964; Sherman, 1982), 
the age of the suspect (Fyfe, 1978; Milton et al., 1977), and the suspect’s demeanor 
(Binder et al., 1982; Dwyer et al., 1990; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Geller and Karales, 
1981). Additional studies have also found connections between the type of crime 
committed by a suspect and the use of deadly force by the police (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and 
Karales, 1981), whether the suspect was armed (Dwyer et al., 1990; Geller and Karales, 
1981; Hayden, 1981; White, 2002), and the type of weapon with which the suspect was 
armed (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981; Milton et al., 1977). 
A number of environmental factors have been linked to police officers’ use of 
deadly force. For example, a number of studies have found that instances of police use of 
deadly force coincide with levels of violence (Fyfe, 1982b; Geller and Karales, 1981; 
Alpert, 1989), as well as with levels of economic inequality and high minority 
concentration within the community (Fyfe, 1978; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998; Sorensen, 
Marquart, and Brock, 1993). 
Lastly, findings from a few studies have revealed connections between 
organizational policies and police use of deadly force among the officers in the 
department.  An assessment of officers’ use of deadly force in New York City (Fyfe, 
1978) and Los Angeles (Meyer, 1980) revealed that after each department placed 
restrictions on “defense of life” and “fleeing felon” policies that had been in practice for 
years, the number of officer-involved shootings markedly decreased. Examples of such 
restrictions enacted in New York included only using deadly force in defense of life or 
when attempting to apprehend an individual suspected of committing a violent felony, 
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discontinuing the use of warning shots, and refraining from firing at moving vehicles 
(Fyfe, 1978). In 1977, police officers working for the Los Angeles Police Department 
were prohibited from firing at suspects who were disobeying orders or appeared to be 
reaching for weapons in situations where there had been “no assault and no use, display 
or threat of a weapon” (Meyer, 1980:105).  
Another strain of research has focused specifically on the decision-making 
processes through which officers make choices during a deadly force incident. A number 
of scholars have posited theories that seek to explain why police officers choose to use 
deadly force. Some have branded the decision to use deadly force as one made in a split-
second after the officer has exhausted all other options (Geller and Karales, 1981). Others 
have argued that an officer’s decision to use or not to use deadly force is influenced by 
decisions made by the officer previously in the encounter (Binder and Scharf, 1980; 
Reiss, 1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). These theories, however, remain largely untested 
to date.  
The current study was designed to add to the existing literature on police use of 
deadly force by empirically assessing a deadly force decision-making framework 
originally proposed by Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf in 1980. This decision-making 
framework was used to guide the qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with 83 
police officers across the United States who were present at an officer-involved shooting. 
The officers in the sample were selected because they were present at an incident in 
which one at least officer fired and at least one officer held fire. Of the 83 officers in the 
sample, 46 officers fired shots during their incident while 37 did not fire but were present 
when a fellow officer took a suspect under fire. The interviews conducted with the 83 
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officers were analyzed to determine whether the Binder and Scharf decision-making 
model (detailed below) holds true among each of the police officers in the sample. The 
data used in this dissertation allowed for an analysis of this deadly force decision-making 
framework that has yet to be completed: an assessment of the decision-making processes 
of multiple officers involved in the same event, some of whom chose to use deadly force 
and some who did not.  
 
DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
Academic consideration of how officers come to make the decision to shoot 
emerged in the early 1980s. An early conception of deadly force decision-making was 
that an officer’s decision to shoot was one that was made in a split-second when the 
officer was left with no other option in order to preserve his or her safety or the safety of 
citizens. While this “split-second” decision theory may explain how some officers decide 
to use deadly force, others have argued that we should be cautious of accepting this 
simplistic understanding of deadly force decision-making (Fyfe, 1986; Reiss, 1980). One 
of the scholars who opposed this simplistic explanation of the decision to shoot was 
Albert Reiss. Reiss (1980:127) argued that although officer-involved shootings are often 
conceived as the result of quick decisions, this view does not coincide with the idea that 
decisions are “formulated in terms of a series of choices or related decisions” and each 
decision “is contingent upon prior choices” made by the individual. Drawing from his 
line of thinking, Reiss proposed that an officer’s decision to shoot may be best 
understood as the result of a series of sequential choices made by the officer during the 
encounter. That is, the series of choices an officer makes during an event can expand or 
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restrict the number of choices available to the officer later in the encounter, which may 
have direct bearing on his or her decision to use deadly force (Reiss, 1980). Reiss does 
acknowledge, however, the difficulty in breaking down an officer’s decision-making 
process and pinpointing specific “choice points” during a process that often unfolds in a 
very short amount of time (Reiss, 1980:128). According to this line of thinking then, the 
task should be to focus on identifying possible factors of the police-citizen encounter that 
influence officers’ decision-making and the outcome of the incident. 
Taking Reiss’ considerations into account, two scholars sought to advance the 
notion of a deadly force decision-making process and aimed to identify key factors that 
affect how officers make decisions during potentially violent interactions with citizens. 
Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf argued that police officers’ decisions regarding the use of 
deadly force are best explained as the result of a series of decisions made by officers 
during specific temporal frames throughout encounters with citizens (Binder and Scharf, 
1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). More specifically, Binder and Scharf state that the 
deadly force decision-making process can be best described as involving four phases 
wherein decisions made by officers in previous phases can impact the decisions they 
make in subsequent ones.  
The first phase of their model, the anticipation phase, begins when an officer is 
made aware of an incident, either through a call into dispatch, personal observation while 
out on patrol, or some other avenue. Once the officer arrives on scene and begins to make 
direct observations of the situation at hand, he or she has initiated the entry and initial 
contact phase. If the officer decides to make verbal or physical contact with the suspect, 
he or she enters the information exchange phase of the incident. During this phase, the 
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officer communicates with the suspect, often in an attempt to gain compliance. The point 
at which the officer decides to fire his or her weapon or decides that the use of deadly 
force is not necessary is the final frame phase of the event.  
Empirical assessments of Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making 
framework have provided some support for their model. Scharf and Binder (1983) 
assessed their own framework by analyzing qualitative data gathered in interviews with 
officers involved in police-citizen encounters. Some of these officers used deadly force 
and others were involved in other situations in which deadly force could have reasonably 
been used, but officers opted to hold their fire. Binder and Scharf then compared the 
decision-making processes of officers who shot with those who arguably could have used 
deadly force but refrained from doing so. Binder and Scharf reported that regardless of 
the outcome, the decision-making processes of all police officers involved in potentially 
violent police-citizen encounters follow the four-phase framework they had originally 
proposed.   
The findings from Scharf and Binder’s assessment advanced scholarly 
understanding of deadly force decision-making, but were limited. To make comparisons 
between officers in different situations who chose to shoot and officers who chose not to 
shoot, Scharf and Binder (1983) attempted to control for situational differences by 
matching incidents based on similar characteristics. For example, in one instance, the 
authors compared a case involving a middle-aged woman armed with a knife who was 
shot by police with another case involving a middle-aged woman armed with a knife who 
was not shot by police.  
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Drawing from the cases from the original Scharf and Binder study, Fridell and 
Binder (1992:389) assessed the Binder and Scharf framework. Again, these data were 
collected from officer-involved shootings, as well as from police-citizen confrontations 
“in which a police shooting reasonably could have been expected but did not occur,” and 
found support for Binder and Scharf’s four-phase decision-making model. Their findings 
suggest, among other things, that the decisions made by officers in the information 
exchange phase of the encounter are critical as they relate to the officer’s final decision to 
use or not use deadly force. 
Although not directly assessing the Binder and Scharf framework, White (2002) 
briefly references the model in his study of officer-involved shootings among officers in 
Philadelphia during two time periods (1970-1978 and 1987-1993).1  White found that 
police officers were more likely to use deadly force earlier in the encounter (e.g., when 
they first entered the scene or made contact with the suspect) when confronted with a 
gun-wielding suspect. Although he does not dwell on this finding, he does acknowledge 
that it is applicable to Binder and Scharf’s multi-phase decision-making framework and 
that early decisions made by officers attending to a “man with a gun” call (e.g., 
maintaining distance between himself/herself and the gun-wielding suspect, finding 
cover2) can escalate or reduce the likelihood of a police shooting.  
While the aforementioned studies have contributed to the understanding of how 
police officers make decisions during high-risk police-citizen encounters, there are 
notable limitations to these works. While Binder and Scharf sought to assess police 																																																								1	White’s 2002 analysis was only limited to incidents in which police gunfire occurred and did not account 
for instances in which officers arguably could have fired, but did not. 2	“Cover” can be defined as a large object or fortification that provides a officer protection from potential 
dangers.	
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officers’ deadly force decision-making processes by comparing cases wherein at least one 
officer shot to cases with similar situational circumstances in which at least one officer 
held fire, the fact remains that these officers did not participate in the same incident.3  
Therefore, one can make a strong argument that important unaccounted for situational 
differences in Binder and Scharf’s comparison analysis could have impacted officers’ 
decision-making.  
 An additional factor that many past studies on deadly force decision-making have 
failed to address, including Binder and Scharf’s work, is how the presence of other 
officers may impact an individual officer’s decision-making. Specifically, if a police-
citizen encounter involves multiple officers, do the decisions of one officer impact the 
decision-making processes of the other officers present? A number of scholars, such as 
Klinger (1997) and Walsh (1986), have emphasized the fact that a lot of police work is 
done in groups. That is, many aspects of police work require officers to work with one 
another to draft solutions and solve problems. It seems reasonable to assume that this 
same notion of “group work” can be applied to situations involving a high potential for 
deadly force. While some such incidents are limited to one officer and one suspect, many 
involve multiple officers (Klinger, Rosenfeld, Isom, and Deckard, 2016; White 2002). 
Therefore, in congruence with its recognition in other aspects of police work, it seems a 
reasonable task to assess how different officers involved in the same incident make 
choices during events that result in police use of deadly force. 
 
 																																																								3	A notable exception to this were the few instances in which the authors describe incidents involving one 
specialized unit from Newark comprised of multiple officers. The individual decision-making processes of 
each of the officers involved, however, were not discussed.	
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 The sequential deadly force decision-making model put forth by Binder and 
Scharf seeks to account for the various factors that may impact an officer’s decision to 
use deadly force. The current study, therefore, was an empirical assessment of the 
applicability of the four-phase decision-making framework proposed by Binder and 
Scharf (1980; Scharf and Binder, 1983). Data from interviews with 83 police officers 
across the United States who were involved in an incident that resulted in police use of 
deadly force were analyzed. This subset of 83 interviews, drawn from a larger sample of 
218 interviews, included responses from multiple officers involved in 24 incidents that 
concluded in police use of deadly force.  
This sample was selected to assess the Binder and Scharf deadly force decision-
making model for a number of reasons. First, the sample of 83 officers included multiple 
officers involved in the same distinct incidents, some of whom chose to fire and some of 
whom chose to hold fire. Second, although Scharf and Binder (1983) were able to assess 
their framework by comparing the decision-making processes of officers involved in 
similar incidents, they were not able to assess differences in the decision-making process 
among police officers involved in the same incident. The qualitative data used in this 
dissertation allowed for the analysis of the decision-making processes of multiple officers 
who were involved in the same event, yet differed in regard to their use of deadly force. 
By accounting for situational differences, the analysis was designed to shed light on 
whether differences in the decision to use deadly force among the officers involved in the 
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same event is primarily due to significant differences in the decisions they made 
throughout the incident. 
Third, by studying officer-involved shootings in groups, I was able to examine the 
effect that the presence of other officers on scene played in how and why police officers 
made decisions regarding the use deadly force during a potentially violent police-citizen 
encounter. This is a factor that was not accounted for in Binder and Scharf’s original 
model, but which might impact how police officers made decisions and moved through 
the decision-making framework proposed by the authors.  
In sum, this analysis was conducted to provide additional insight as to whether 
police officers involved in deadly force incidents complete the decision-making process 
as outlined by Binder and Scharf and if the factors identified by the authors do, in fact, 
directly impact officers’ decision-making. Therefore, the first question my dissertation 
was designed to answer is:  
Do the decision-making processes completed by the different police officers involved in 
the same incident follow the deadly force decision-making framework as proposed by 
Binder and Scharf?  
Because both “shooters” and “witness officers” (i.e., officers in the sample who 
did not use deadly force but were present at an event in which a fellow police officer used 
deadly force) were interviewed, these data allow for the analysis of decision-making 
processes among officers involved in the same incident who made different decisions 
regarding whether to use deadly force. The second question this dissertation was 
designed to answer is: Given the same situation, do stark differences in how police 
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officers move through the Binder and Scharf decision-making process account for why 
some officers chose to use deadly force and some chose not to use deadly force? 
The data also allowed for an analysis of decision-making at the incident-level. 
One factor that could influence officers’ decision-making during a high risk police-
citizen encounter, but is not identified in the Binder and Scharf framework as a factor, is 
the presence of other officers. One could argue that the presence of other officers and the 
decisions they make could have the potential to influence the decisions made by an 
officer in early stages of the incident, which in turn may influence that officer’s decision 
to use deadly force in the final frame. Therefore, the third and final question this 
dissertation was designed to answer is: How does the presence of other police officers 
affect the choices made by an individual officer during a deadly force incident?   
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CHAPTER TWO: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 
 
 Police are entrusted with the power and authority to use coercive force when 
necessary (Bittner, 1970). Although police rarely decide to use deadly force, the social 
impact of this decision is great and our society has a vested interest in understanding how 
police officers decide when to exercise such power. Research on police use of deadly 
force has examined various factors that may influence officers’ use of deadly force, 
including individual, situational, and organizational elements. Many of the early studies 
cited in the subsequent sections of the literature review assessed officers’ use of deadly 
force within a single department (Fyfe, 1978, 1982b; Geller and Karales, 1981; Hayden, 
1981; Robin, 1963; Rubenstein, 1977). As deadly force research progressed, scholars 
were able to access data from multiple departments, make comparisons within and across 
departments, and gather information pertaining to the suspect, the situation, and officer-
provided explanations regarding why deadly force was used.  
 
INDIVIDUAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
Scholars have analyzed the individual characteristics of the officer in relation to 
the use of deadly force, including police officers’ gender (McElvain and Kposowa, 
2008), race (Binder, Scharf, and Galvin, 1982; Fyfe, 1978; 1981; Geller and Karales, 
1981; Geller and Scott, 1982; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), officers’ level of education 
(Aamodt, 2004; Binder et al., 1982), officers’ age and rank (Binder et al., 1982; Geller 
and Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008), and their assignments (Blumberg, 
1983; Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981). 
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Findings from a number of studies have revealed that male officers are more 
likely to use deadly force than female officers (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and Karales, 1981; 
McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). This finding is consistent with what is known about 
officer behavior and use of other types of force. For example, Alpert and Dunham’s 
(2004) assessment of force used by officers in Prince George’s County Police 
Department revealed that female officers were more likely to use lower levels of force, 
such as verbal commands or defensive force against suspects if necessary, compared to 
their male counterparts. The small number of cases that resulted in police use of deadly 
force in their sample all involved male officers. 
Regarding officers’ race, scholars who have assessed the use of deadly force 
among police departments in New York (Fyfe, 1978), Chicago (Geller and Karales, 
1981), and Riverside, California (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008) found that most police 
officers involved in shooting incidents, regardless of the race of the perpetrator, were 
white. Conversely, these studies also revealed that most suspects involved in police 
shootings, regardless of the race of the officer, were black (Fyfe, 1978; Geller and 
Karales, 1981; McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). As Fyfe (1978) notes, however, these 
findings could be consistent with the fact that policing has been a white male-dominated 
occupation, and therefore, white males are more likely to be involved in deadly force 
incidents.  
Interestingly, given the prominence of white officers among shooters, a number of 
studies have also found that black and Hispanic officers are disproportionately involved 
in shootings when compared to their representation in the department (Fyfe, 1978; Geller 
and Karales, 1981). Geller and Karales (1981) reported that minority-race officers in 
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Chicago (e.g., black and Hispanic) were more likely than white officers to shoot civilians. 
These findings could be connected to the fact that minority officers were more likely to 
live in and be assigned to high-crime areas of the city, therefore increasing the likelihood 
of being involved in an incident that may conclude in the use of deadly force (Fyfe, 1978; 
Geller and Karales, 1981).   
Results from prior research have also identified relationships between experience, 
officers’ rank, and use of deadly force. McElwain and Kposowa (2008) report that the 
risk of being involved in a shooting decreases for police officers as they age and their 
years of experience in law enforcement increase. Fyfe (1978) found that officers in 
supervisory positions were less likely to use deadly force than patrol officers and 
detectives. In their assessment of officers who had used deadly force in Chicago, Geller 
and Karales (1981) found that line officers were more likely to use deadly force when 
compared to officers in supervisory positions. This finding, however, may be best 
explained by the fact that officers in supervisory positions are less likely to be out on the 
street and interacting with citizens when compared to line officers (Geller and Karales, 
1981). Finally, an officer’s assignment may have direct bearing on their likelihood of 
being involved in a deadly force incident. For example, Geller and Karales (1981) 
reported that officers assigned to special operations groups, tactical units, and robbery 
units were far more likely than officers assigned to any other unit to shoot civilians while 
on duty in Chicago.  
Some researchers have also analyzed the characteristics of the suspects involved 
in police shootings. In regards to gender, officer-involved shooting suspects 
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overwhelmingly tend to be male (Fyfe, 19784; Geller and Karales, 1981; McElvain and 
Kpowosa, 2007; Milton et al., 1977). The picture is not so clear where the race of the 
suspect goes. Findings from early studies on police use of deadly force suggest that 
minorities are disproportionately targeted by the police (Fyfe, 1982a; Geller, 1982; Geller 
and Karales, 1981; Goldkamp, 1976; Meyer, 1980; Milton et al., 1982; Robin, 1963, 
1964; Sherman, 1982). Some scholars, however, have argued that this disproportionality 
can be explained by situational and environmental factors. In New York City, for 
example, Fyfe (1978) found that although blacks made up a disproportionate share of the 
suspects in officer-involved shootings, they were also more likely to have been armed 
with a firearm and engaged in a robbery at the time of the shooting. This finding, Fyfe 
(1978:141) argued, suggests that police officers do not have “one trigger finger for whites 
and another for blacks,” noting that the disproportionate number of minority suspects in 
police shootings could be due to factors other than racial discrimination or police 
misconduct. 
The findings of racial disproportionality may also be explained by the higher 
levels of violent crime and the lower levels of cooperation with law enforcement that are 
typically found in communities with primarily minority residents, which in turn may lead 
to an increase in officers’ use of lethal force (Geller and Karales, 1981; Robin, 1964). 
Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) argue that the environment in which officer-involved 
shootings take place needs to be accounted for, as they found that police shootings are 
more likely to occur in large, more populated cities with higher levels of race inequality.  
																																																								4	Fyfe’s (1978) analysis of shooting suspects in New York City found that although females were present 
at officer-involved shootings, a male accompanied most all of them at the time of the shooting.         
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The racial effects captured in past studies could also be due to a greater number of 
officers being assigned to areas with higher rates of violent crime and increased number 
of calls for service, which also tend to be areas characterized by low socioeconomic 
status and high percentages of minority residents (Geller and Karales, 1981; McElvain 
and Kposowa, 2008). This can create an environment in which the police begin to 
associate violent crime with the underclass and minority residents, causing members of 
the underclass and minority residents to feel “over-policed” by law enforcement, 
therefore creating feelings of resistance toward the police. This then may lead to an 
increase in situations in which citizens attack officers, thus concluding in police use of 
deadly force (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008). 
Finally, the age of the suspect has been another factor linked to officer-involved 
shootings. In their analysis of officer-involved shootings in seven U.S. cities, Milton and 
colleagues (1977) found that almost three-quarters of the shooting victims were under the 
age of 30, and 50 percent were under the age of 24. An analysis of deadly force incidents 
in New York City revealed similar findings, as more than half of the suspects on which 
age data were available were less than 24 years old at the time they were involved in a 
police shooting (Fyfe, 1978).  
Research on police-shooting suspects also suggests that most are armed at the 
time of the police shooting. Fyfe’s (1978) analysis of deadly force incidents in New York 
City revealed that the majority of suspects shot at were armed with handguns at the time 
of the shooting. Milton and colleagues (1977) found that 57 percent of the suspects 
involved in the shootings they examined were armed at the time the officer fired. Geller 
and Karales (1981) found that the majority of the police officers in Chicago who 
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intentionally used deadly force reported being threatened by a perpetrator with a gun at 
the time they decided to fire.  
Furthermore, scholars have also found relationships between police use of deadly 
force and the type of incident to which officers are responding. Assessments of officer-
involved shootings in New York City (Fyfe, 1978) Chicago (Geller and Karales, 1981), 
and Philadelphia (Robin, 1963) revealed that the type of incident in which police most 
often used deadly force was armed robbery. In contrast, Milton and colleagues (1977) 
found that the most common type of incident in which deadly force was used in seven 
U.S. cities involved disturbance calls (i.e., family quarrels, fights, assaults, disturbed 
persons, reports of an individual with a gun). 
Most recently, White (2002) conducted a multivariate analysis of situational 
factors related to officer-involved shootings using data from the Philadelphia Police 
Department. He argues that such an analysis was necessary because many previous 
studies on situational factors and police use of deadly force have only assessed simple 
bivariate relationships, ignoring “more complex and likely important multivariate 
relationships” (White, 2002:726). His results indicate that the type of incident in which 
an officer is involved is a critically important predictor of deadly force. For example, 
“man with gun,” robbery, and disturbance calls were more likely to conclude with an 
officer-involved shooting.  
As previously stated, deadly force data are often difficult to come by. To identify 
situational characteristics that play into officers’ decision to use force then, some scholars 
have used vignettes and asked participating officers to identify which situational factors 
they would consider if they found themselves in a similar situation in real life. In one 
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such study, Hayden (1981) provided officers in a police department with brief synopses 
of three situations and asked officers to identify, in the order of importance, which 
situational factors would most impact their decision to use deadly force. Participating 
officers who reported that they would have used deadly force in each scenario 
consistently selected five situational factors that affected their decision: the type of 
weapon the suspect had, the location of the interaction, the physical distance between the 
officer and the suspect, the availability of back-up, and whether cover was available to 
the officer (Hayden, 1981). These results suggest that regardless of the differences in the 
situations posed to the officers, most officers considered the same type of information 
and attached similar weight to the aforementioned factors. 
Similarly, Dwyer and colleagues (1990) provided a sample of police officers with 
written scenarios, asking officers to read each scenario and then decide whether they 
would a) refrain from drawing their weapon, b) draw their weapon, c) draw their weapon 
and aim it at the suspect, or d) shoot the suspect. Officers were then asked to explain why 
they chose the action they did. Based on these responses, the authors found four 
situational factors that significantly predicted the likelihood that officers would shoot: (1) 
the suspect had a weapon, (2) the suspect intended to harm the officer, (3) the suspect 
was committing a felony, and (4) the suspect was leaving a building.  
 
COMMUNITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL FACTORS 
Past studies have looked at community context and how it relates to deadly force 
and found positive relationships between levels of violence in the community and the 
shooting behavior of police officers (Fyfe, 1986; Geller and Karales, 1981; Jacobs and 
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O’Brien, 1998). That is, a number of scholars have reported strong relationships between 
officer-involved shootings and violent crime rates and homicide rates in the area (Fyfe, 
1978, 1986; Sherman and Langworthy, 1979; Matulia, 1985). As previously mentioned, 
police shootings tend to occur in high-crime areas characterized by high concentrations of 
minorities and high levels of economic inequality (Fyfe, 1978; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998; 
Kania and Mackey, 1977; Sorensen, Marquart, and Brock, 1993; Waegel, 1984). Jacobs 
and O’Brien (1978) argue that as economic inequality within the community increases, so 
too will police use of lethal force. It is the “disparities in economic rewards” that tend to 
“produce potentially unstable social order,” which needs to be quelled by force on the 
part of the police (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998:843). Regarding high minority 
concentrations within a community, some have posited that dominant populations are 
threatened in areas characterized by a large racial underclass (Blalock, 1967), causing 
fear of crime to increase. Police departments then may be more likely to use coercive 
force against members of a minority population in response to the growing fear of crime 
within the community (Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998). 
Lastly, past studies have found relationships between organizational 
characteristics and police use of deadly force. Lee and Vaughn (2010) detailed how 
administrative failures, such as a breakdown of division of labor, authority, and control, 
may contribute to officers’ use of deadly force. In addition, deadly force policy within 
police departments can affect officers’ use of lethal force. Fyfe (1980) in New York City 
and Meyer (1980) in Los Angeles found a decrease in officers’ use of deadly force after 
more restrictive policies were implemented in their respective police departments.  
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In 1977, the New York City Police Department provided detailed guidelines for 
when their officers could use deadly force in “defense of life” or “fleeing felon” cases. 
These guidelines stated that NYPD officers could use deadly force provided that every 
other means of coercion was utilized before they fire their weapon, officers could no 
longer fire if said gunfire would place innocent citizens in harm’s way, officers could not 
fire warning shots, they could not fire their weapon from a moving vehicle, or discharge 
their firearm to summon the assistance of other officers (Fyfe, 1978). The NYPD also 
established a review board consisting of the Chief of Operations of the police department 
and two deputy police commissioners who had the ability to review each officer-involved 
shooting (Fyfe, 1978). The board was permitted to conduct hearings if need be, 
interviewing civilian witnesses to the shooting, the officer(s) involved, and supervisors of 
the officer(s) involved. An analysis of the officer-involved shootings in New York City 
revealed “a considerable reduction” in the frequency of police shootings after these 
guidelines were established (Fyfe, 1978). 
Meyer (1980) found similar results in his assessment of officer-involved 
shootings in Los Angeles. In 1977, the Los Angeles Police Department adopted a policy 
restricting the shooting of fleeing felons unless the police officer knew that the suspect 
had committed a felony involving the death or serious bodily injury of another individual. 
Although the department saw a decrease in officer-involved shootings prior to the new 
restrictions taking into effect in 1977, the kinds of incidents that were specifically 
restricted by the new policy (e.g., using deadly force against non-violent fleeing felons, 
firing at suspects who disobeyed orders or made furtive gestures as if reaching for 
weapons) substantially declined (Meyer, 1980). Such findings have led a number of 
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scholars to encourage police departments to establish clear guidelines and procedures 
outlining officers’ discretion to use deadly force (Fyfe, 1980) and to place more 
restrictions on when officers are authorized to use deadly force (Fyfe, 1982b; Gellar and 
Karales, 1981; Reiss, 1980).  
 
DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING THEORIES 
A number of theories have been proposed to explain how police officers make the 
decision to use deadly force. The two most commonly referenced vary in terms of when 
in the incident the decision to fire one’s weapon occurs, how long it takes for an officer to 
make such a decision, and the various factors that influence an officer’s decision to pull 
the trigger. The following section will be devoted to reviewing two deadly force decision-
making theories. 
 
SPLIT-SECOND DECISION-MAKING 
 
Geller and Karales (1981) note that early conceptualizations of deadly force 
decision-making revolved around the “split-second” model. This was the belief that there 
is a decision point during a deadly force incident at which an officer decides to fire his or 
her weapon and that this decision is often made “only at the last moment when the citizen 
had failed to heed all warnings” (Reiss, 1980: 127). This assumption may have been 
grounded in the fact that all too often, police officers do not attempt to diagnose problems 
until they find themselves in the middle of one (Fyfe, 1986). Assessing police use of 
deadly force through this split-second lens, however, fails to account for other factors that 
may contribute to officers’ decision-making during this type of encounter, such as 
decisions made early in the encounter (Fyfe, 1986; Reiss, 1980). The split-second 
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decision-making theory ignores the possibility that the decision to use deadly force is 
influenced by other decisions made by the officer previously in the encounter that may 
have decreased the number of other available options for the officer (Fyfe, 1986; Reiss, 
1980). That is, if the analysis of officers’ decision to use deadly force is reduced to one 
point in time during which a decision to pull the trigger is made, this suggests that the 
decisions made by officers earlier in the encounter had no bearing on his or her decision 
to fire. By focusing only on the point at which an officer makes this decision, this 
narrows attention to only one frame of the incident and fails to account for anything that 
occurred previously (Fyfe, 1986).  
All police-citizen encounters that result in an officer-involved shooting are 
different and while some may be prolonged events, such as a hostage situation, others 
may begin and conclude in a matter of minutes or seconds. Fyfe (1986:477) argues, 
however, that in most police-citizen contacts, police officers often have time “to attempt 
to prevent the potential for danger from being realized.” Because most police officers are 
dispatched to scenes of potential violence (as opposed to already being present when 
violence erupts), officers can use the time between when they are assigned to a location 
and when they arrive on scene “to avoid split-second decisions” by using the information 
they have been given by dispatch to diagnose the problem and consider possible solutions 
(Fyfe, 1986:477). Such considerations may impact the officer’s decision to request back 
up, where he or she will park their vehicle upon arrival, how close the officer is to 
available cover and concealment, and how the officer will approach the perpetrator. All 
of these decisions, in turn, may impact whether or not an officer may find himself or 
herself in a position later in the encounter where deadly force is necessary.  
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 Because the “split-second syndrome” viewpoint fails to consider a number of 
potential influences on officers’ deadly force decision-making, Reiss (1980) encouraged 
scholars to view police use of deadly force as the result of multiple decisions made by an 
officer during an incident. He refers readers to sequential decision theory, stating that this 
model “focuses both upon the options or alternatives attached to each decision and how 
each decision affects subsequent ones” (Reiss, 1980:127).  That is, each decision made by 
the individual is contingent upon prior decisions he or she has made. Decisions made by 
an officer during police-citizen encounters can either increase or decrease the number of 
potential options available to the officer, as well as the number of potential solutions to 
the issue at hand. According to Reiss (1980), when the number of available alternatives to 
deadly force are narrowed by decisions made by an officer earlier in the encounter, the 
officer may find himself or herself at “a point of no return” in regards to the use of deadly 
force, therefore substantially increasing the likelihood that deadly force will be used 
(127). Fyfe (1986) echoes this notion, arguing that police officers should be trained as 
diagnosticians and be provided with the decision-making skills necessary to assess and 
diagnose problems, consider all possible solutions, and be cognizant of the fact that each 
decision they make has the potential to expand or constrict the options they will have 
available to them later in the encounter.  
 
THE BINDER AND SCHARF DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK 
In 1980, Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf sought to advance the notion that a 
police officer’s decision to use deadly force is best described as “a contingent sequence 
of decisions and resulting behaviors” that “[increase] or [decrease] the probability of an 
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eventual use of deadly force” (116). Potentially violent police-citizen encounters often 
require officers to make important decisions in a short amount of time and complex social 
forces may explain why one officer may choose to use deadly force while another may 
not (Scharf and Binder, 1983). To best understand how officers make decisions during 
such an event and how decisions made previously in the encounter can impact subsequent 
decisions made by the officer, Binder and Scharf believe that the police-citizen encounter 
must be analyzed using a framework consisting of four phases: anticipation, entry and 
initial contact, information exchange, and the final decision.5 A visual of this framework 
is provided in Figure 1. Binder and Scharf also identify a number of factors, which they 
refer to as “social influences”, that they believe impact officers’ decision-making in each 
of the four phases. Figure 2 provides an overview of these influences. The subsequent 
paragraphs will provide a detailed explanation of each of the figures below:  
 
Figure 1: The Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								5	This phase model was modified in their 1983 book, wherein the authors referred to the final decision 
phase as the “final frame” and added a fifth phase, the aftermath (Scharf and Binder, 1983). This fifth phase 
will not be included in the analysis, as it occurs after the officers’ decision to use or not use deadly force 
and thus is not relevant to the focus of this project.	
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Figure 2: The Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework with 
accompanying social influences (as originally proposed by the authors in 1980 and 
subsequently updated in 1983) 
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Anticipation, the first phase of the incident, occurs as the encounter is being 
initiated and includes the time from notification, or dispatch, to the arrival of the officer 
on scene. During this phase, officers may receive information about the incident, the 
caller, or the suspect from a dispatcher, a fellow officer, or a citizen. Furthermore, “the 
words used by others to describe the opponent” to the officer “may greatly affect the 
[approach] that the officer takes toward the incident” (Scharf and Binder, 1983:112).  
According to Binder and Scharf, officers often use the information they receive 
during the anticipation phase to develop a working definition of the situation they are 
about to enter (Scharf and Binder, 1983). During this phase then, the authors hypothesize 
that the mode, quality, and credibility of the information officers receive about the 
incident or the suspect involved eventually influences the outcome of the incident (as 
demonstrated in Figure 2 above). That is, police officers’ decision-making in this first 
phase may be influenced by matters such as: from whom they receive the information 
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(e.g., dispatch, another officer, or a citizen), the quality of the information they receive 
(e.g., amount of detail about the situation and/or suspect involved), and how credible or 
accurate they believe that information to be. 
For example, Scharf and Binder (1983) note that citizens may distort the 
information they give police officers during the initial call in order to ensure that their 
call is a high priority and police attend to their issue as soon as possible. A citizen 
observing a prowler on their property may call the police and report a “man with a gun,” 
knowing that this will be labeled a high priority call (Scharf and Binder, 1983). Because 
this information has come from a citizen, an officer may not give credence to the “man 
with a gun” report from the citizen, instead opting to “downplay” the call because past 
experience tells the officer “that all calls are exaggerated” (Scharf and Binder, 1983:119). 
On the other hand, the officer may trust in the information reported by the citizen caller 
and over-anticipate the seriousness of the incident, leading him or her to prepare for a 
confrontation with an armed individual upon arrival on scene. In sum, Scharf and Binder 
(1983) believe these early understandings of the situation and how and what information 
officers choose to process can impact officers’ decision-making during this initial phase. 
Upon arriving on scene, officers enter the entry and initial contact6 phase of the 
encounter. During this phase, officers may make a number of decisions, such as how or 
when to approach the citizen, as well as gather information about the suspect and the 
situation at hand through direct observation. Binder and Scharf believe a number of 
factors may play a role in officers’ decision-making during the entry phase, including the 
amount of distance between the officer and the perpetrator, the availability of cover, and 																																																								6	Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, the entry and initial contact phase will be referred to as the 
entry phase for the sake of brevity. 
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the physical appearance of the perpetrator (Scharf and Binder, 1983). Once the officer 
has arrived on scene during this phase, Scharf and Binder believe the officer immediately 
seeks to expand the options available to him or her. An example of this would be finding 
a good position on scene (e.g., not too close to the suspect) and seeking out cover. The 
authors provide a number of examples in which police officers fired at suspects because 
they were not protected by cover and in close proximity to the armed individual, thus 
leaving the officer exposed to serious harm at the hands of the suspect. In these cases, the 
officers’ early decisions to not seek cover and distance upon arrival on scene directly 
influenced their later decision to fire.  
It is also during the entry and initial contact phase that officers are able to confirm 
or disregard previous information that they received in the anticipation phase, an action 
Scharf and Binder (1983) identify as being pivotal to determining the outcome of the 
situation. In some cases, this may mean that the situation to which officers were 
originally alerted is not as serious as they considered it might be. The authors provide 
readers with an example of an officer receiving a call about a man with a gun attempting 
to murder another individual. Once the officer arrived on scene however, he observed 
that the man wielding the pistol was so intoxicated that the officer “didn’t think he could 
hit me with that gun” and that this situation was “not what I expected from dispatch” 
(Scharf and Binder, 1983:123).  
Alternatively, police officers can arrive on scene and directly observe situational 
characteristics that suggest a far greater degree of danger than they had initially 
considered (Scharf and Binder, 1983). Another example provided by the authors involved 
officers who received a call about a domestic dispute between a man and a woman. They 
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received information that the female wanted the male out of her house and was insisting 
that one of the items he was trying to leave with was hers, inciting an argument between 
the two. The officers reported that they “were expecting a nothing thing,” but upon 
arrival observed the male throwing things and threatening the officers with a broken 
bottle and a kitchen knife (Scharf and Binder, 1983:124). In both cases, officers used 
their direct observations of the scene and the situation to adjust their original definition of 
the situation and ultimately used the new definition to guide their decision-making. 
Scharf and Binder (1983) note that many, but not all, police-citizen encounters 
have a third phase, the information exchange, during which the officer and the suspect 
communicate. This communication may be verbal, such as the officer issuing commands 
to the suspect, or it may be non-verbal, such as the officer and the suspect exchanging 
looks or adjusting their postures based on the presence of the other party. This exchange 
can last seconds or hours depending on the situation. For example, an officer may issue a 
command to the suspect and the suspect complies with the officer’s command. In such a 
case, the information exchange phase might last mere seconds. In a more complex 
encounter, such as a hostage situation, the information exchange phase may last for hours 
while officers attempt to resolve the situation at hand. Information provided to the officer 
by the suspect, the body language of the officer and the suspect, the type of 
communication made by the officer, and changes in the level of control the officer has 
over the situation are all factors that may influence an officer’s decision-making during 
this phase (as noted in Figure 2). 
For example, Scharf and Binder (1983:126) argue that the body language of the 
suspect “may be critically important in determining the outcome of some situations.” If 
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the suspect takes an aggressive stance toward the officer or abruptly advances at the 
officer, the officer may interpret this as a threat, which will guide his or her decision-
making at this point. Conversely, the authors also note that police officers’ body language 
can be equally as important during this phase (Scharf and Binder, 1983). A citizen may 
interpret an officer’s body language as being “unreasonably violent,” leading the citizen 
“to fight to defend himself” (Scharf and Binder, 1983:126). Thus, the decisions officers 
make regarding their approach to communication with the suspect, both verbal and non-
verbal, during this phase of the encounter can expand or constrict the decisions and 
options available to the officer. Scharf and Binder (1983) note that the information 
exchange phase provides officers with the opportunity to prevent the suspect from hurting 
himself or herself, as well as other officers, through non-lethal means. 
If the situation cannot be solved through communication or other less-lethal 
means, police officers may consider the use of deadly force. Scharf and Binder (1983) 
believe that at some point during the encounter the officer will make the decision to 
either use deadly force or decide that the use of deadly force is not necessary, thus 
entering the final frame phase. This decision might be deliberate and planned, as 
exemplified in a sniper operation, or this decision “might simply be the reflexive 
squeezing of the trigger” (Scharf and Binder, 1983: 115). Regardless of whether an 
officer decides to shoot or not to shoot, Scharf and Binder (1983) believe that this 
decision can be influenced by the perpetrator’s movements, implied dangers to others on 
scene as perceived by the officer, and the officer’s assessment regarding the degree to 
which the suspect is an immediate threat. 
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In sum, as one can see when referencing Figure 1, Binder and Scharf posit that 
decisions made by officers involved in high-risk police-citizen encounter can be 
classified as occurring in one of the four phases. The authors believe that officers’ 
decisions and actions follow this linear four-phase model, thus making it an optimal 
framework through which to analyze deadly force decision-making. 
After initially proposing this model in a 1980 article, Scharf and Binder expanded 
on their model in their 1983 publication. Using narratives collected from police officers 
involved in shootings and officers who had been involved in high-risk situations during 
which they opted to hold fire, the authors found evidence of officers’ decision-making 
being predicated on decisions made earlier in the encounter. While the stories from 
shooters and non-shooters were drawn from different incidents, Scharf and Binder 
attempted to compare the decision-making of officers who shot to the decision-making of 
officers who held fire by selecting officers involved in incidents that shared situational 
similarities, including the behavior of the suspect(s) toward the officer and the type of 
weapon possessed by the suspect. 
 In their 1992 article, Fridell and Binder also assessed the Binder and Scharf 
deadly force decision-making model using the same data utilized in Scharf and Binder’s 
1983 analysis of their own model. They found that incidents characterized by surprise or 
ambiguities, such as not having information about the suspect(s) involved, the inability to 
determine the mental state of the suspect, and failure to consider early on that the 
situation could end in police gunfire, were more likely to result in a shooting. 
Furthermore, their findings suggested that the information exchange phase of an incident 
is a “critical point in the process” (Fridell and Binder, 1992:393). That is, officers’ 
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communication with the suspect played a large role in their decision to fire or hold fire. 
For example, roughly 44 percent of shooters in their sample reported that communication 
during this phase of the incident did not help to diffuse the situation, but rather made their 
opponent “much angrier” (Fridell and Binder, 1992:395). This anger and non-compliance 
on the part of the suspect may have increased the likelihood that these situations 
concluded in police gunfire. On the other hand, the authors found that roughly 20 percent 
of the non-shooting officers said that communication made their opponent “much 
calmer” (Fridell and Binder, 1992:395). This calmness could have encouraged these 
suspects to comply with officers’ commands, which may have eliminated the need for 
officers in these situations to use deadly force. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While the Binder and Scharf model has been assessed using data from officers 
who chose to use deadly force and those who could have but chose not to (Fridell and 
Binder, 1992; Scharf and Binder, 1983), the data used in prior studies to assess this 
decision-making model did not include shooters and non-shooters who participated in the 
same incident. Using this model to assess the decision-making of officers involved in the 
same incident may provide insight into  why, given the same situation, some officers 
choose to fire, while others do not. What accounts for this within-situation difference in 
use of deadly force? Is the difference in outcome due to differences in decision-making 
that occurred in earlier phases of the encounter? Do officers who ultimately choose to use 
deadly force consider factors not considered by officers who choose not to shoot?  
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Although a number of scholars have emphasized the importance of understanding 
how officers make decisions during police-citizen encounters (Alpert and Rojek, 2011; 
Binder and Scharf, 1980; Fridell and Binder, 1992; Reiss, 1980; Scharf and Binder, 
1983), few have had access to the type of data necessary to complete such an analysis. 
That is, one would need data that identifies the cues that officers see during a potentially 
violent police-citizen encounter, how these cues are considered and used in officers’ 
decision-making processes, and an explanation of why officers selected the particular 
responses they chose (Alpert and Rojek, 2011). Furthermore, in police shootings that 
involve more than one officer, it is still unknown how the presence of other police 
officers and the decisions they make influence the decision made by other officers 
involved in the event. This is a topic of inquiry regarding deadly force decision-making 
that should be addressed, but such questions can only be answered by analyzing data 
collected from multiple officers who were present at the same officer-involved shooting.  
One way to capture information about the aforementioned factors is through in-
depth interviews with police officers who have been involved in an incident that 
concluded in police use of deadly force. In doing so, officers who have been present at 
and involved in such an incident are provided with a private forum in which to detail their 
decision-making process, as well as identify key factors and cues that impacted their 
decision-making process during the officer-involved shooting. Therefore, using data 
drawn from interviews with 83 police officers who were involved in an incident that 
concluded with police use of deadly force, this dissertation was designed to fill the 
aforementioned gaps in the deadly force literature and to answer the three questions that 
were first stated in the initial chapter of this dissertation. 
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1. Do the decision-making processes completed by different police officers 
involved in the same incident follow the deadly force decision-making framework 
as proposed by Binder and Scharf?   
2. Given the same situation, does a significant difference in how police officers 
move through the Binder and Scharf decision-making process account for why 
some officers chose to use deadly force and some chose not to use deadly force?   
3. Does the presence of other police officers impact the decision-making process 
completed by an individual officer during a deadly force incident?  
 The next chapter details the data and analytical methods that were put to use to 
examine these three questions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS 
 
Qualitative methodologies have commonly been used in past studies focused on 
police use of deadly force. Qualitative work allows researchers to “get close to the 
subject matter” by gaining understanding “through lived experiences and perspectives of 
critical actors” (Shover, 2012:11). Therefore, this dissertation has been designed to gain a 
greater understanding of police officers’ decision-making processes during deadly force 
incidents using data derived from in-depth interviews with officers who have been 
involved in this specific type of police-citizen encounter.  
The first section of this chapter will describe the data collection methods used by 
the interviewer. The second section will provide readers with a description of the sample 
that will be used in the analysis. Characteristics of the officers in the sample, as well as 
characteristics of the incidents in which they were involved, will then be discussed. 
Finally, the third section of this chapter will outline the analytic strategy that was used to 
analyze the data garnered from each of the interviews included in the analysis. 
 
DATA 
The data used in the analysis were collected as part of a Bureau of Justice 
Assistance study geared toward understanding police officers’ decision-making during 
officer-involved shootings. During 2011 and 2012, Professor David Klinger from the 
University of Missouri – St. Louis conducted interviews with police officers in the United 
States who had been directly involved in incidents in which police bullets were fired. 
Officers were eligible to participate in the study if they had been present at an officer-
involved shooting and either themselves fired during the event or could have shot, but 
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held fire during the event. This interview framework created two groups within the 
sample Klinger developed: police officers who were “shooters” and police officers who 
were “witness officers” during the event. 
A chain referral sampling method with multiple strategic informants located in 
various geographic regions was used to recruit participants. The interviewer used initial 
contacts within multiple departments who then communicated with other officers who fit 
the inclusion criteria. This technique was utilized to develop a sample that included 
multiple officers involved in single incidents. In the end, the interviewer conducted a 
total of 218 interviews of shooters and witness officers that covered distinct officer-
involved shootings. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the original sample of 218 police officers 
was narrowed down to a subsample of 83 police officers who were involved in 24 distinct 
shootings. These 83 officers were selected from the larger original sample because they 
were present at a deadly force incident in which at least one officer involved fired a shot 
and at least one officer involved held fire: 46 of these officers fired shots and 37 did not. 
A brief description of each incident included in the analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
 
INTERVIEW STRUCTURE AND DESIGN 
After police officers who agreed to participate in the study signed an informed 
consent form, interviews with each individual officer began. Each interview was 
conducted in private, with only the interviewer and interviewee present. All interviews 
took place in one of three sorts of locations: police headquarter buildings, police station 
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houses, and hotel rooms. Each interview was audio recorded and later transcribed.7 The 
transcriptions from the 83 officers selected for this study were for the present study.  
To collect information regarding officers’ decision-making, the interviewer used a 
modified critical incident method to conduct each interview. The critical incident method 
is a knowledge elicitation strategy that uses cognitive probes in order to determine one’s 
decision-making process and situational assessment during non-routine events. Klein, 
Calderwood, and MacGregor (1989) established this retrospective interview strategy to 
gain a better understanding of how individuals who work in occupations that require 
expert judgment make decisions. Examples of such occupations include urban and 
wildland firefighters, paramedics, and tank platoon commanders.8  
The critical incident method is a step-by-step process that starts with asking the 
interviewee to provide a brief description of the incident in question. The interviewer 
then uses probing questions to collect more information about different aspects of the 
event and the interviewee’s decision-making process during the incident. As Klein and 
his colleagues (1989:465) note, such probes are used to “obtain information at its most 
specific and meaningful level” and most of the interview should be focused on 
“uncovering these cues.” The authors also stress the importance of using this method to 
strike a balance between a completely structured approach and a completely unstructured 
approach to an interview. Although the interviewer should ask interviewees the same 
questions at each decision point, the order and wording of the questions asked should 
follow the natural flow of dialogue (Klein et al., 1989). The semi-structured format of 																																																								7	A number of interviews were randomly selected and their audio files were checked against the typed 
transcription in order to ensure that the interviews had been transcribed accurately.	8	The study from which the interviews used for this dissertation came appears to be the first to employ the 
critical incident method framework to examine officer-involved shootings.	
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this method allows the interviewer to collect specific information from the interviewee 
while also providing the interviewee with the opportunity to reflect on the strategies 
he/she selected and the decisions he/she made during the incident.  
At the beginning of each interview, participating police officers were asked to 
complete a brief questionnaire in order to provide the interviewer with basic information 
about themselves and the incident.9 Next, each officer was asked to recount the incident 
as they experienced it to activate his or her memory regarding the incident. Using 
participants’ responses on the initial questionnaire and their initial recounting of the event 
as guides, the interviewer then led officers through a timeline reconstruction of the 
incident. It was during this portion of the interview that officers provided details relating 
to what decisions they made and how they made them. A series of different probes were 
then used by the interviewer to collect information regarding the officers’ situational 
concerns, goals, and whether or not they considered multiple options at each decision 
point. Each interview concluded with participating officers sharing lessons learned from 
the encounter and possible training and policy implications of it. Due to the wide range of 
topics discussed, interviews lasted more than an hour on average. 
 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES 
 The aforementioned questionnaire sought demographic information about the 
officers and information about each incident in which each officer was involved.10  This 
																																																								9	Additional data about officers’ participation in their shooting event(s) were collected in the questionnaire 
and during the interviews, but the discussion here is limited to the data pertaining to officers’ decision-
making processes, as that is the focus of this study. 10	Some of the participating officers were involved in multiple incidents captured in the sample and made 
different decisions regarding their use of deadly force in each incident.	
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demographic information will be reviewed in the following section, but can also be 
referenced in Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix B.  
Most of the 83 subjects are male (90 percent). The majority of the subjects are 
white (80 percent), with the additional officers identifying as Hispanic (17 percent), black 
(1 percent), Asian (1 percent), and other (1 percent). At the time of the event in question, 
the youngest officer in the sample was 24 years old and the oldest officer was 57, with an 
average age of 37. Most of the 83 officers in the sample had completed some college (43 
percent) or had earned a four-year college degree (41 percent) at the time of the event. 
The majority of the police officers in the study worked for a municipal police agency at 
the time the officer-involved shooting in question took place (88 percent), with the 
additional officers being employed by county (10.8 percent) or state agencies (1.2 
percent).  
At the time of the event, most subjects held the position of patrol officer (86 
percent), but seven (7) held the rank of sergeant and five (5) held the rank of lieutenant. 
The number of years an officer had served in law enforcement prior to being involved in 
the incident in question ranged from less than one year to 35 years. The average number 
of years between when an officer became a law enforcement officer and when the event 
about which they were being interviewed occurred was 12. Lastly, many of the subjects 
were performing general patrol duties at the time of the event (48.2 percent), but some 
officers reported being involved in a special patrol assignment when the shooting 
occurred (18.1 percent), taking part in a SWAT operation (12 percent), apprehending a 
suspect or engaging in detective work (9.6 percent), executing a search warrant (4.8 
percent), working a traffic-related (2.4 percent), K-9 (1.2 percent), off-duty (1.2 percent), 
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or administrative (1.2 percent) assignment, or identified their assignment at the time of 
the event as “other” (1.2 percent). 
Participating police officers also shared information about the other officers on 
scene, citizens present at the time of their shooting, and the suspects who were involved. 
The average number of officers present at an incident was 3.5.11 The majority of the 
police officers in the sample reported that the other officers with them during the time of 
the event were from their own law enforcement agency (86.7 percent). In a small number 
of cases, some of the other officers involved in the shooting were from the officer’s own 
agency and some of the officers were from another law enforcement agency (10.8 
percent). Lastly, in two incidents, officers reported that the only other officers present 
during their incident were from another law enforcement agency (2.4 percent). 
Participating officers were asked to report whether non-suspect citizens were 
present at the time of the officer-involved shooting. The number of citizens present 
ranged from zero to 60, with the average number of citizens present being 2.5. Nearly 
half of the officers, however, reported that there were no non-suspect citizens present at 
the scene when the officer-involved shooting took place (48.2 percent).  
Regarding the suspects involved, most of the 24 incidents captured in the sample 
included only one suspect (95.2 percent), but a small number of incidents included 
multiple suspects (4.8 percent). Of the suspects who were armed at the time of the 
officer-involved shooting, 56 percent of them were armed with a handgun. Aside from 
firearms, additional weapons used by suspects present at the incidents included in the 
sample were motor vehicles (9.6 percent) and edged weapons, such as knives (6 																																																								11	When one incident involving 16 officers in the sample is removed (Incident #20), the average number of 
police officers present at the time of the shooting drops to 2.9. 
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percent).12 Nearly 23 percent of the officers in the sample reported that the suspect fired 
at them during the incident. Some officers reported that the suspect fired at other officers 
on scene (33.7 percent) and only a small percentage of officers reported that the suspect 
fired shots at citizens on scene during the incident (4.8 percent).  
 
 
ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
 
To analyze the deadly force decision-making model proposed by Binder and 
Scharf, I completed a qualitative analysis of the aforementioned 83 in-depth interviews in 
which some officers fired and some did not. Qualitative analysis can be used to 
investigate specific concepts of interest, but can also provide insight into concepts that 
may have gone unobserved in previous studies using different analytic methods 
(Charmaz, 2006).  
Because I was assessing the Binder and Scharf framework, I needed to apply this 
four-phase framework to the data drawn from the interview transcripts. To begin, I read 
through each narrative and demarcated when each of the four phases described by Binder 
and Scharf appeared to begin and end. The decisions officers made and how they made 
them were then categorized based on when they occurred in the incident using the four 
phases proposed by Binder and Scharf: anticipation, entry and initial contact, information 
exchange, and the final frame. By organizing officers’ thoughts, actions, and decisions 
based on when they occurred during the incident, this framework provided the ability to 
assess how officers made decisions in each of the phases and which, if any, social 
influences impacted their decision-making during each phase.  																																																								12	A more comprehensive list of the weapons possessed by the perpetrators in these incidents can be 
viewed in Table 3 in Appendix B. 	
43		
To properly apply this framework to the data, it was necessary to have a 
comprehensive understanding of when one phase ended and another began according to 
the original authors. The anticipation phase began when the officer was dispatched to a 
call or made an independent decision to make his or her way to the location of the 
incident. The anticipation phase continued until the officer arrived on the scene of the 
incident. Once the officer arrived on scene, decisions made from this point until the 
officer made verbal contact with the suspect were categorized as occurring in the entry 
and initial contact phase. If the officer made verbal contact with the suspect, this initiated 
the information exchange phase.13 The information exchange phase continued until the 
officer entered the final frame stage, which occurred when the officer made the decision 
to use deadly force or made the decision not to fire.  
It is necessary to note that not every officer’s account will include all four phases. 
For example, if, after being dispatched to a location and upon arrival on scene, an officer 
made a quick decision to fire his or her weapon, Scharf and Binder would argue that this 
encounter lacks an information exchange phase. In this example, the officer arguably did 
not have time to verbally communicate with the suspect before making the decision to 
fire. According to this train of thought laid out by the authors, decisions made by this 
officer prior to his or her decision to use deadly force would be classified as occurring in 
either the anticipation phase or the entry phase, but not in the information exchange 
phase, as that phase never transpired during the encounter. 
After applying this framework to each narrative, I separated the narratives into 
two groups: shooters and witness officers. By reviewing each group separately, my goal 																																																								13	If the officer did not engage in verbal contact with the suspect, they did not enter the information 
exchange phase and their decisions were coded as occurring in either the entry or final frame phase. More 
information about why this decision was made will be addressed in a subsequent section of the dissertation. 
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was to identify themes that were specific to either officers who chose to use deadly force 
or to officers who chose not to use deadly force during their respective incidents. Once 
the narratives were separated into two groups and the four-phase framework had been 
applied to each transcript, I completed an open coding of each interview. The process of 
open coding can be best described as reading the interview data and applying open-ended 
codes or themes to particular descriptions or actions (Charmaz, 2006). An initial open 
coding of the data allowed me to identify key factors that influenced or impacted officers’ 
decision-making when they made decisions during each phase. Open coding also 
provided me with preliminary themes and initial codes that were later condensed into 
categories (Charmaz, 2006; Neuman, 2006). Next, I completed close, repeated readings 
of each narrative, which enabled me to refine the codes and themes that emerged during 
the initial open coding process.  
Throughout the coding and categorization process I used a constant comparative 
method. This method involves the systematic comparison of statements across the various 
levels of data (Chamberlain, 1999). According to Strauss (1989: 25), this process forces 
the analyst to “[confront] similarities, differences, and degrees of consistency of 
meaning” among categories. To accomplish this, I compared officers’ statements and 
descriptions of their actions, thoughts, and decisions to other statements and descriptions 
they gave regarding their actions, thoughts, and decisions during the interview. This 
comparative method allowed me to label the considerations officers made when making 
decisions and then group each based on their conceptual similarities and differences, thus 
creating specific categories related to decision-making (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). In 
addition, as Charmaz (2006) notes, this process also provides researchers with an 
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opportunity to identify instances when the data do not fit into previously identified 
patterns. This constant comparative process allows researchers to identify similarities and 
differences in the data, but also serves as a way to minimize subjectivity and bias during 
the coding process (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Once the data were 
coded, I used basic tabulation to count and total each instance of the observed patterns to 
assess their strength. 
Once I completed within-interview comparisons, I then began conducting across-
interview comparisons. That is, officers’ decision-making processes were compared to 
the decision-making processes of other officers in their respective category (i.e., shooters 
and non-shooters). Finally, I grouped officers’ narratives by incident in order to assess 
officers’ decision-making processes in relation to the processes of other officers on scene 
at given shootings. The goal of this incident-level analysis was to understand whether 
differences in the decision-making process of the officers involved could explain why 
some officers chose to use deadly force during the incident and other officers did not. 
Again, I continued to use a constant comparative method when coding each narrative. I 
reviewed each officer’s interview, comparing statements, descriptions, and rationales 
linked to decision-making provided by one officer to statements, descriptions, and 
rationales linked to decision-making provided by the other officers involved in the 
incident. The continued use of the constant comparative strategy throughout the analysis 
allowed me to adjust and refine my conceptual definitions of the categories and 
subcategories I had created.  
Using a constant comparative method during the coding process also allowed me 
to identify deviant cases, which were those that are not consistent with previously 
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identified patterns and themes. The existence of such cases is important to address when 
considering the strength of a theoretical perspective. As Sullivan (2011: 906) states, the 
“deductive testing of evidence in support of or against specific theories is an important 
aspect of explanatory development.”  
 
LIMITATIONS 
There are some limitations associated with the data that were used in this study. 
First, because the sample is a non-probabilistic sample, the findings from this study may 
not be representative of the larger police officer population in the United States regarding 
deadly force decision-making. But, as Marshall (1996:524) notes, non-probabilistic 
sampling methods are common in qualitative work, “where improved understanding of 
complex human issues [are] more important than the generalizability of results.”  
Second, the interviews were conducted by a single interviewer. This may be 
considered a limitation, as a single-interviewer has the potential to bias the data collection 
by dictating which questions are asked and the way questions are asked, thus leading to 
inconsistencies in data collection. It can also be argued, however, that relying on a single-
interviewer is better than utilizing multiple interviewers, as the use of multiple 
interviewers can also introduce issues of inconsistency and bias across interviews. Should 
there be some concern regarding consistency and potential bias introduced by the 
interviewer, the author of this study transcribed the majority of the interviews and can 
confirm that the interviewer asked respondents the same series of questions and in the 
same manner during each interview she was responsible for transcribing. 
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Third, police officers’ accounts of their incident were reported to the interviewer 
retrospectively and, as such, this may introduce issues associated with validity and 
reliability, specifically associated with memory, recall, and distortion.14 A number of 
concerns have been voiced regarding retroactive accounts of traumatic events. First, 
individuals may have an incomplete recollection of the event in question (Hardt and 
Rutter, 2004; Krinsley, Gallagher, Weathers, Kutter, and Kaloupek, 2003) or report false 
memories (Hardt and Rutter, 2004), or suffer from incomplete recall (Della Famina, 
Yaeger, and Lewis, 1990; Mollica and Caspi-Yavin, 1991). Second, individuals may only 
be able to recall what they were aware of at the time of the event, which may lead to an 
incomplete account of the incident (Hardt and Rutter, 2004). Lastly, repeat storytelling of 
the incident in question, whether in the form of formal reviews or therapeutic sessions, 
may lead to inconsistent reporting by the individual (King, King, Erikson, Hwang, 
Sharkansky, and Wolfe, 2000). The focus on traumatic events and the growing need to 
gain a better understanding of such phenomena, however, often requires researchers to 
collect trauma histories using retroactive interviewing (King et al., 2000).  
Although these are all considerable limitations regarding the analysis of 
retrospective data, the data collection efforts used by the interviewer may help to mitigate 
some of these potential problems. For example, scholars have recommended that when 
using retrospective data, researchers should attempt to corroborate retrospective 
recollections by gathering data from additional sources that can support or discredit the 
information collected during the initial interview (Hardt and Rutter, 2004). Because the 
data that will be used in this analysis were collected from multiple officers who 																																																								14	The average time between the date of the shooting incident and the date of the interview was five years. 
The range of years in which shootings took place among the officers in the subsample was 1996 to 2011.	
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participated in the same shooting, individual officer’s accounts of what transpired were 
cross-checked with responses provided by the other officers on scene. Furthermore, the 
critical incident method used by the interviewer was designed to minimize potential 
sources of bias by first asking the interviewee to provide an uninterrupted account of the 
incident (Klein et al., 1989). It was not until this initial account was completed that the 
interviewer began to ask probing questions. This interview process also lends itself to a 
comprehensive assessment of the incident in question, as each interviewee reviewed the 
incident with the interviewer multiple times during the interview, allowing any possible 
discrepancies to be identified and discussed. 
In sum, while there may be limitations regarding the sample used in this 
dissertation, these data provided information about decision-making during deadly force 
incidents that other data sources are lacking, and as such, were optimal for answering my 
research questions. The subsequent chapters will detail the findings from this study, with 
each chapter addressing the findings of one of the three research questions proposed by 
the author. Lastly, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the results and training 
and policy implications associated with my findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ASSESSMENT OF THE BINDER-SCHARF DEADLY FORCE 
DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK 
 
As noted previously, the first question this dissertation was designed to examine 
is: Do the decision-making processes completed by the police officers in the sample 
follow the decision-making processes outlined by Binder and Scharf? That is, do each of 
the officers in the sample enter into and make decisions in each of the four phases 
described by Binder and Scharf? In addition to their outline of these four phases, Scharf 
and Binder (1983) identified a number of social influences that they believe impact 
officers’ decision-making in each phase. While assessing the presence of these social 
factors and whether they influenced officers’ decisions would have been ideal, it became 
clear that the nature of the data would not allow for the measurement of every social 
influence proposed by the authors.15  When these social influences could be identified in 
the data, however, they were coded as such and will be discussed when applicable.  
The following section will detail the results yielded from this portion of the 
analysis. As is common in qualitative studies, excerpts from some of the narratives were 
selected to serve as examples when discussing themes and patterns that emerged from the 
data. The work begins at the start of the Binder and Scharf model: the anticipation phase.  
 
ANTICIPATION 
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) argue that the deadly force decision-making 
process begins with the anticipation phase. This phase is initiated when an officer is 
dispatched to a call or makes the individual decision to become involved in an incident 																																																								15	The Binder and Scharf framework was applied to the interview transcripts for the present analysis after 
interviews had already been conducted. Therefore, the original interviewer did not have this model in mind 
when crafting interview questions for participating officers. 
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and continues until the officer arrives on the scene of the incident. The authors assert that 
at this stage, officers will be collecting as much information as they can about the 
situation they are about to enter and the suspect (or suspects) involved. Information about 
the situation or the potential suspect(s) can come from dispatchers, other police officers, 
or citizens who have made the call to the police requesting assistance.  
The majority of the police officers in the sample (n=78) began their decision-
making process in the anticipation phase and did collect information about the situation 
and potential suspect(s) they were about to encounter. Fifty-nine (59) officers (33 
shooters, 26 witness officers) in the sample used this time to collect information about the 
type of situation they would be arriving to and/or the suspect with whom they would be 
dealing. Such information often included what was known about the situation (e.g., the 
type of call, whether suspect(s) could be, or were, present), the suspect’s physical 
description, whether the suspect was armed, the perceived emotional state of the suspect, 
and what was known about the suspect’s past criminal history.  
In addition, 11 other officers (six shooters, five witness officers) had previously 
collected information on the suspect prior to getting involved in the incident. For 
example, most of these 11 officers had been involved in investigations of the suspect and, 
when they received a call that they believed involved this suspect, they made the decision 
to become involved in the incident. These officers did not necessarily collect additional 
information about the suspect during this phase, as they were relying on the information 
they had previously collected prior to the call.  
Contrary to what Binder and Scharf suggested, some officers in the sample did 
not use their time in the anticipation phase to collect information about the incident they 
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were en route to address. Interestingly, eight (8) officers reported that their decision to 
initiate involvement in their incident was in response to a request by other officers to 
serve as back-up. These officers did not use the anticipation phase to collect additional 
information other than the type of incident to which they would be responding. Instead, 
these officers engaged in information collection once they arrived on scene (i.e., when 
they entered the entry and initial contact phase; see below).  
Furthermore, some of the 78 officers in the sample who operated within the 
anticipation phase framework also used this time to communicate with their fellow 
officers (via the radio) about the information that was known to them about the situation 
and the suspect(s). At times this was with the goal of drafting a plan with other officers 
who were en route to the same incident (12 officers) or communicating known 
information about the situation or suspect(s) with other officers or dispatchers (8 
officers).  
In sum, most of the officers in the sample began their incident in a fashion 
consistent with Binder and Scharf’s notion of the anticipation phase. That is, all but five 
officers gathered information about the situation they were on their way to attend, the 
potential suspect(s) involved, or both, prior to arriving on the scene of the incident. The 
five officers who did not act in conformance with the anticipation phase were already on 
the scene of an incident when they observed a suspicious-looking individual or situation 
and independently made the decision to initiate action. This means, by Binder and 
Scharf’s definition, that they were unable to collect information about the situation or the 
suspect(s) prior to arriving on scene, which eliminates the anticipation phase.  
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An example of this type of deviant case comes from Incident 20, which involved 
16 officers (the incident with the largest N of officers involved). Officer #35 was a 
supervisor of an anticrime unit who was conducting a nightly patrol in his vehicle when 
he spotted a male who looked suspicious. Officer #35 described this man as “heavily 
tattooed [with a] big mustache, bald head,” leading this officer to assume that the man 
“was a parolee. . .no doubt in my mind that this guy’s been to the joint.” When the officer 
approached the man, he described how this individual kept “looking over his right 
shoulder to see what my move was going to be.” Officer #35 made the decision to 
approach this individual and initiate a conversation with him. As Officer #35 approached 
him, the male drew a pistol and shot at Officer #35. Officer #35 did not fire shots back, 
but instead requested back up to apprehend the fleeing assailant. Fifteen (15) additional 
officers responded to the request for assistance and 11 eventually fired shots. 
Another example wherein the anticipation phase was eliminated involved four 
officers in Incident 47. These officers were members of an anticrime team in a large city 
who were tasked with making routine contact with individuals hanging around an area of 
the city known to be a location for criminal behavior. As two of these officers were 
preoccupied talking to other citizens on scene, the other two officers sought to talk to an 
elderly man who rebuffed their attempt to speak with him. While the second pair of 
officers persisted, the elderly man drew a weapon and fired at one of the officers. Three 
of the four officers returned fire. Because the officers in this incident were already on 
scene when the situation unfolded, they began their decision-making process in the entry 
phase and never entered the anticipation phase described by Binder and Scharf. 
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It should be recognized that although the five deviant cases are not representative 
of the majority of the sample, they still signify an inconsistency with the deadly force 
decision-making model as proposed by Binder and Scharf. The authors acknowledge that 
officers may skip – or not enter – the information exchange phase, but they do not state 
that officers may fail to enter and complete the anticipation phase. Therefore, in contrast 
to Binder and Scharf’s original model, police officers involved in a deadly force incident 
may initiate a potentially violent police-citizen contact in the entry phase. 
 
ANTICIPATION PHASE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
Two possible social influences that Binder and Scharf believe affect officer 
decision-making during the anticipation phase include the mode of information (i.e., who 
the information is coming from) and the believed accuracy of the information. Results 
from the analysis suggest that these factors can, in fact, impact officers’ decision-making 
early in the incident. Furthermore, the mode of information and the believed accuracy of 
the information can impact officers’ decision-making in subsequent phases as well.  
Although not a strong pattern, a few of the officers in the sample detailed how the 
mode of the information they received influenced their decision to become involved in 
the incident in question. For example, three officers, all involved Incident 20 that began 
when another officer was shot at when he tried to stop a suspicious pedestrian noted that 
they chose to get involved because they knew the initial officer would not request back-
up unless it was a very serious matter. When Officer #35 broadcast on the radio that shots 
had been fired at him, that the suspect has run off on foot, and requested that additional 
officers make their way to the scene, Officer #37 reported how he knew this was a 
54		
legitimate request, saying, “Bob16 is Bob and he doesn’t cry wolf. And if he’s chased the 
[suspect] that was shooting at him, then it’s. . .it’s serious.” Officer #42 echoed this 
thought, stating that he thought the call was “serious because it’s Bob Johnson” 
requesting back-up and “he doesn’t normally just call these things out.” Lastly, when 
detailing why he originally thought this call was high in danger, Officer #42 mentioned 
why the mode of information in this case mattered, saying: 
“It was an officer putting it out. We get a lot of calls of ‘shots fired’ and it turns 
out it’s nothing, but we had an officer – a sergeant – a squared away, well-
respected guy saying that there are shots being fired, so you know it’s legit. 
Something is happening.” 
 
 These officers’ descriptions demonstrate that because they knew the officer who 
requested assistance was a sound source of information, they placed more stock into the 
information being broadcast. Had another officer put out the call for assistance, it leads 
one to wonder whether officers would have put the same amount of stock into the call 
and responded in the same fashion. 
  
ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT 
 
After police officers arrive on the scene of the incident, Binder and Scharf (1980; 
1983) assert that officers begin observing the situation and the suspect, thus reconciling 
the information they received in the anticipation phase with what they are directly 
observing now that they are present at the scene. These direct observations will either 
confirm or dispute the information received by officers in the previous phase. Using this 
																																																								16	To preserve the confidentiality of the research subjects, pseudonyms will be used throughout this study.	
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new information then, Binder and Scharf suggest that the officer will update his or her 
assessment, or working mental model, of the situation and respond accordingly. 
Similar to what was observed in the anticipation phase, many officers continued 
to collect information during the entry and initial contact phase, both through direct 
observation and from the reported observations of other officers. The majority of officers 
(52 officers; 27 shooters and 25 witness officers) used the beginning stages of this phase 
to provide one another with situational updates, coordinate plans (whether it be a building 
entry or a suspect apprehension plan), or direct incoming officers where to go on scene. 
These officers thus used communication as a tool to ensure they all had the same 
information, which allowed them to have similar conceptions of the situation at hand.  
Consistent with Binder and Scharf’s description of the entry phase of the 
encounter, the results suggested that upon arrival on scene, officers (both shooters and 
witness officers) often began assessing the situation. Ten (10) of the 83 officers explained 
that after they arrived on location, they tried to get more information about the suspect, 
such as known background information or observations of the suspect made by other 
officers on scene. In addition, nine (9) officers in the sample described focusing on the 
suspect’s demeanor or overall appearance, observing that the suspect in their incident 
appeared to be “agitated,” “calm,” “passive,” or “not acting like a typical suspect does.” 
This new information was then commonly used among these officers when deciding on 
their next steps in the encounter. 
At times, this newly acquired information during the entry phase altered officers’ 
perceptions and definitions of the situation, causing them to view the situation as more 
serious than they had originally considered it to be in the anticipation phase. For example, 
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in Incident 12, Officer #15, a SWAT officer, was called to respond to a barricaded 
persons incident. A female had called the police to alert them that her husband had 
barricaded himself and one of their children in their home and she was afraid he was 
going to harm the child. When asked how he rated the level of danger of this situation on 
a one-to-ten scale (with one representing “low danger” and 10 representing “very high 
danger”) based on what he knew about the incident prior to arriving on scene, Officer #15 
rated it as a one because he had responded to many SWAT call-ups that turned out to be 
false alarms in terms of violence. Once he arrived on scene, however, Officer #15 learned 
that the suspect had been violent toward his family in the recent past and this led him to 
believe that the situation was more serious than he originally thought. As he put it: 
I’m starting to put on my gear and a supervisor came up to me and he goes, “Hey, 
[the suspect], he came home from work, got in a fight with his wife”. . .and the 
most telling thing to me that ramped me up the most was, [my supervisor] goes, 
“They started fighting and he pulled a gun and started throwing his two year old 
daughter around and threw her into the wall and broke the dry wall.” That was the 
one thing that made go, “This guy is a mean mother-fucker”. . .	you know, I’m 
like this guy’s crazy. . .Cause he threw his daughter into a wall. . .And I thought 
anybody that does that is not right.	. .anybody that does that is fucked up. . .mean. 
And it turns out he did have a long history of violence. . .I said, “If this guy comes 
to the door and he does not [come] completely out, I’m shooting.” Even if he’s 
unarmed [when he exits the home]. . .he’s already shot at his wife. . .I’m not 
letting him back in [the house]. 
 
 
Receiving the information that the suspect had been violent toward his daughter 
led this officer to believe that this situation was likely far more dangerous than he had 
originally considered. After learning this, Officer #15 made the personal decision that if 
the perpetrator exited the house, he was going to shoot.  He then decided to communicate 
his intent to the other officers around him, telling them, “I’ll give him commands like 
‘Come here,’ but if he starts to shut that door, we’re launching.” Not only did information 
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acquired after arrival alter Officer #15’s definition of the situation, but it also played a 
considerable role later in the incident when officers drafted and executed a hostage rescue 
plan, during which Officer #15 fired at the suspect.  
Another example of how information acquired during the entry phase altered 
officers’ ideas comes from Officer #69, who was involved in Incident 46. He described 
how what he viewed upon arrival at the scene of his incident drastically changed his 
initial mindset about the nature of a situation to which he responded. Incident 46 involved 
two officers who were dispatched to a community center after someone had reported that 
shots were being fired. At first, these officers were surprised and in disbelief, as they 
were working a traffic detail a few blocks from the community center and had not heard 
any gunshots. Surely if shots had been fired, they would have heard something, or so they 
thought. After arriving on scene and making their way to the community center front 
door, Officer #69 described how they came upon the body of a young woman who had a 
gaping shotgun wound to her chest. He soon noticed that there was a duffle bag in close 
proximity to the woman’s body containing shotgun ammunition. Officer #69 realized at 
this point that this could be an active shooter situation, saying:		
She had multiple shotgun wounds to the chest. Like close contact. There was 
smoke or steam coming out of her chest. As I looked around, there [were] two 
gym bags. One of the gym bags was open. Spilled out of it were several 12 gauge 
shotgun cartridges and a box of ammo. He. . .he came. . .you know, it’s not like 
he took a club out of his pocket and just beat her. In my brain it was like he came 
ready. Ready for war. Ready for battle. Ready to do a killing. I don’t know. But 
he came ready. With the extra ammo he could walk through that building and just 
keep killing until he’s stopped. . .So yeah, I took that much more serious. . .And 
of course, he’s gone into the shelter. About that time, [the suspect] appeared 
behind the glass doors and [my partner] engaged him verbally. 
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Officer #69’s partner during this incident, Officer #104, echoed this change in 
perceived seriousness of the situation upon viewing the victim and, soon after, the 
suspect armed with a shotgun, describing: 
When I saw the victim. . .and oh, by the way there was a box of shotgun shells 
next to her and there was a whole bunch of shells lying around her. . .at that point 
there was that, that fear factor and that adrenaline rush. You’ve got your gun out. 
You’ve got it trained, but now you know, you’re at home plate and it’s a full 
count. Bases are loaded, you know? It’s up to you to do your job or strike out. 
When I saw [the victim] and then [the suspect] with the gun. . .that’s when 
everything came to. . .came to a head. 
 
 
Both of these officers originally questioned whether this “shots fired” call was 
legitimate, as they failed to hear shots being fired when they were in close proximity to 
the reported location. Upon arrival, however, their direct observations of the deceased 
victim with a shotgun wound to her chest, a bag filled with shotgun ammunition, and 
seconds later seeing a man holding a shotgun, led these officers to change their original 
perception of the incident from disbelief to a legitimate call involving a suspect who had 
the potential to harm other citizens and themselves. Eventually, Officer #104 fired shots 
at the armed suspect while Officer #69 held fire. 
The aforementioned examples show how some of the officers in the sample used 
new information they received during the entry phase (whether it was through direct 
observation or from other officers) and adjusted their definition of the situation. This is 
consistent with the decision-making process as described by Binder and Scharf. That is, 
officers’ decision-making during such an encounter is fluid and can be influenced by 
newly acquired information and shifting situational conditions. 
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ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT PHASE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
One of the social influences identified by Binder and Scharf that could impact 
officers’ decision-making during the entry phase was safety. That is, Scharf and Binder 
(1983) found that officers often make decisions and behave in ways to protect their 
personal safety when first arriving on the scene of an incident. In congruence with Scharf 
and Binder’s findings, “safety” was a common theme that influenced decision-making 
among shooters and witness officers during the entry phase among the officers in the 
sample used in this study. Of the officers who later used deadly force during their 
incident, eight (8) officers described taking actions intended to enhance their personal 
safety once arriving on scene and 11 officers reported drawing their weapons during this 
phase of the encounter. Among the witness officers, 12 officers described taking actions 
designed to enhance their personal safety, such as finding cover, and nine (9) officers 
drew their weapons during this phase of the incident. These behaviors on the part of 
shooters and witness officers may have been the result of training and on-the-job 
experience. As Skolnick (1966) noted, danger is ever-present in police work and because 
of this fact, police officers are encouraged to be cautious at all times to preserve their 
safety. 
One interesting finding from the analysis of officers’ entry phase actions 
regarding safety is that for many officers, safety concerns extended to their fellow 
officers and this can, at times, impact their decision-making. Eighteen (18) officers (10 
shooters, 8 witness officers) described how their concern for another officer impacted 
their decision-making upon arrival on the scene of the incident and before verbal contact 
was made with the suspect. 
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A good example of this can be found in Incident 59, which involved four officers 
who responded to reports of shots being fired at a local high school. Officer #133 and his 
partner were the first officers on the scene. Officer #133 made the decision to wait for at 
least two additional officers to arrive before entering the school. This was a tactical 
decision; he had SWAT experience and wanted to enter the school with three additional 
officers so they could utilize what is known in police culture as a diamond formation 
wherein one officer takes a leading, (or “point”) position, officers flank the front officer 
(one on the left and one on the right), and the last officer positions him or herself behind 
them, thus forming a diamond. Officer #133 described his reasoning thusly: 
My thought process at that point was that [it was] an active shooter, although we 
were not hearing shots immediately when we arrived on scene. We were informed 
that there had been a classroom taken over and shots had been fired. So, my 
thought process was to go in immediately, neutralize that threat by containing, 
stopping, controlling that scene as fast as possible, but as intelligently as possible. 
In other words, instead of having two people covering where I know that I can’t 
physically cover every 360 degrees, if I have the opportunity to go in – in that 
diamond formation - then I’m going to have a lot higher odds of successfully 
resolving that situation.  
 
 
While Officer #133 does not directly say it, it appears that he believed utilizing 
the diamond formation would provide these officers with more protection from an armed 
student, and, by maintaining their safety, the entering officers would be able to do their 
job and protect the students and teachers inside the school from further harm. When it 
came time to decide which positions in the diamond the officers would take, Officer #133 
decided that he would be in the front (the point position) not only because of his SWAT 
experience, but also because he valued the safety of his fellow officer, explaining: 
I’m on point because I chose it. And I’m on point because I think I had the most 
tactical background at that particular time given my time on SWAT, as well as 
just my experience in general. And I felt that personally, if I’m going to make a 
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decision as to do something that I was going to put myself in what I considered 
the most vulnerable position. I’m asking somebody to do something that is going 
to put them directly in the line of fire as well, and so I felt that the odds of 
somebody being in that line of fire were higher given that point position than they 
would be say in a rearguard position. [I was] protective I guess. . .if you will.  
 
 
As is evident in this description, Officer #133 was well aware that he was asking 
these patrol officers to do something – and enter a situation – that may place them in 
harm’s way if they made their way into the school and the suspect fired at them. While he 
recognized his SWAT experience may justify why he chose to be the point officer, the 
remaining part of his explanation shows that he was cognizant of the safety of his fellow 
officers and this contributed to his decision to take the lead upon entering the high school. 
This incident continued when the officers found the armed student barricaded in a 
classroom, at which point a standoff ensued until the student emerged from the classroom 
with a firearm in a raised position in his hand and aimed in the direction of police 
officers, at which point three of the four officers interviewed fired shots (including 
Officer #133). 
Another example of how concern for other officers’ safety impacted officers’ 
decision-making during the entry phase can be observed in Incident 47. As previously 
mentioned, this incident involved four officers who were members of an anticrime team 
and tasked with patrolling a high-crime area that was known for being a narcotics hub 
and was the location of many calls for service. When Officer #103 spotted the elderly 
man who looked suspicious, he felt the need to alert the other officers to his uneasy 
feeling about this individual, stating that although the other officers may not have noticed 
this man or felt the same uneasiness about it, he was “still making sure that other people 
are paying attention to what I’m paying attention to. If I felt uncomfortable, they needed 
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to feel uncomfortable.” Alerting the other officers to his suspicions arguably changed the 
trajectory of this incident. Had Officer #103 not said anything, perhaps his fellow officers 
would have continued their contacts with other individuals and left the suspicious-
looking man alone. Instead, the officers who were alerted to the elderly man’s odd 
demeanor attempted to make contact with him, at which time he pulled out a firearm 
from his waistband and fired at the officers, causing three of the four officers to return 
fire. 
In sum, the analysis of officers’ social influences during the entry phase revealed 
that safety concerns did drive the decision-making of some of the officers in the sample. 
Again, it is necessary to note that these findings are not limited to only shooters or only 
witness officers, but rather were decision-making patterns observed by officers who made 
varying decisions in the final frame phase. Such findings suggest that shooters and 
witness officers may have more commonalities in their decision-making and the ways in 
which social influences impact their decisions than they do differences. 
 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
 
 Scharf and Binder (1983) designate the information exchange phase of the 
encounter as the point at which the police officer and suspect make verbal or non-verbal 
contact. A shortcoming of the authors’ description of this phase, however, is that they do 
not clearly explain what constitutes as a non-verbal interaction between police and the 
suspect. Scharf and Binder (1983) briefly allude to the use of gestures on the part of the 
officer or citizen as the basis for non-verbal communication, but this is the only point of 
clarification provided. Because Scharf and Binder did not provide a clear definition of 
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what constitutes “non-verbal contact” and for the sake of conceptual clarity, information 
exchange was limited to verbal communication between the police and the suspect(s) in 
this study. More specifically, officers in the sample were coded as engaging in 
information exchange only if they made verbal contact17 with the suspect.  
Working off of this definition, 36 officers (21 shooters, 15 witness officers) 
entered the information exchange phase. That is, they relied on verbal communication to 
either convey their intentions to the suspect, or to gain a better understanding of the 
suspect’s intentions. When analyzing the circumstances under which the 36 officers in 
the sample issued verbal commands to the suspect in their respective incidents, 22 
officers who made verbal contact with the suspect did so to ask the suspect to drop 
his/her weapon (14 shooters, eight witness officers). The remaining 14 officers who 
issued verbal commands during this phase did so for the following reasons: five (5) 
officers informed the suspect that he/she was under arrest (one shooter, three witness 
officers), four (4) officers communicated to the suspect that they needed to stop and talk 
to him/her (four shooters, two witness officers), four (4) officers requested that the 
suspect exit his/her vehicle (four shooters, two witness officers), and one (1) officer used 
verbal communication to instruct a suspect to stop running to evade police contact. In 
addition to communicating with the suspect, officers also communicated with one another 
about the suspect, the situation at hand, and, given what information they had at this 
point, how the situation may play out. 
																																																								17	For the purposes of this study, “verbal communication” occurred when an officer spoke directly to the 
suspect. Initiation of the verbal communication was a non-factor. Police-suspect verbal exchanges took 
many forms among the incidents in the sample, from informing the suspect that officers were on the scene 
to issuing commands to the suspect in attempt to gain compliance.	
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Of the 83 officers in the sample, 47 officers did not enter the information 
exchange phase. Consistent with Binder and Scharf’s conception of this, 17 of these 47 
officers did not issue commands to the suspect because there was not time to do so. To 
illustrate why these 17 officers did not issue verbal commands to the suspect(s) in their 
respective incidents, descriptions of three of the seven incidents follow. For more detailed 
information about the other four incidents in which at least one officer did not enter the 
information exchange phase, please see Appendix A.18 
Incident 20 involved 16 of the officers in the sample and began when Officer #35 
was fired upon by an assailant. After the suspect shot at Officer #35, he fled on foot. 
Responding officers received word from a resident of the area that there was rustling in 
nearby bushes about a block from the assault on Officer #35. This led a small group of 
officers to believe the suspect may be in said brush. Six officers (Officers #28, #29, #31, 
#32, #34 and #41) congregated in this street near the brush and began discussing the 
situation at hand. As the officers were talking, the suspect emerged from bushes and fired 
shots in the direction of the officers, then fled from them on foot down a nearby sidewalk. 
As the suspect was running away, four of these officers (Officers #29, #31, #32, and #41) 
shot at the suspect without saying anything to him, thus entering the final frame stage and 
skipping the information exchange phase of Binder and Scharf’s decision-making model. 
Similarly, Incident 124 involved four officers who were members of a team 
assigned to execute a search warrant of a residence. Officers believed that individuals 
dwelling in the home were involved in drug trafficking and two of the officers involved, 
Officer #183 and Officer #213, had been working for months to build a case to support 																																																								
18 Incidents 11, 90, 105, and 127 included at least one officer who did not enter the information exchange 
phase because he or she did not have time to communicate with the suspect.  
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the request for a search warrant. Once the officers had collected the necessary 
information and obtained the warrant, they worked to gather a team of officers to 
participate in serving said warrant.  
Officer #213 explained how he worked with the officers involved in the incident 
to draft an entry plan into the home. Participating officers were assigned a place in the 
entry line up: the first officer was charged with breaching19 the door to the home and, 
simultaneous to the breaching of the door, another officer would break a nearby window 
of the home to detonate a stun grenade20 to disorient anyone who may be in the home at 
the time. Additional officers in the line-up would then file into the home, with the goal of 
locating and apprehending any individuals in the home and proceeding with their search 
of the location. 
Upon entering the home, however, officers were immediately fired at by two 
suspects. To prevent the suspects from continuing to fire, one of the four officers 
instantly began returning gunfire (Officer #213 was the only shooter). The other three 
officers who were interviewed and held fire did so for one of three reasons: one officer 
chose to attend to a fellow officer who had been shot by suspects’ gunfire (Officer #184), 
another officer did not have a clear shot of the suspects because other officers in front of 
him in the entry line-up were in his line of fire (Officers #183), and because other officers 
had already engaged the suspects in gunfire, a third officer chose to hold fire (Officer 
#185). Although these officers varied in their use of force, one commonality they shared 
was, due to how quickly this incident unfolded upon their entry into the home, each of 																																																								19	The process of “breaching” an entryway requires an officer to breakdown a fortification (such as a 
doorway) for the purpose of entry. 20	A stun grenade, or a flashbang, is a non-lethal device used by law enforcement to temporarily disorient a 
suspect’s senses (such as sight and/or hearing). 
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these officers failed to issue verbal commands to the suspects, thus not participating in 
the information exchange phase. 
A third example of an incident that unfolded so quickly that officers did not enter 
Binder and Scharf’s information exchange phase was Incident 103, which involved two 
of the officers interviewed. Officer #147 was on his way to work and driving on a busy 
highway when he spotted a highway patrol officer, Officer #152, who had initiated a 
traffic stop and appeared to be administering a field sobriety test to the driver. Officer 
#147 soon saw that an additional police vehicle was heading in the direction of the 
stopped highway patrol officer, which signaled to Officer #147 that this highway patrol 
officer had requested back-up and something about the traffic stop was not right. This 
officer decided to pull over to assist, noting that he was approximately 15 yards away 
from the highway patrol officer, when very quickly he noticed that Officer #152 was in a 
physical altercation with the driver he had pulled over. Officer #147 soon lost sight of 
Officer #152, leading him to believe that he had fallen next to or in front of the driver’s 
vehicle. When Officer #147 heard the gears of the driver’s vehicle grinding, he thought 
Officer #152 was about to be run over and felt he had very little time to prevent the driver 
from seriously injuring or killing Officer #152. Because he believed giving verbal 
commands to the driver would not stop him from harming Officer #152, Officer #147 
decided to fire at the driver to protect Officer #152. Because this incident unfolded so 
quickly, Officer #147 did not have time to issue verbal commands to the driver before he 
made the decision to use deadly force. 
In addition to the 17 officers who did not enter the information exchange phase 
because their incidents unfolded rather quickly, 30 officers (17 shooters, 13 witness 
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officers) did not make verbal contact with the suspect in their respective incidents, but 
not for the reason originally proposed by Binder and Scharf. These 30 officers, who 
participated in 14 different incidents, did not make verbal contact with the suspect(s) 
because another officer had already initiated verbal communication with the suspect(s). 
This finding is worth noting, as it is unique to incidents that involved more than one 
officer. That is, many of these 30 officers may have very well verbally communicated 
with the suspect(s) in their incidents had other officers not been present. Because this 
finding is unique to incidents that involved more than one officer, this may explain why 
Binder and Scharf did not consider this vis-a-vis the information exchange phase in their 
writings; most of the cases they considered were single-officer events. The presence of 
other police officers and how their choices about contacting suspects impacted officers’ 
decisions in the information exchange phase will be expanded upon in Chapter Six of this 
dissertation. 
On another note, one factor that was present in a few of the incidents studied here 
but was not mentioned by Binder and Scharf in their description of the information 
exchange phase is the use of a formal negotiator. Four (4) of the 24 incidents captured in 
the sample involved the use of an officer who had formal training and was designated by 
a police agency as an expert in crisis negotiation. In these cases, the negotiators were 
tasked with engaging in verbal contact with the suspect. Some of the officers involved in 
these incidents described how this type of communication with the suspect was used in an 
attempt to coax the suspect out of the location or as a de-escalation tool. The use of a 
negotiator, however, limits the number of officers who are supposed to verbally 
communicate with the suspect, which explains why some of the officers who were 
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involved in these incidents did not enter into what Binder and Scharf designated as the 
information exchange phase. The implications of this finding for the Binder and Scharf 
model are discussed below. 
 In sum, the analysis of the information exchange phase among shooters and 
witness officers provided some support for Binder and Scharf’s conception of this phase. 
The results suggest that officers may, at times, enter the information exchange phase and 
communicate with the suspect for a number of reasons. The results from the analyses also 
support Binder and Scharf’s hypothesis that not all officers enter the information 
exchange phase, as some potentially violent police-citizen encounters can proceed 
quickly, thus not providing the involved officers the time needed to open lines of 
communication before having to make the decision to use or not use deadly force. Both 
shooters and witness officers can be observed in both groups (i.e., those who entered the 
information exchange phase and those who did not), suggesting similarities between 
decisions made by those who chose to shoot and those who chose to hold fire. 
 One key finding from the current analysis that was not addressed by Binder and 
Scharf concerns the use of crisis negotiators. As previously noted, much policing is group 
work and the division of labor when negotiators are present means that Binder and 
Scharf’s focus on individual officers would appear to miss the mark when it comes to 
their notion of information exchange. The use of a designated crisis negotiator to open 
the lines of verbal communication with a suspect eliminates the need for other officers 
present to engage in verbal contact with the suspect. Consequently, the use of negotiators 
indicates that Binder and Scharf’s decision-making framework should be expanded to 
include the notion that police work groups can frame encounters with police in particular 
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ways that will exclude some officers from engaging in some aspects of the initial Binder 
and Scharf model. 
 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE: SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
One of the social influences that Scharf and Binder (1983) identify as applicable 
to officers’ decision-making in the information exchange phase is the level of control 
over the situation that an officer may feel he or she has. While the police officers who 
were interviewed were not directly asked about how much control they felt they had 
throughout the incident, a number of officers did report that, during this phase, they could 
tell by the suspect’s behavior that he or she was not going to comply or reported having 
“a bad feeling” about how the situation would conclude. Seventeen (17) officers (11 
shooters, six witness officers) explained that during this point in the incident, they did not 
expect the suspect to comply with their commands and considered that the incident may 
not conclude without the use of deadly force.  
An example of this was found in the decision-making of Officer #149 who 
participated in Incident 105. This incident involved four officers in the sample who were 
part of specialized team tasked with identifying and apprehending a suspect who had 
been breaking into vehicles in a particular neighborhood. An officer spotted a male exit a 
vehicle he had been driving and break into a vehicle parked in an alley, and alerted the 
other team members. By the time officers converged on the suspect, he had returned to 
his vehicle and was attempting to flee, so they used their vehicles to try to block the 
suspect’s vehicle from leaving. Multiple officers, including Officer #149, were issuing 
commands to the suspect to exit his vehicle. The suspect, however, refused to comply, 
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and instead began moving his vehicle back and forth, attempting to break free from the 
vehicle enclosure officers had set up. In the midst of this takedown, one of Officer #149’s 
fellow officers, Officer #166, had exited her vehicle and found herself trapped behind the 
suspect’s vehicle.  
Officer #149 described his summation of the situation at this point, saying: 
We’ve moved up to within maybe 10 feet or so of [the suspect’s] car and we’ve 
been telling him the whole time, “Stop and put your hands up!”. . .that kind of 
thing. And I look inside of the [suspect’s car] and he’s trying to go from reverse 
to drive, from drive to reverse. And I see him doing it and I recognize that 
[Officer #166] is behind the car.  Everything else he’d hit so far he’d totally 
destroyed. I felt like if he hit her with that car that she would be either crippled or 
killed. This all happens in my head immediately. . .it just sort of dawns on me and 
that if we don’t do something right now, she’s probably going to get run over by 
this car. 
 
 
While Officer #149 does not directly reference his level of control over the 
situation, one can see from his description that, based on the suspect’s behavior and non-
compliance with police commands, he saw this as a situation in which the suspect was 
dictating action. He highlights his concern about the suspect’s control over the safety of a 
fellow officer, leading him to the conclusion that if the officers did not act quickly to 
somehow alter the suspect’s behavior that Officer #166 could be seriously wounded or 
killed. In fact, soon after reaching this conclusion, Officer #149 (along with another 
officer interviewed) decided to shoot the suspect in order to prevent him from running 
over Officer #166. 
Another example that highlights an officer’s perception of his level of control 
during the information exchange phase can be drawn from Incident 26. This incident 
involved four officers who were going to apprehend a suspect who was wanted on a 
felony family violence warrant in a bail bondsman’s office. Each of the officers stated 
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that prior to making contact with the suspect, they thought this apprehension was going to 
go smoothly. Once they entered the bondsman’s office and issued commands to the 
seated suspect to stand up so he could be placed under arrest, the suspect quickly became 
defensive and began posturing like “he [was] going to fight” (Officer #53; witness 
officer). Officer #172, the second witness officer in this incident, reported that the 
suspect’s demeanor and behavior also signaled to him that this situation was not going to 
conclude as easily as they all thought, saying: 
[The suspect] moved away from us. Believe it or not, it’s something I hadn’t seen 
before, it’s something they hadn’t trained us for either. He didn’t run and he 
didn’t stand and fight, which is the two things that you expect. [Suspects] either 
wanna a piece of you or they try to get away. I’m a little more aggressive by 
nature, even though I’m kinda small, I don’t know, so when [the suspect] moved 
away from us I jumped on him. . . first thing I did, I grabbed him and I tried 
bringing him down. . .and that’s when Joe jumped on him, too. The other officer’s 
on his right side and that’s when I hear Greg yell that [the suspect] has a gun. . 
.and when I heard him call, “Gun!”, I was like holy shit. I knew what was gonna 
happen. I knew that this was gonna end badly. 
 
 
 Interestingly enough, Officer #172 was confident that these officers would 
overtake the non-compliant suspect once he stood up and backed away from the officers. 
Even though the suspect did not listen to their commands and multiple officers attempted 
to physically restrain him, Officer #172 felt they had him “under control physically” 
because “I had four cops there.” Once he heard another officer had spotted a gun on the 
suspect, however, Officer #172 changed his view of the situation, noting that this 
signaled to him that the situation could go in a direction he had not previously anticipated 
and that he and his fellow officers may not, in fact, be able to physically control the 
suspect. After a physical altercation between the suspect and officers ensued, two of the 
four officers fired shots at the suspect. 
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Another example of how a suspect’s demeanor and/or actions can suggest to 
officers that they are losing control of an encounter can be found in Incident 11, which 
included four officers who had been involved in a vehicle pursuit. Officer #25 made the 
decision to participate in the pursuit when he heard it on the radio. As he was en route to 
the location of the chase, he heard on the radio that the suspect had been purposefully 
ramming into other officers’ vehicles with his car in an attempt to flee. The suspect 
eventually crashed his vehicle, which ended the pursuit and gave officers the opportunity 
to exit their vehicles and issue verbal commands to the suspect to exit his vehicle. Officer 
#25 described how he issued commands to the driver to exit the vehicle, but rather than 
complying with the officer’s request, the suspect began lurching his car forward toward a 
fellow officer’s vehicle with the officer still inside. Officer #25 explained that the 
suspect’s behavior at this point signaled that he was not going to listen to officers’ 
commands and he was not going to stop his flight. He stated: 
You know I was thinking right there this is okay. [The suspect] has nowhere else 
to go. I was getting out of my car to hear him going back and ramming us again. It 
was kind of one of those things like, ‘Are you kidding me?’ And that’s what 
raised my concern, my worry for us, because he’s not showing any indication that 
this is going to stop. It’s going to be us or him. And that was the scenario I felt 
that he was putting us in by just continually ramming us. You know, whatever it 
took for him to get away, that’s what he was going to do at the time. 
 
 
As one can see, Officer #25 believed the suspect’s behavior indicated that he 
would do whatever was necessary to escape apprehension. This officer then made the 
decision to exit his vehicle and draw his weapon, continuing “to treat it as a felony [stop], 
pointing the gun, [trying to] get [the suspect] out of the car.” In the final phase of the 
incident, Officer #25 made the decision to fire at the suspect. 
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Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #14, made a similar 
interpretation of the suspect’s mindset, but did not use deadly force in the final frame 
phase of the incident.  When witnessing the suspect’s erratic driving during the high 
speed chase, Officer #14 reported that this behavior on the part of the suspect made it 
clear that he had no intention of being apprehended. He stated:  
You can tell this guy is just driving like a madman now, you know? You can tell 
he’s not going to stop. I mean just years of experiencing, you know, high speed 
pursuits, you could tell this guy wasn’t going to be getting out and surrendering 
anytime soon. 
 
 
Once the suspect crashed his vehicle and officers surrounded his vehicle with 
their own, the suspect continued to try to break his vehicle free by backing into the 
surrounding police vehicles. Again, this behavior suggested to Officer #14 that the 
suspect did not intend to surrender. At this point, Officer #14 drew his weapon, 
explaining: 
I was already exiting my vehicle and I saw [the officers’] weapons drawn, so I 
remembered starting to draw mine. But I was thinking the whole time this guy 
might get back on the road, but, it was almost a point of no return then, you 
know? 
 
 
This officer did not fire at the suspect because by the time he felt he had a clear 
shot, Officer #25 had already shot the suspect. What this incident demonstrates, however, 
is that regardless of whether an officer decides to shoot or hold fire, officers can observe 
a suspect’s behavior, make similar inferences about the suspect’s intentions and their 
perceived level of control over the situation, and then use these perceptions to guide their 
subsequent decision-making. 
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Suspect Demeanor 
Another social influence identified by Binder and Scharf as impacting officers’ 
decision-making during the information exchange phase is the suspect’s demeanor, or 
response to officers’ commands. The authors note that officers often use verbal 
commands at this point to inform the suspect what he or she needs to do to reduce the 
threat posed to the officers. For example, if a suspect is armed with a firearm, an officer 
may issue commands to the suspect to “Drop the weapon.” Therefore, in addition to 
analyzing officers’ behaviors and decisions during this phase, it is also necessary to 
assess suspects’ responses to what officers say in each incident. 
As previously noted, 36 officers issued verbal commands to the suspect in their 
respective incident. If Binder and Scharf’s hypothesis holds true, one would expect to 
find that more shooters than witness officers were confronted with non-compliant 
suspects. By not listening to officers’ commands, such non-compliant suspects limit the 
options available to police to resolve the incident.  
None of the suspects who received commands from the 36 officers who issued 
them complied with the orders given. Twenty-two (22) of the 36 officers who issued 
verbal commands told the suspects to drop the weapons they possessed. Fourteen (14) 
additional officers issued commands to the suspect to do a variety of other tasks (e.g., 
stop and exit his/her vehicle, stop to talk with the officers, or request that the suspect 
cease from fleeing from custody). Of the 36 officers who issued verbal commands, 21 
officers ultimately used deadly force in the final frame phase and 15 officers refrained 
from using deadly force.  
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It is important to note that these 36 officers participated in 20 different incidents. 
Of those 20 incidents, there were 10 that included at least two officers who issued verbal 
commands to the suspect, one who eventually used deadly force and another who did not. 
To demonstrate the similarities observed among officers who engaged in the same 
behavior (i.e., issuing verbal commands to the suspect) and how they interpreted the 
suspect’s non-compliance in their incident, a few examples will be reviewed below. 
Incident 43 involved two officers: Officer #65 was a field training officer at the 
time and his trainee, Officer #113, was with him when they received a call reporting 
multiple homicides at a local apartment complex. Officer #65 explained that his trainee 
wanted to work on one of her weak points (e.g., verbal communication), so they opted to 
respond to the location of the call, even though both officers made it clear in their 
interviews that they initially believed this to be a prank call. Upon arrival on scene, 
however, the officers were confronted with a visibly angry male. Since Officer #113 was 
in training and wanted to practice her stern communication skills, Officer #65 told her to 
initiate verbal contact with the suspect. As Officer #113 was beginning to approach the 
suspect, Officer #65 saw that the suspect was armed with two knives. Fearing for his 
trainee’s safety, Officer #65 began issuing commands to the suspect, explaining: 
I’m thinking ok, now this is great training opportunity because we’re going to 
have a little standoff here until this guy surrenders. And you know, [I am] just 
giving him commands, “Alright, drop the knives.” At this point, I still didn’t think 
anything of this. I hadn’t even drawn my weapon at this point. I’m just, “Drop the 
knives. Come on. What’s going on?” It was just kind of a thing of ordering 
commands by rote, you know? “Drop the knives. What’s your problem?”.	.	.He 
didn’t actually ever [listen]. . .I had that sick feeling in my stomach that I’m going 
to have to shoot this guy. And I actually said to him, I said, “Come on buddy, 
don’t make me do this.” 
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His officer-in-training, Officer #113, was also issuing commands to the suspect. 
She also reported similar concerns about the suspect’s behavior, saying: 
I figured, you know. . .remember, I was out to prove that “Hey, I’m gonna control 
this guy.” I’m gonna walk up and say, “Hey, come back here” and I’m actually 
gonna make him do it when he doesn’t want to. . .I remember my FTO saying, 
“Stop!” I think we were both definitely saying, “Stop! Don’t come any closer!” 
And [the] guy kept walking. . .there’s a guy with a knife approaching, he’s well 
within twenty-one feet. So I took the slack out of my trigger. 
 
 
Both Officer #65 and Officer #113 issued verbal commands to the suspect to drop 
his knives, but the suspect remained non-compliant by continuing to hold on to his 
weapons and move toward the officers. At this point, both officers considered that this 
situation could conclude in the use of deadly force. Officer #65 verbalized this 
consideration to the suspect, while Officer #113 described her recognition that based on 
the totality of the circumstances in front of her, she could, and may have to, use deadly 
force. This situation ultimately concluded with Officer #65 firing shots at the suspect 
while Officer #113 held fire. 
Another incident that involved multiple officers who issued commands to a 
suspect was Incident 118. This case involved two homicide detectives who were 
searching for a man they suspected of committing a recent homicide. They had a photo of 
the suspect and identified a number of locations he could be based on where he was using 
the victim’s stolen credit cards. These officers were driving around one of these locations 
hoping to find their suspect and bring him into custody. They happened upon a man who 
matched the suspect’s description and, while still in their undercover vehicle, discussed 
whether they agreed that the man they saw could be their suspect and, if so, what would 
be the best way to apprehend him. They called for back-up, but were afraid that once the 
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suspect heard the sirens from arriving patrol cars, he would run. Therefore, they agreed 
that they should make contact with him immediately, as they did not believe back-up was 
far behind.  
Upon exiting the vehicle, they agreed that Officer #217 would be the one to issue 
commands and his partner, Officer #168, would be the one to take the suspect into 
custody. As they approached the suspect and began to execute their plan, however, 
Officer #217 described how the encounter quickly went awry, explaining: 
I had opened the door and step[ped] out of the car and I’m literally on the 
sidewalk. [The suspect] is walking towards me. I immediately start issuing 
commands and now I’m face to face with him. He’s looking at me. “Police, don’t 
move! Police, get down on the ground! Police, don’t move!” Those kinds of 
commands. And he. . .[my partner] is in my peripheral vision out in the middle of 
the street and he may have been yelling some commands as well, but he. . .[the 
suspect] for whatever reason, he has this. . .it was almost Hollywood-like 
transformation of his face where he turned. . .he turned to this animalistic facial 
expression where he was gritting his teeth. . .a very angry look. And he 
immediately dropped the bottle he was carrying and his hands went out in front of 
him like this in a claw sort of. . .zombie sort of hand thing. . .and he let out this 
scream that was a growl. And he starts running towards me. 
 
 
His partner, Officer #168, described similar behavior on the part of the suspect in 
his account of the information exchange phase, saying: 
I can see my partner in the peripheral and I start hearing the commands. And I’m 
looking at the suspect the whole time.  As soon as I hear that, I put the gun up on 
him and put a sight picture on him.  He had been walking totally unaware [we] 
appeared, and then as soon as he starts hearing the commands, he freezes, just 
stops in his tracks. He’s looking directly at [my partner], but not doing anything, 
so I start yelling out, “Police, freeze.  Don’t move.  Police.” He – this has all 
happened – from this point, just extremely fast.  He looks at my partner, looks at 
something between my partner and I, is what it appeared to me, and then looks 
directly at me.  He drops into a slight crouch, just gets a look of absolute rage on 
his face, baring his teeth. I kind of describe it as a war cry, [and] just starts 
screaming.  He throws his hands out directly in front of him and starts running. 
 
 
78		
Again, both of these officers issued verbal commands to the suspect in their 
incident and ended up dealing with a non-compliant individual who had no interest in 
listening to the officers and instead decided to physically attack them. As one can see, 
both of these officers made the same decision (i.e., to issue verbal commands to the 
suspect) and observed the same aggressive, non-compliant behavior from the suspect, yet 
in the final frame phase, Officer #168 decided to fire shots and Officer #217 held fire.  
In sum, these findings suggest that suspects’ responses to officers’ commands 
may not have as much of a direct influence on an officers’ decision to shoot or hold fire 
as the original Binder and Scharf model had opined. True, the results do suggest that 
more officers who dealt with non-compliant suspects ended up using deadly force 
compared to those who did not shoot, but the fact that the number of officers who chose 
not to shoot - despite being faced with an individual who posed a dangerous threat - was 
relatively close to the number of officers who did choose to shoot is worth noting. If 
anything, this finding demonstrates that both shooters and witness officers confronted 
suspects who were not willing to comply, yet they still made different choices regarding 
the use of deadly force. In addition, as exemplified by incidents presented above, shooters 
and witness officers in the same incident can have similar reads of the suspect during this 
phase, yet ultimately make different decisions regarding whether to use deadly force. 
While the reason for this difference has yet to be determined, the response of the suspect 
– or lack of response – does not definitively explain why some officers chose to shoot 
and others did not. 
 
 
79		
Line in the Sand 
Furthermore, when describing how a suspect’s demeanor and physical appearance 
can impact officers’ decision-making in the information exchange phase, Scharf and 
Binder (1983) describe how officers can use this to form a metaphorical line in the sand. 
That is, officers may create “if. . .then” conditions in their mind that would lead them to 
make the decision to fire their weapon at a suspect, thus entering the final frame. For 
example, if an officer is involved in an encounter with an armed individual, the officer 
may tell himself or herself that if the suspect raises his or her weapon in the direction of 
this officer, other officers, or citizens, then they will shoot.  
This notion of drawing “lines in the sand” and how the creation of such lines are 
not exclusive to shooters are illustrated by Incident 123, which involved two officers in 
the sample (plus two who were not interviewed) who ultimately made different decisions 
regarding their use of deadly force. These officers were responding to a call of an armed 
individual at a local high school. While Officer #182 considered that they could have a 
suicidal subject on their hands, Officer #188 explained that he believed it was an active 
shooter inside the high school. Both officers arrived separately at different locations on 
the high school grounds, but near the suspect, who was pacing back and forth outside the 
school and carrying a rifle. Officer #182 took a position facing the suspect, while Officer 
#188 ended up arriving at a location behind the suspect. Officer #182 and other officers 
on scene (who were not interviewed) were issuing commands to the suspect to put his 
weapon down, but the suspect failed to comply; instead he reportedly raised and lowered 
the weapon in the direction of other officers on scene. At this point, Officer #188, who 
had positioned himself behind the armed suspect, drew a line in the sand, explaining: 
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I was looking. . .really trying to pay attention to everything was going on because 
I was waiting for that moment when [the suspect] turned around and came back 
[toward me]. If he saw me there, I thought in my mind [that] if he saw me, he was 
gonna be like, “Oh, fuck” and he was gonna just draw and come up just out of 
instinct. . .there's an officer there. . .boom. I had made my mind up.  If he turned 
towards me, I would have killed him. 
 
 
The suspect had lifted and pointed his rifle in the direction of other officers, but 
not at Officer #188, the witness officer. Had he fired at this point, he would have shot the 
suspect in the back, something he was not willing to do. The suspect never turned around 
to face Officer #188, which meant he did not cross this officer’s line in the sand, so 
Officer #188 did not fire. He did make it clear, however, that had the suspect crossed that 
line he drew in his head, he would have fired, explaining: 
I watched [the suspect] point that gun towards [other officers] multiple times. It 
was like three or four times he points his rifle. He just flat armed pointed. 
Obviously, he's doing it in a threatening manner. I mean, if I'm gonna shoot 
somebody with a rifle, I'm gonna come up, draw up, and the whole bit. But he 
never really does that. There was no doubt in my mind if he had flipped around 
and that gun had come up [toward me], he'd have been dead. I had a great shot.   
 
 
 Although Officer #188 chose to hold fire, another officer (Officer #182) 
eventually fired shots at the armed student, bringing the standoff to a close. 
Another example of an officer drawing a mental line in the sand but who held fire 
was found in Incident 68. This incident, which involved three officers in the sample, 
began when officers received a call reporting an individual with a grenade in a 
courthouse. Officers #91 and #92 arrived on the scene and both agreed to enter the 
courthouse to assess the situation. They took time to find a safe location relative to the 
position of the suspect inside the courthouse and were soon joined by a few additional 
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officers. Officer #92, the witness officer, recalled receiving a command for his supervisor 
over the radio about how to handle the situation, explaining: 
. . .you know, one of the lieutenants comes over the air and says. . .I mean to me 
at the time it seemed really asinine, “Do not allow the man to move freely around 
the building. Use any force necessary to prevent that.” It’s like well, I don’t care 
about moving around the building – if he takes a step towards me he’s. . .I’m 
going to use whatever force necessary. 
 
 
At this point in the encounter, the suspect did not move and because of this, 
Officer #92 held fire. As the situation progressed, however, the small group of officers in 
the building made the decision as a collective that deadly force was necessary in order to 
prevent the suspect from detonating the grenade and causing serious harm or death to 
anyone in the blast radius. Officer #92 was ready and prepared to fire at the suspect, but 
other officers on scene had fired before him and by the time he went to pull the trigger on 
his weapon, he could see that the suspect had been hit by police gunfire and was no 
longer a threat. 
One final example of officers’ decisions to establish conditions under which they 
would fire was found in Incident 59, which was the incident involving a student who had 
barricaded himself in the classroom of his high school and to which four of the officers 
interviewed responded. Once officers entered the school, located the suspect, and allowed 
additional officers to arrive, the designated crisis negotiator (Officer #80) began verbally 
communicating with the suspect. As this was going on, Officer #89 described how he 
considered the circumstances under which he would use deadly force, explaining: 
. . .that was the advantage of having had so much time to anticipate and pre-plan 
and schema what he was going to do. So, you know, the decision in my mind had 
already been made. If [the suspect] comes out with a gun pointed at anybody or 
even in his hand, he’s probably going to get shot. 
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Verbal communication with the suspect went on for about 45 minutes until the 
suspect stood in the doorway of the classroom and raised his arm with the gun in his 
hand, at which point Officer #89 fired at the suspect. When asked if he made a conscious 
decision to fire his weapon and use deadly force, Officer #89 described his pulling the 
trigger as a reaction to the suspect’s behavior, but felt this reaction was grounded in 
considerations he had already made, saying: 
I was reliant upon my own judgment and perception of what was happening to 
make that decision for me. And fortunately, I guess, [the suspect] presented 
himself in a schema that I had already anticipated or expected and I just reacted to 
it, as opposed to him coming out in some unorthodox way where I would have 
had to actually consciously say “Can I shoot him now?” or “Am I supposed to?” 
or “Do I need to?” That thought never occurred. It was pure reaction. 
 
 
Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #133, echoed Officer #89’s 
mindset, explaining that he too had considered conditions under which he would shoot if 
the suspect engaged in certain behaviors, explaining: 
For me, it was pretty clear that – he was told numerous times not to grab the 
weapon, not to touch the weapon, to set the weapon down, to leave the weapon in 
the classroom and come out.  He was given ample opportunity to do that over this 
period of time.  And when he grabbed that weapon and started to come up with it, 
I was not waiting to see – or waiting for him to fire a round at us first. As soon as 
he reached for the gun and became – I had made a decision that if he reached for 
the gun and I saw him actually grab the gun that I was going to deploy my 
weapon on him. 
 
 
Officer #133 described his decision to fire his weapon at the suspect as a 
conscious one, saying that he had already made the decision to fire had the situation 
matched the conditions noted above. When the suspect moved toward the doorway and 
toward officers with a gun in his hand, this officer fired multiple shots.  
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These examples demonstrate that officers do, in fact, consider potential situations 
in which they would make the decision to use deadly force, thus drawing a line in the 
sand or creating an “if. . .then” scenario in their minds. These examples also show that 
this behavior was not limited to officers who ultimately decided to fire shots. An officer 
may fire shots when the suspect’s behavior matches that which the officer has designated 
as his or her line in the sand, but if a suspect’s behavior does not cross this line, this may 
explain why, at times, officers who held fire did just that. The creation of “if. . .then” 
scenarios and mental models among shooters and witness officers in the information 
exchange phase is yet another example of the similarities that exist in the decision-
making of officers in potentially violent police-citizen encounters regardless of their 
decision in the final frame. 
In sum, the findings from the first three phases reveal that, regardless of whether 
an officer chose to use deadly force, certain factors consistently impacted officers’ 
decision-making throughout their respective incidents. Both groups of officers, shooters 
and witness officers, engaged in similar behaviors and decision-making patterns as they 
related to retrieving and processing information in the anticipation phase, making direct 
observations and refining their situational definitions in the entry phase, and the use (or 
lack thereof) of verbal communication, perceptions of the suspects’ behavior and/or 
demeanor, and “if. . .then” scenarios in the information exchange phase.  
Once arriving at the final frame phase, however, notable differences among 
shooters and witness officers began to emerge. 
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FINAL FRAME 
 
 According to Binder and Scharf’s decision-making model, the final phase of the 
incident is marked by an officer’s decision to use or not to use deadly force. That is, at a 
certain point in high-risk police-citizen encounters, Binder and Scharf assert that an 
officer will either decide that deadly force is necessary and make the decision to shoot, or 
the officer will decide that the use of deadly force is not necessary and will choose to 
hold fire. This decision was observed in the majority of the cases included in the sample 
wherein officers made the decision to either fire their weapons or hold fire and executed 
this action immediately following the decision to do so. There were instances, however, 
in which officers did not make a decision to either use or not use deadly force during the 
final frame of the incident. The following section will detail findings from the analyses 
drawn from the final frame phase of officers’ decision-making process in order to finish 
out these basic findings. 
  
THE DECISION TO SHOOT OR HOLD FIRE 
As noted previously, of the 83 police officers in the sample under analysis, 46 
officers fired shots during the incident under consideration and 37 officers did not. Of the 
46 officers who fired shots during their respective incidents, 32 of these officers made the 
conscious decision to use deadly force and pull the trigger. These officers made the 
decision that deadly force was necessary and executed this decision by firing at the 
suspect for a number of different reasons. The most frequent reason reported by officers 
for using deadly force was to protect himself or herself or a fellow officer from what they 
believed to be an immediate threat to innocent life (n=21 officers). Additional reasons for 
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why the shooters reported making the decision to fire included furtive, potentially 
dangerous motions or other behavior exhibited by the suspect that led the officer to 
believe the suspect posed a deadly threat (n=7), returning fire at a suspect who began 
firing shots at him or her (n=2), being asked to fire shots at the suspect by a fellow officer 
(n=1), and firing at the suspect because he/she saw the suspect was armed with a firearm 
(n=1).  
When analyzing the decision-making process during the final frame phase of the 
37 officers in the sample who did not shoot, 19 of the officers reported that they did 
consider shooting during the final frame but ultimately decided it was not necessary. 
When asked why they considered shooting but ultimately decided against it, officers’ 
explanations included: another officer had already fired at the suspect (n=4 officers), the 
officer did not feel threatened by the suspect at the time (n=3), by the time the officer 
considered shooting, the suspect was no longer a threat (n=3), a fellow officer was in 
his/her line of fire (n=3), he/she did not have a clear view of the suspect (n=2), he/she 
could not see that the suspect was armed (n=2), and he/she did not feel they would be 
justified in using deadly force at the time (n=2). 
The descriptions of the above officers’ decision to either fire or hold fire are 
consistent with how Binder and Scharf describe an officer’s decision-making during this 
phase of the potential violent police-citizen encounter. Most of the officers in the sample 
who used deadly force did so because they had determined that the use of deadly force 
was necessary and they followed through with this decision. In addition, most of the 
witness officers who did not fire did so because they made the decision that the use of 
deadly force was not necessary at the time they considered shooting and, therefore, chose 
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to hold fire. What is perhaps most interesting, however, was that upon analyzing officers’ 
accounts during the final frame phase of their incident, it became clear that not all of the 
officers in the sample fell into one of these two categories described by Binder and 
Scharf. 
 
 
IS THERE ALWAYS A DECISION? 
 
 Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making model is predicated on the 
notion that all police officers involved in high-risk encounters with citizens make a 
decision to either use deadly force or refrain from doing so, with the exception of 
instances in which an officer’s firing behavior is the result of unconscious reaction. Some 
of the narratives in this sample, however, suggest that not only do shooters not always 
make the decision to shoot, but that witness officers do not always make the decision to 
hold fire.  
When analyzing the decision-making of the officers who decided to use deadly 
force, it became clear that not every officer who fired shots made the decision to do so. 
Where shootings go, 14 officers reported that pulling the trigger was not the result of a 
conscious decision to fire their weapon, but rather, was a subconscious reaction to what 
they perceived or defined as a threatening action by a suspect they faced. To demonstrate 
this finding, three examples of this sort of shooting are provided below. 
In Incident 18, two officers in the sample were involved in a vehicle pursuit of a 
robbery suspect who police had been searching for over a four month period. When other 
officers called out that they had located an individual driving the car associated with the 
suspect, Officer #22, who had been involved in the investigation of the robberies, 
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believed him to be the man he had been looking for and decided to join the pursuit. The 
suspect later crashed his vehicle and fled on foot, leading officers, including Officers #22 
and #119, to chase him on foot through a local neighborhood. As other officers were 
attempting to set up a perimeter throughout the neighborhood to catch the suspect, 
Officer #22 reported that at one point during the chase, the suspect drew a gun on Officer 
#119 and threated to hurt him. Officer #22 issued commands to the suspect to drop his 
weapon, but the suspect did not comply. Rather, he said to Officer #119, “I don’t want to 
hurt you, but I’m going to [have to]. I’ll do [it]. You know I will.” Upon hearing the 
suspect threaten his fellow officer, Officer #22 fired shots at the suspect. When asked 
why he fired at the suspect, Officer #22 reported: 
I don’t remember pulling the trigger. I remember seeing the gun. . .I don’t 
remember the actual trigger pulls. I remember [the] gun, Kevin’s in trouble, get 
your sights on target, and as soon as I got sights on target that’s when I started 
shooting. That’s when the recoil started happening, you know?  But I remember, 
you know, as soon as those sights came on line that’s when the recoil started 
happening and I don’t remember the trigger pull. And I really. . . I don’t 
consciously remember thinking, “I need to shoot this guy.” I saw [the gun] and I 
did it. You know, I saw, I did.  There is that gap of. . .you know. . .I don’t 
remember the thought process of “I need to shoot this guy” and I don’t remember 
the thought process of “squeeze the trigger,” you know? So, all’s I remember is 
“Get your sights up” and boom! That’s. . .you know. . .that’s how fast it was. 
 
 
Officer #22 went on to describe that he had seconds to take action, as Officer 
#119 was in danger of being seriously injured or killed by the suspect. Furthermore, 
Officer #22 explained that Officer #119 did not have his weapon drawn at the time, so he 
could not have fired shots to defend himself. He was able to process that the suspect was 
armed, that Officer #119 was in trouble, and that he needed to raise his weapon, but he 
had no sense that he made a conscious decision to pull the trigger. 
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Two officers involved in Incident 59 provide additional examples of unconscious 
firing behavior. As previously mentioned, this incident involved four officers who 
responded to a local high school where an armed student had barricaded himself inside a 
classroom. During the extensive negotiations that occurred (about 45 minutes to an hour 
long), officers who had been waiting outside the classroom considered many possible 
outcomes. Officer #89 described how he had created a line in the sand in his mind for the 
suspect: if the suspect exited the classroom with the gun in his hand, he was going to 
shoot. Later in the encounter, the suspect attempted to exit the classroom with a gun in 
his hand in a raised position and pointed in the direction of the officers, at which time 
Officer #89 fired shots. 
Officer #89 explained that because he had considered this as a possibility and 
made the conscious decision to fire if the suspect’s behavior met these conditions, his 
shooting behavior was more of a reaction to the suspect’s behavior, explaining: 
You know, there was no. . .you know, I prepared for it and obviously all my 
training had prepared myself to take a shot like that. . .but there was no conscious 
decision to do it. It was pure reaction. I mean, I had already made that conscious 
decision beforehand, you know. . .if the threat presents itself I’m going to take the 
shot. And so there was no thought process in it. It was just, you know, well, here’s 
the scenario. 
 
 
Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #135, had not drawn any sort of 
proverbial line in the sand during negotiations, but rather described pulling the trigger as 
an unconscious reaction to the suspect emerging from the classroom with a gun in his 
hand, saying: 
I don’t actually remember consciously pulling the trigger or coming up on target. 
So it was just – just based on training. [I] just kind of just kicked into training 
mode. I do not consciously remember in my brain saying, “I need to pull the 
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trigger.” It just. . .I pulled the trigger. It was just a reaction to [the suspect] 
presenting the gun.  
 
 
The examples provided by Officer #89 and Officer #135 both demonstrate how 
officers’ firing behavior can occur without conscious choice, but also provide two 
different pathways to such behavior. For example, although Officer #89 reported that he 
did not make a conscious decision to fire his weapon, he did acknowledge that he had 
previously identified conditions under which he would fire and, when the suspect’s 
behavior paired up with the mental boundaries that he had created, he fired his weapon 
without conscious thought. In comparison, Officer #135 explained that he had not 
previously considered conditions under which he would fire, but rather that his shooting 
behavior could be best summed up as a simple reaction to the armed suspect emerging 
from the classroom. This behavior on the suspect’s part was something Officer #135 
recognized from training, which led him to shoot without consciously deciding to do so.  
One last example of an officer’s unconscious decision to use deadly force comes 
from Officer #92. This officer, along with one other officer (#106) in the sample, was 
involved in Incident 69. These officers received a call of a man with a gun in a local 
neighborhood. Upon arriving on scene and engaging in a brief search for the suspect from 
their vehicle, the officers believed they found the individual matching the suspect 
description provided to them by dispatch. When they issued commands to the suspect to 
stop so they could talk with him, he fled on foot. Both officers chased after him.  
At this point, Officer #92 drew his TASER because he did not see the suspect in 
possession of a gun and, therefore, decided to use less-than-lethal force to prevent the 
suspect from escaping. As he began to raise his TASER to fire, the suspect turned around 
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and faced Officers #92 and #106, lifting his sweatshirt up and reaching down into his 
waistband. This movement suggested to Officer #92 that he was reaching for a weapon. 
In the next moment, Officer #92 shot the suspect. He explained, starting when the suspect 
first reached toward his waistband: 
So, as he’s doing this, I’ve got the “Oh shit”. . .He’s reaching. I can’t see his right 
hand. I don’t want my TASER in my hand anymore. I want my gun. Sight wise, I 
can clearly remember him turning. I can clearly remember his right hand finally 
coming into my view.	I can remember [the suspect] doubled over tugging on that 
gun. I mean, he was yanking on that gun. I can remember seeing that. I have the 
visual memory of that, but my inner dialogue is, “I want to get rid of my TASER. 
Oh crap, who just shot?” I don’t remember drawing my gun. I don’t remember 
sighting my gun. And I do not remember the decision to pull the trigger. 
 
 
Based on his narrative, Officer #92 was cognizant of his desire to switch from 
holding his TASER to holding his gun, but when he heard the sound of a gunshot, he 
struggled to understand where the shot came from. Little did he realize that he had not 
only drawn his weapon and aimed it at the suspect, but that the shot he heard had come 
from his firearm and that he was the one who had pulled the trigger. In sum, the three 
aforementioned examples demonstrate how, consistent with Binder and Scharf’s 
conceptualization of the final frame phase, not every officer who fires shots during a 
high-risk police-citizen encounter makes the conscious choice to do so. 
Upon analyzing the responses provided by officers who fired shots, there were 
three officers whose decision to fire could not be classified as either conscious or 
unconscious. For example, when asked directly if his decision to use deadly force was the 
result of a conscious decision, one officer struggled with labeling how he came to pull the 
trigger. In addition, there were two officers who fired shots at different times during their 
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incident and shared that while one of their shots was the result of a conscious decision to 
shoot, others may not have been. The stories of these three officers appear below. 
Officer #117 became involved in Incident 88 when he and a fellow officer were 
called to complete a welfare check at a local apartment complex. A neighbor reported 
hearing loud moaning from the apartment next door and was concerned for the resident 
inside. The officers arrived at the location and, when the resident was non-responsive to 
their knocking, they located the maintenance man for the apartment complex who was 
able to let them into the apartment. Once they entered the apartment, they were 
confronted by a knife-wielding male. Both officers drew their weapons and issued 
commands to the suspect to drop his weapon. The suspect was not compliant and, soon 
after, Officer #117 used oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray in an attempt to disorient the 
armed man. Because he thought the suspect would be subdued by the OC spray, Officer 
#118 moved close to the suspect in an attempt to apprehend him. Instead, the suspect 
began moving rapidly toward the officers and the maintenance man. At this point during 
the encounter, Officer #117 shot the suspect. Officer #117 described the moment of his 
trigger-pulling thusly: 
The guy was like right on top of me. I mean within, you know, basically a little bit 
further than arm’s length. So, you know, I had the barrel [of the gun] trained I 
guess. . .basically center mass [on the suspect]. And, you know, I couldn’t have 
really missed. So yeah. . .it could have been more of a reaction. . .I mean as I was 
firing. . .it was happening so quick. I don’t know if I really had any conscious 
thoughts going through my head. 
 
 
When the interviewer returned to this portion of the incident at another point in 
the interview, Officer #117 clarified his mindset at the time he fired the weapon, saying 
that he believed his decision to fire was “a little bit of both” (conscious and unconscious). 
92		
When asked to clarify why he classified his decision to fire as both conscious and 
unconscious, he stated: 
The unconscious I think it was more a reaction, but the conscious being, you 
know, part of your training and, you know, aiming center mass and putting him 
down. And, once again, you know, if I’m put in that situation, I’m going home at 
night. So, I think that may have played a part as well. Yeah, it could be a little of 
both. 
 
 
Officer #117 recognized that his decision to shoot may have been a reaction to the 
suspect approaching him with a knife at a rapid pace, but he also acknowledged that he 
was cognizant of his training at the time (i.e., what he could or should do under such 
circumstances). Furthermore, he reported being cognizant of his desire to survive the 
encounter. To Officer #117, this consideration of training and thoughts of survival led 
him to believe that there was some conscious thought behind his decision to shoot, but he 
could not say with any sense of certainty if his was a conscious or unconscious decision 
to pull the trigger.  
 The two officers whose trigger-pulling included some based on conscious choice 
and some rooted in unconscious thought had a much clearer sense of how they came to 
fire their guns. The first of these officers, Officer #29, was involved in Incident 20, the 
case involving 16 officers who were pursuing a man who had fired shots at one of their 
sergeants. He was one of the officers shot at when the suspect jumped from the bushes in 
which he had been hiding. Officer #29 gave chase, along with other officers, and made 
the conscious decision to fire multiple rounds at the fleeing suspect. When the suspect 
collapsed, Officer #29 was one of the officers who surrounded the suspect and began 
issuing verbal commands to him. When the suspect moved, Officer #29 fired a 
reactionary shot at the suspect. He explained: 
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I can’t tell you if [the suspect] reach[ed] for his gun or he just turn[ed] toward his 
gun. But I remember movement towards the gun. What it was exactly, I don’t 
know. I remember clearly the lieutenant yelling out, “He’s getting up!” “He’s 
getting up!” or “He’s going for it!” or something he was yelling. Something of 
that nature. And I fired first. . . At the time, it wasn’t. . .I don’t know so much 
surprise as much as. . .[I] just reacted to it. I wasn’t consciously thinking about it. 
It was just. . .he moved, I shot. 
 
 
It is clear from Officer #29’s account that he made the conscious decision to fire 
at the suspect early in the encounter (i.e., during the foot chase), but later fired a shot at 
the suspect that was not the result of a conscious decision, but rather was an unconscious 
reaction to the suspect’s movement.  
The second officer who fired both consciously and unconsciously in a single 
incident was Officer #104, who was one of two officers in the sample who responded to 
Incident 46, the incident wherein officers responded to a call of shots fired at a nearby 
community center. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers spotted the armed suspect 
and followed him into the community center and issued commands to the suspect to drop 
his weapon. The suspect had raised his shotgun a number of times as if he was going to 
shoot, but never pointed it in the direction of the officers. When the suspect pointed his 
weapon at the officers, however, Officer #104 fired. When asked if he made a conscious 
decision to fire at the suspect at this time, he explained: 
I don’t, I don’t think I actually said, “Ok, now!” It was just, “Okay, drop the gun, 
drop the gun!” And the [the suspect] turned toward me and I let loose. So yeah, I 
don’t. . .I don’t think I actually, you know, [thought] “Okay, now it’s time to 
shoot the bad guy.” I reacted. 
 
 
Although he fired shots at the suspect, the suspect was still able to move and 
began running up the stairs in front of him. At this point, Officer #104 described his 
conscious decision to hold fire at the fleeing suspect, saying: 
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I followed [the suspect] for a good one to two seconds up those stairs as he ran 
with my gun pointed directly at his back. And I actually made a conscientious, 
conscience decision not to pull the trigger at that point because of bad press. 
 
 
The suspect made it up the stairs and began poking his head and his shotgun 
around the corner. Once the suspect had moved his weapon so that it was in a firing 
position and directly facing the officers, Officer #104 made a conscious decision to fire, 
explaining: 
[The suspect] had both feet firmly planted and he swung the gun towards me 
again. This time, having a good clean platform, I shot and I kept shooting until he 
dropped. . . the second volley was absolutely 100 percent a conscious decision. 
 
 
Findings from the officers described in this section indicate that not all officers 
make a decision to use deadly force during the final frame of the incident. The notion of 
firing as reaction, however, is addressed by Binder and Scharf. In their description of the 
final frame phase, they do acknowledge that, at times, an officer’s shooting behavior can 
be characterized as an “impulsive reaction” or a decision requiring “minimal rational 
input” in response to a suspect’s behavior (Binder and Scharf, 1980, p. 118). Therefore, 
while it is noteworthy that the decision to use deadly force was not made by all 46 
officers who fired their weapons, this finding is consistent with the authors’ description 
of the final frame. 
 
NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 
When analyzing officers’ decision-making in the final frame and attempting to 
pinpoint what would make one officer shoot and another hold fire, it quickly became 
clear that many of the officers who held fire did not actually make a decision to hold fire, 
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but rather never considered shooting at all during the final frame. Of the 37 witness 
officers in the sample, 16 of these officers stated that they never considered the 
possibility of shooting at any point during the encounter. There were many reasons why 
these officers did not consider firing shots during their incident, including: they were 
assigned to another task at the time (n=5 officers), they did not have their weapon out 
(n=3), they were focused on attending to someone else (e.g., an injured officer) on scene 
(n=3), their perception of their role prevented them from considering whether to fire shots 
(n=2), the suspect was not facing them at the time (n=1), the suspect had already been hit 
by police gunfire (n=1), and the incident transpired rapidly and they did not have time to 
consider firing shots (n=1).  
To provide additional understanding of why some of the officers present at 
officer-involved shooters did not even consider using or not using deadly force, a few 
examples of such occurrences are provided below.21  
Officer #34 was involved in Incident 20, wherein 16 officers were involved in the 
chase of a suspect who had fired upon one of their fellow officers.  Upon his arrival on 
scene, Officer #34 spoke with a citizen who lived in the neighborhood reporting that she 
saw the suspect in the area and believed he could be hiding in the bushes nearby. Officer 
#34 then found a group of officers standing near said bushes and alerted them that the 
suspect may be close and recommended they back away from the bushes and find cover. 
No sooner did he say this than the suspect jumped out of the bushes and open fired on the 
officers.  
																																																								21	Additional details regarding the five officers who did not consider shooting or holding fire because of 
their assignments and the three officers who did not consider shooting because of their perceived role 
during their incident will be discussed in a subsequent section of the dissertation (see Chapter 5).	
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Along with other officers, Officer #34 began chasing after the suspect as he fled 
down the street, but he never fired. When the suspect eventually collapsed from other 
officers’ gunfire and multiple officers converged on the downed suspect, Officer #34 had 
his gun out and ready should he need to use it. While standing there, he noticed that the 
officer standing next to him was acting strangely. Officer #34 stated:  
My gun is trained on the suspect and I can see [Paul] and he’s not focused. His 
gun is up and he puts his gun down and he looks at himself and puts his gun back 
up and he does it, like, twice. And for whatever reason, I got annoyed. I said, 
“[Paul], what are you doing?” because this is a trained guy. He knows better than 
to let his guard down and not be behind cover. And he says, “I think I’m hit.” And 
I holstered my gun and I put my flashlight on his shirt and there was the tiniest, 
tiniest, little hole in his shirt. And that’s the first time I remember being scared. 
 
 
Upon seeing the hole in the other officer’s shirt, Officer #34 realized his fellow 
officer had been shot and turned his attention away from the suspect and focused on 
getting the injured officer from the scene and to a space where he could receive medical 
attention. He stated: 
I remember holstering my weapon and grabbing his right arm, kind of under his 
arm and kind of supporting his arm. I think my goal was to get him down past all 
the cars and get him down maybe, down below. . .so, you know, an ambulance 
[could] respond there. 
 
 
Because he chose to help the wounded officer, Officer #34 stopped focusing on 
the downed suspect and, therefore, never considered shooting or not shooting the suspect 
at this point during the encounter.  
Another example of never considering shooting comes from Officer #118’s 
account of Incident 88, which was the incident in which two officers responded to a 
welfare check call at an apartment complex. Once the officers were able to enter the 
apartment, they were confronted by a knife-wielding man inside and both officers began 
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issuing commands to him to drop the weapon. After Officer #117 had used OC spray on 
the suspect, Officer #118 made the decision to get close to the suspect and grab him 
while the spray distracted him. He soon realized that the suspect was coming toward 
Officer #117 and that Officer #117 may have no choice but to shoot. Officer #117 stated: 
I took one step towards [the suspect] with the intention of grabbing him and it 
only took one step and I realized that [Jimmy] wasn’t going to have a choice - he 
was going to have to shoot him because he didn’t have the room and I didn’t have 
the time to get to [the suspect] before he got to [Jimmy]. So, I immediately. . .and 
everything started going through my head really quick. I go, “Okay he’s gonna 
shoot him and I’m down range of this bullet.” I said, “This bullet [is] gonna go 
through [the suspect] and from that point I don’t know where it’s gonna go.” 
 
 
At this point, rather than contemplating whether to use deadly force, Officer #118 
was trying to figure out how to avoid being hit by Officer #117’s bullets. Officer #118 
continued: 
So, I immediately start thinking what do I do. I just went to the right side wall and 
I just put myself in front of it and I just held myself as close to that wall as I could 
and I got there just about the time the first shot went off. After the first shot went 
off, I looked over and I saw [the suspect]. He just stood there and he still had the 
knife in the air. And then about maybe a second later, [Jimmy] shot a second time 
and at that point I saw [the suspect] fall backwards to the ground. 
 
 
As one can see from Officer #118’s description, he never considered whether he 
should use deadly force because he was focused on his own safety (re: his partner’s 
gunfire). His description suggests that he was confident enough that his partner was going 
to use deadly force against the suspect that he needed to focus on his own safety. 
Therefore, Officer #118 never considered whether to shoot or hold fire, as he was 
preoccupied with removing himself from his partner’s line of fire. 
Lastly, in addition to the 16 officers who never considered shooting and the 19 
officers who considered shooting but chose to hold fire, there were two officers whose 
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decision to hold fire may not have been a decision at all. When asked why they chose not 
to shoot during their respective incidents, Officers #28 and #113 could not articulate why 
they chose to hold fire. For example, Officer #113, was still in training at the time of 
Incident 43, the previously mentioned incident wherein a non-compliant male armed with 
multiple knives confronted her and her partner. Officer #113 explained that although she 
had her gun drawn and pointed at the knife-wielding suspect approaching her and her 
partner, she was unsure why she did not fire, explaining: 
In my mind I was thinking this is exactly, you know, this is a perfect academy 
scenario.  There’s a guy with a knife approaching, he’s well within twenty-one 
feet, and so I took the slack out of my trigger and at some point after that I heard 
[my partner’s] shot. . .I don’t know [why I didn’t shoot]. I guess, you know, 
whether I don’t know how much time there was between the time that I took the 
slack out and the time that [my partner] shot or that [the suspect] was actually 
shot.  I really don’t have an answer to that question. 
 
 
The other witness officer who struggled to understand why he held fire was 
Officer #28 who was one of the 16 officers involved in Incident 20. His situation was 
unique as he was the lone officer struck by the suspect’s gunfire. As he and other officers 
were chasing after the suspect who had open fired on them, Officer #28 considered 
shooting, as he put it: 
I remember thinking about shooting his head. I don’t know why, but the thought 
of shooting his head kept popping in my mind. When I think back about it. . .I 
couldn’t have put my sights more centered on the back of his head than anything 
else. I mean, I had it there. . .I remember I was squinting. I was looking through 
my sights. I was looking at the back of his head and I had my trigger halfway 
pulled. And I was ready. And uh. . .I don’t know what made me stop. 
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SUMMARY 
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) provided scholars with a framework to analyze 
police officers’ decision-making during high-risk police-citizen encounters that may or 
may not conclude in police use of deadly force. They hypothesized that the difference in 
whether an officer chooses to shoot or hold fire is best attributed to differences in 
decisions and considerations that officers make throughout such incidents. The results 
from this analysis disclose, however, that regardless of the decisions officers make in the 
final frame, many officers thought and acted the same way during the time that preceded 
the final frame phase. 
In the anticipation phase, both shooters and witness officers collected information 
about the situation and/or the suspect they would be encountering prior to arriving on 
scene.  It was also observed that both shooters and witness officers considered the source 
of the information they were receiving (e.g., from a fellow officer, dispatcher, or citizen). 
Once they arrived on scene and entered the entry and initial contact phase, both shooters 
and witness officers continued to collect more information about the situation and the 
suspect through direct observation and used these observations to alter their 
understanding of the situation at hand. Furthermore, both shooters and witness officers 
reported communicating with other officers on scene to share the information they had 
about the suspect or the situation at hand. Finally, both shooters and witness officers 
reported considering their personal safety and the safety of other officers during the entry 
phase, leading many of them to make decisions that they felt reduced their likelihood of 
being injured or killed (e.g., considering safe, tactical approaches to the scene or toward 
the suspect, and drawing their firearms). 
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When officers did enter in the information exchange phase, both shooters and 
witness officers used this time to communicate with suspects, most commonly issuing 
commands to suspects to drop their weapon. It appeared that these officers, both shooters 
and witness officers, issued commands with the goal of gaining control over the suspect 
and the situation. In addition, both shooters and witness officers made similar 
interpretations of suspects’ physical demeanor and described how this impacted their 
view of the situation and subsequent decision-making. Lastly, both shooters and witness 
officers formed “if. . .then” mental models (or drafted lines in the sand) to help frame 
their shooting behavior. Regardless of whether they eventually followed through with 
such thoughts, it is important to note that both officers who later fired shots and those 
who did not sometimes considered during the information exchange phase the possibility 
that deadly force may become necessary.  
After reviewing officers’ decision-making behavior in the anticipation, entry, and 
information exchange phases, it is clear that more similarities than differences exist in the 
thought processes of shooters and witness officers. This leads to the following question: 
if stark differences between shooters and witness officers do not exist during the first 
three phases of police-citizen encounters, what explains why some officers shoot and 
others hold fire? This question is addressed in subsequent chapters of the dissertation. 
Before doing so, however, some consideration of what the analysis in this chapter says 
about the final frame is in order. 
Conception of the final frame is predicated on the notion that police officers make 
the determination that deadly force is either necessary or unnecessary and, based on this 
determination, follow up with a decision to use or not use deadly force. Binder and 
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Scharf do acknowledge, however, that there may be times when officers’ shooting 
behavior can be best described as a mere reaction to a suspect’s action, not a conscious 
decision to pull the trigger. Some of the findings presented in this chapter support this 
argument.  
Additional findings, however, indicated that some officers who did not shoot 
never considered using deadly force at all. The results suggest that not all officers enter 
Binder and Scharf’s final frame, which Binder and Scharf fail to consider. This finding 
thus indicates that there exists a notable hole in the Binder and Scharf deadly force 
decision-making framework. This matter will be revisited later in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING AND THE IMPACT 
OF OTHER OFFICERS 
 
 
 The first research question this study was designed to assess was how well Binder 
and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework accounted for officers’ thoughts 
and actions in police-citizen interactions in which some officers present discharged their 
firearms and some officers held fire. The core finding was that officers processed through 
the decision-making framework in a linear fashion and made decisions and carried out 
actions in each of the four phases encompassed in the framework.   
To explain why some officers shoot and other officers hold fire in similar 
situations, Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) assert that the two sorts of officers make 
different decisions as they move through the phases that precede the final frame of the 
encounters. That is, perhaps officers who choose to use deadly force consider different 
situational factors or make different decisions in the first three phases compared to 
officers who choose to hold fire.  
To assess whether Binder and Scharf’s hypothesis described above holds, the 
second research question this study examined was: Given the same situation, do stark 
differences in how police officers move through the Binder and Scharf decision-making 
process account for why some officers chose to use deadly force and some chose not to 
use deadly force? The results described in the previous chapter indicate that although 
officers sometimes made different decisions in the final frame phase, shooters and 
witness officers did not always consider different factors or make significantly different 
decisions during the anticipation, entry and initial contact, and information exchange 
phases. In their work, Binder and Scharf (1983) assert that differences in how officers 
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move through this decision-making model (i.e., decisions they make and factors that 
impact these decisions) account for why some ultimately choose to use deadly force 
while others choose to hold fire. In contrast, the results from this study suggest this is not 
the case. If a significant difference in how officers move through high-risk situations does 
not account for why some officers shot while others did not, what does explain this 
difference in action during the final frame phase? 
This chapter will begin with a brief review of the similarities observed among 
shooters and witness officers in the first three phases of Binder and Scharf’s deadly force 
decision-making framework. Next, the stated reasons for shooting or holding fire 
provided by the officers in the sample will be reviewed in order to shed light on how the 
presence of and actions of other officers on scene impacted officers’ decision-making 
during the final frame stage of encounters. The chapter will then conclude with a 
discussion of how social roles during a deadly force incident can influence officers’ 
decision-making throughout a potentially violent police-citizen encounter where multiple 
officers are present. 
 
EARLY PHASE CONSIDERATIONS 
 The majority (n=55) of the 83 officers in the sample, regardless of their decision 
in the final frame phase, used the first phase of Binder and Scharf’s decision-making 
framework to collect and review known information about the situation and/or the 
suspect. Of the 55 officers who engaged in this behavior, 30 eventually fired shots during 
their incident and 26 held fire. While there is a slight difference between these figures, 
that many officers on both sides of the shooting divide comported themselves similarly 
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indicates that differences in phase one do not account for different outcomes. Eleven (11) 
additional officers reported that they relied on information they had previously acquired 
about the suspect who, when alerted to the incident by dispatchers, they believed to be 
involved. Rather than taking the time en route to the scene to collect additional 
information about the suspect, these officers made the decision to work with the 
information they already had. Of these 11 officers, six (6) officers ended up using deadly 
force during their incident and five (5) did not. Again, while there is a very slight 
difference in these figures, it is certainly not enough to say that stark differences in 
officers’ behavior during this first phase account for their behavior differences in the final 
frame. 
  When analyzing officers’ behaviors in the entry phase, one can see that the 
majority of the officers in the sample, regardless of their decision to use deadly force in 
the final frame, continued to collect information about the situation and the suspect 
through direct observation (54 officers; 27 shooters, 25 witness officers). Furthermore, 
both shooters and witness officers used the additional information collected during this 
phase of the encounter to assess and adjust their definition of the situation at hand. In 
sum, while there were slight differences in the counts of shooters and witness officers 
who engaged in these behaviors, they are not enough to suggest striking differences in 
how officers processed through this second phase. 
 Finally, when analyzing officers’ decision-making and considerations made 
during the information exchange phase, more similarities as opposed to differences were 
discovered among shooters and witness officers. Of the 38 officers in the sample who 
made verbal contact with the suspect in their incident, 24 of them fired shots during the 
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final frame phase and 14 did not. Furthermore, of the 46 officers in the sample who did 
not enter the information exchange phase (either because their incident unfolded quickly 
or because they did not issue verbal commands to the suspect), 23 officers ultimately 
used deadly force and 23 did not. Binder and Scharf note that information collected 
through verbal exchanges between officers and suspects and the suspect’s response to 
said communication can ultimately impact officers’ decision-making in the final frame 
phase. Findings from this study suggest, however, that even when verbal communication 
was used and exchanges between the police and suspect occurred, there is still variation 
that existed in the decision to shoot. Furthermore, in instances where officers did not 
verbally communicate with the suspect (which, arguably, limited their ability to collect 
additional information about the suspect’s intentions, state of mind, etc.), a variation in 
the decision to use deadly force also existed. Given the number of similarities that are 
present in the decisions and behaviors of officers throughout the first three phases of 
Binder and Scharf’s framework then, what accounts for the difference in officers’ 
decision to use deadly force? 
 The analysis suggests that rather than being the result of significant differences in 
decision-making or factors considered by officers in the first three phases of Binder and 
Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework, the difference in whether officers 
used deadly force or held fire in their incidents was largely influenced by the presence of 
other officers on scene. The remainder of this chapter explores and expands on the nature 
of this social influence. It begins with an examination of officers who made conscious 
choices to fire their weapons, then follows with an examination of officers who did not 
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consider using deadly force, and concludes with the examination of officers who 
unconsciously fired their weapons. 
 
OTHER OFFICERS AND THE DECISION TO USE DEADLY FORCE 
 As noted previously, 32 police officers in the sample made the conscious decision 
to use deadly force. During their interviews, officers were asked directly if they made a 
conscious decision to fire their weapon and, if so, why they chose to do so. The 32 
officers who made the conscious decision to fire gave numerous explanations for why 
they chose to fire. All but two of these officers indicated that the presence of or the 
decisions made by other officers had some influence on their choice to shoot.  
 Incident 9, which involved four officers in the sample, included two officers who 
made the conscious decision to fire in order to protect one of their own. Two officers 
(Officer #9 and Officer #16) had been conducting an investigation of an armed robbery of 
a gas station that had occurred the previous night. In addition to surveillance video of the 
incident, a witness had come forward with the license plate number of the suspect’s 
vehicle. The officers ran the license plate number and found that the make and the model 
of car registered to those plates matched the vehicle in the surveillance video. These 
officers then made the decision to drive to the residence associated with the vehicle 
registration to see if, in fact, this was the vehicle – and suspect – for which they were 
looking.  
They called two additional officers to assist them in the case (Officers #10 and 
#13) and once all four officers arrived on scene, they drafted a plan to make contact with 
the suspect: Officers #9 and #16 would stay in the front of the suspect’s home and 
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attempt to knock on the door to initiate contact while Officers #10 and #13 would keep 
watch around the back of the suspect’s home in case he attempted to flee. Officer #9 
approached the front door to the suspect’s home, knocked, and then announced himself as 
a police officer. The suspect proceeded to open the door with a gun held at his waist. 
Officer #9 issued commands to the suspect to drop the weapon and made sure to do so 
loud enough that the other officers on scene could hear that the suspect was armed. When 
the suspect did not comply with his orders and began to point his weapon in the direction 
of his partner, Officer #9 decided to shoot, saying: 
. . .When he comes up and I see that gun and I yell “Police! Drop the gun! Police! 
Drop the gun!” I mean, that’s all the time it took. I mean as soon as I yell 
“Police!” the first time, I mean, I got the words out the second time, and it was. . 
.it was trigger time. You know, it wasn’t like I was waiting for him to point at me. 
That was not the deciding factor cause, uh, the way he was coming out and 
pointing the gun, waist-level, that’s until in the general direction of [my partner] 
behind this truck.   
 
 
During this interview, the interviewer asked Officer #9 for clarification about his 
decision to fire, asking him that if his partner had not been in the area where the suspect 
pointed his weapon, would he have still made a decision to fire? Officer #9 responded by 
saying, “No—if I’d been the only officer there, nobody else around, and [the suspect] 
was pointing at nothing, I would not have fired until that gun came towards me.” 
His partner, Officer #16, also made the conscious decision to fire shots at the 
suspect, citing that his decision to fire was based on his concern for Officer #9 who was 
right in front of the suspect. He explained: 
[My partner] knocked on the door a second time, knocked on the door a third 
time, [and] by that time the door opens slow and shuts.  Now we’re yelling, 
“Police! Police! Come out. We want to talk to you.  Show us your hands! Step out 
of the door!”. . .you know, all these commands are starting to come across. I 
believe we’re both yelling. And uh not only do [I] see the gun, [but my partner] 
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sees a gun and I’m yelling, “Gun” to make sure he’s aware of the gun and he’s 
doing the same thing to make sure that I’m aware of it. . . I’m firing to protect 
[my partner]. The gun looked like it was first going up in his direction. 
 
 
 The responses provided by Officers #9 and #16 highlight how both were 
concerned for each other’s safety during the incident. Although Officer #9 was closer to 
the armed suspect and feared for his safety, the reason he decided to shoot was to protect 
his partner who he believed would be in the line of fire had the suspect started shooting. 
Similarly, Officer #16 made the decision to fire at the suspect based on his perception 
that his partner was at risk of being shot.  
 Although both of these officers fired shots at the suspect, the suspect was still able 
to shoot a number of rounds at the officers, leading these two officers to fire multiple 
rounds at him. A third officer involved, Officer #13, who was originally assigned to the 
back of the suspect’s home in case he attempted to flee, heard the gunfire and made his 
way around to the front of the house to assist the two officers who were firing shots. 
Officer #13 was the one officer in the sample who made the decision to use deadly force 
at the request of another officer, saying: 
I immediately said “Shit!” to myself.  And I took off running.  I came around the 
opposite end of the trailer where they were at. While I was running I heard several 
shots. As I come up around the corner of the trailer I saw [Officer #16] engage 
some more rounds and I could see that the front door was opened and [Officer 
#16] was shooting into the trailer. And he looked at me [and] he goes “Mike, 
cover me, I got to reload.”  So I came around, I positioned myself and . . .knowing 
[another officer] was on the other side [of the house] if I was going to shoot, I 
kind of squatted down, so I would shoot upwards at an angle and I shot two-two 
round bursts. 
 
 
Later in the interview, Officer #13 was asked to clarify his decision to fire his 
weapon. While he acknowledged that part of his decision was a response to a fellow 
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officer asking for cover so he could reload his firearm, the other part of his decision to 
fire was to ensure that the suspect did not harm other officers, saying: 
. . .my major concern was that this guy would come out while [Officer #16] was 
trying to reload. And then when I knew the location where [the suspect] was at, I 
thought that there was a good chance I could hit him if I shot where I shot. So my 
thought was to stop the threat as soon as possible.  And um, that’s why I engaged. 
. . what I want to do is put an end and put a stop to what I thought was an 
aggressive act towards the other officers. 
 
 
While his decision may not have been as straightforward as the decisions made by 
Officers #9 and #16, the two main influences on his firing decision involved other 
officers. Not only did Officer #16 ask for Officer #13 to provide cover (in the form of 
gunfire) while he reloaded his weapon, but Officer #13 also acknowledged his concern 
for other officers on scene and the impact it had on his decision to pull the trigger. In 
sum, Incident 9 included three officers whose conscious decisions to use deadly force 
provide clear examples of how this decision was influenced by other officers on scene. 
The fourth officer involved in the incident, Officer #10, did not fire shots, but rather 
chose to hold fire. 
Incident 103 provides another example of an officer making the conscious 
decision to use deadly force to protect a fellow officer. This was the incident that 
involved two officers and began when an officer on his way to work spotted a highway 
patrol officer in a physical altercation with a driver he had stopped. He explained his 
initial observations, saying:  
I remember seeing [Officer #152] at the side of the [driver’s] car trying to yank 
this guy out from the driver’s seat and the driver’s door was open and I hear gears 
grinding and I hear tires squealing and I see the car start to gun forward and I see 
Bruce still in trying to get this guy out of the driver’s seat. . ..[Officer #152] is 
between the door and the car frame and seconds later, as the car started moving, I 
see [Officer #152] drop out of the picture. I yelled, “Trooper, are you okay?” and 
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I got no response. . .all I could think of was him getting crushed between that door 
and the car or getting crushed between the car and the jersey wall and I realized I 
had to stop that car. 
 
 
At this point, Officer #147 fired multiple shots at the suspect, with the goal of 
stopping the driver from moving the vehicle forward and potentially running over Officer 
#152 (the highway patrol officer). Officer #147 later stated in his interview that at the 
time he pulled the trigger, he was completely sure that if he did not use deadly force at 
the moment he did, Officer #152 would have been seriously injured or killed. When 
asked to rate the likelihood that he or citizens in the area would have been injured or 
killed had he not fired when he did, Officer #147 reported that these outcomes were 
highly unlikely. Therefore, it was clear that his sole concern, and reason for using deadly 
force, was to ensure the safety of a fellow law enforcement officer. 
One last example to demonstrate how officers’ conscious decision to use deadly 
force was influenced by concern for the safety of other officers can be observed in 
Incident 123. This was the incident that involved two officers in the sample who 
responded to a call reporting a student armed with a rifle outside of a local high school. 
Officer #182 was the second officer to arrive at the school and soon witnessed the suspect 
raising the rifle up and pointing it at himself, explaining: 
At the time, [the suspect] was pointing [the gun] at his head and even brought it 
down and held it up to his chin.  He had pointed it in all different directions.  He 
leveled off at two of the officers that were basically together at the same car very 
briefly, and then he lowered it, returned to putting it at his head and so forth 
during the times they were trying to negotiate with him to put the gun down. . 
.you know, “You don’t want to do this,” this and that, and everything. He leveled 
that gun off again and this time he more or less buried it in his shoulder as to 
steady the weapon, to fire it, aiming for the officers.  I just told myself this [had 
gone on] far enough. I had to do something so I did. I shot three times and hit him 
twice. 
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Officer #182 went on to clarify that he never personally felt threatened by the 
armed suspect. Instead, his primary concern was for the two officers who were standing 
in the direction where the suspect continued to aim his rifle, saying: 
At no time did I feel threatened. I felt that I had positioned myself tactically. I was 
behind a car to where, you know, I could fend for myself. [The suspect] 
concentrated his efforts on the two officers and himself and the second time he 
pointed it at the two officers I just thought to myself, “I’m not gonna let this 
happen,” so I shot. 
 
 
 In sum, the examples provided above demonstrate a common pattern observed 
among officers who made the conscious decision to use deadly force: the decision to pull 
the trigger made by many officers in the sample was influenced by other officers. That is, 
the majority of those who made a conscious decision to use deadly force did so with the 
goal of protecting other officers on scene.  
 In their summary of the final frame and factors they believe influence an officer’s 
decision-making at this point during an encounter, Binder and Scharf do not address how 
other officers may impact a single officer’s decision to pull the trigger. Again, their 
failure to address the potential for other officers to impact an individual officer’s 
decision-making may have been due to the data they analyzed and a lack of interviews 
with officers involved in violent police-citizen encounters in which more than one officer 
was present. The findings from this study then contribute to what is known about 
officers’ decision-making in the final frame when multiple officers are involved, 
specifically that an officer’s decision to use deadly force can be strongly influenced by 
their perception of other officers’ safety and their desire to protect other officers from 
serious injury or death at the hands of a suspect. 
112		
OTHER OFFICERS AND THE CONSCIOUS DECISION TO HOLD FIRE  
As previously mentioned, 19 of the 37 officers in the sample who did not shoot 
made the conscious decision to hold fire. In their conceptualization of the final frame 
phase of their decision-making framework, Scharf and Binder (1983) assert that a non-
shooting officer enters this phase when he or she makes the determination that, based on 
the situation and level of threat in front of them, the use of deadly force is not necessary. 
The officer will then make the conscious decision to refrain from firing his or her 
weapon. The findings from the analysis reveal that, similar to the officers described in the 
previous section whose decision to use deadly force was impacted by other officers, 
officers’ decision to hold fire can also be influenced by other officers involved in the 
incident. 
 First, it should be stated that nine (9) of the 19 officers who made the decision to 
hold fire in their incidents did so independent of any influence by the presence of or 
decisions made by other officers on scene. Three (3) officers reported making the 
decision not to shoot because they did not feel personally threatened by the suspect at the 
time. Two (2) additional officers shared that they held fire during their incident because 
they could not see the suspect at the time other officers fired shots. Two (2) officers 
reported that they did not fire because they could not see the suspect’s weapon. Lastly, 
two (2) officers stated that they did not feel their use of deadly force would be justified at 
the time, so they made the decision to not to shoot.  
 The remaining 10 officers who made the decision to hold fire in their incidents 
reported that their decision to refrain from shooting was influenced by other officers in 
one of two ways: by the presence of another officer or by a decision made by another 
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officer. For example, three (3) officers reported that they made the decision to hold fire 
not because they had determined that the suspect was no longer a threat, but instead 
because a fellow officer was in their line of fire. Therefore, their decision to refrain from 
shooting had little to do with the perceived threat level of the suspect in their incident and 
more to do with maintaining the safety of other officers involved in the incident. 
 An example of this can be found in Incident 46, during which two officers in the 
sample responded to a call of shots fired at a nearby community center. One of these 
officers, Officer #69, made it clear that his decision to hold fire had everything to do with 
ensuring he did not hit his partner with gunfire. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers 
spotted the armed assailant, followed him into the community center, and issued 
commands for him to drop his shotgun. The suspect failed to comply with the officers’ 
request and instead continued to make his way through the community center. Officer 
#69 explained: 
We see [the suspect] moving up the stairs and he stopped and kind of turned about 
halfway up and was yelling at us “Don’t come in here!” And we’re continuing to 
yell, “Put the weapon down!” [My partner] is in front of me. . .right in front of 
me. I’m behind him as we move up to the first pillar and we see the suspect kind 
of turn and go to the left behind a wall. . . Suspect comes back, shotgun lowered 
at us. [My partner] was in front of me [and he] fires several shots. I had my finger 
on the trigger. I think I was starting to press, but [my partner’s] head was just 
right in front of me. So, I didn’t.  
 
As one can gather from this example, Officer #69 considered the suspect to be a 
serious threat. After all, this officer had his weapon drawn and his finger on the trigger 
ready to fire. At the moment where he presumably was going to make the decision to fire, 
however, his partner was directly in front him. The fact that his partner was in his line of 
fire directly influenced Officer #69’s decision to hold fire because had he made the 
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decision the fire, his partner could have been very seriously injured or killed by his 
gunfire.  
Another example of similar behavior was observed in Officer #217’s decision to 
hold fire in Incident 118, the one in which two homicide detectives were searching for a 
suspect wanted in a recent homicide. When the officers first approached the suspect and 
issue commands for him to get down on the ground (as he was under arrest), the suspect 
instead charged at Officer #168 and engaged him in a physical fight and attempted to 
steal his firearm. Officer #217 watched as this unfolded, aware that the suspect posed a 
threat to his partner, but cognizant of his partner’s close location to the suspect and how 
the use of deadly force would factor in, saying: 
I’m watching the [suspect] and he turns towards [my partner] and he gets right up 
on my partner. . .I’m thinking holy shit. . .I have no idea why this is happening. 
I’ve never seen this before. And I think I started some back steps, continued the 
commands, and you know, a split second later [the suspect] makes his turn. [My 
partner, myself, and the suspect are] no longer in a triangle. Now we’re in a 
straight line. Me, looking at the back of the suspect and going towards the front of 
my partner. So, we’re in a crossfire now. 
 
 
As he was recounting the incident, Officer #217 voiced his concern that the 
suspect would be able to maneuver his partner’s weapon away from him and potentially 
use it against both officers. This led Officer #217 to fear not only for his partner’s safety, 
but also for his own. Although he had his weapon drawn and he recognized that the 
suspect posed a deadly threat, Officer #217 made it clear that because his partner was in 
his line of fire, he made the decision to not shoot. His partner was eventually able to 
shoot the suspect, concluding the incident. 
The interviewer later asked Officer #217 if his decision-making at this point 
during the encounter would have been different had his partner not been able to fire a 
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shot at the suspect when he did (thus incapacitating him). Officer #217 found the 
question tough to answer, saying that, “. . .at the moment that [my partner] took the shot, 
the distance that I had was still a little more than I would have liked to take a shot with 
[my partner] being that close [to the suspect].” It is clear that the positioning of his 
partner in relation to the suspect was a critical concern for Officer #217 and ultimately 
impacted his decision to hold fire even though the suspect continued to fight his partner. 
One last example was observed in Incident 53, which involved two officers in the 
sample. These officers were on patrol together when they received a call from another 
officer reporting that he had spotted a robbery suspect they had been searching for and 
needed back-up. They drove to the reported location and saw a man matching the 
description of the suspect wanted for the robbery. The officers exited their vehicles and 
attempted to make verbal contact with the man, at which point the suspect took off 
running. Officer #91 began chasing the suspect on foot, with his partner, Officer #75, 
close behind him. Both officers reported seeing the suspect draw a weapon, which led 
them both to draw their weapons as well. When the suspect began to turn around toward 
officers with his weapon, Officer #75 reported that she was aware of the deadly threat 
posed by the suspect to herself and her partner and she had made the conscious decision 
to fire, but when she went to raise her weapon to shoot, she quickly opted to hold fire, 
explaining: 
So then [the suspect] starts running and then he ends up pulling a gun out and 
kind of turning towards us, but [my partner and I] were both kind of like running 
at him. . .and Nick was kind of in front of me at that point, so I didn’t shoot 
because there were people down the street from me and because Nick was just a 
little bit ahead of me, so he kind of. . .he would have been in my line of fire. 
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Her partner, Officer #75, had fired shots at the suspect just seconds prior to 
Officer #91 making the decision to hold fire. After she had recounted her incident and the 
decisions she made, the interviewer asked Officer #75 to consider whether she would 
have used deadly force had her partner not fired. She replied no, reasoning that “because 
[my partner] was in my way and because I was really concerned, you know, because. . .at 
the end of the block there’s a bunch of people in the crosswalk. It’s the middle of the 
afternoon.” Furthermore, when asked what she would have done had her partner not been 
in front of her and had citizens not been down the block and in her line of fire, Officer 
#75 responded that, given that situation, she would have most likely decided to use 
deadly force. Based on these findings, it is apparent that her concern for possibly striking 
her partner (as well as citizens) with gunfire played a pivotal role in her decision to hold 
fire.  
In addition to other officers’ presence impacting officers’ decision to hold fire, 
the decisions made by other officers on scene also factored into officers’ decisions to 
refrain from using deadly force. For example, seven (7) officers reported holding fire in 
their incident because a fellow officer on scene had already shot the suspect, thus 
eliminating the threat posed by this individual. A good example of this type of decision-
making was observed in Officer #172’s thinking during the final frame of Incident 26, the 
one wherein four officers went to a bail bondsman’s office to arrest an individual wanted 
on a family violence warrant. Once the altercation began, Officer #172 saw that the 
suspect was holding a firearm. Upon seeing the weapon, and coupled with the suspect’s 
non-compliant behavior, Officer #172 decided that the use of deadly force was necessary. 
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In his mind, this suspect was now “a cop killer. . .I wasn’t thinking anything other than 
we gotta put him down.” 
Officer #172 soon realized that, based on the position of other officers, that he 
could not use deadly force against the suspect without potentially hitting another officer 
with police gunfire. Similarly, he realized that other officers could not shoot without 
endangering him. As Officer #172 said, “I wasn’t helping the situation anymore, so I 
kinda looked at [another officer] and went, “Sorry, man” and I jumped off of [the 
suspect] and I gave him a shove on the way out.  And then that’s when the shots were 
fired.” 
By distancing himself from the suspect, Officer #172 was giving other officers the 
space they needed to use deadly force against the suspect without compromising officer 
safety. Once he pushed off the suspect and created space between himself and the 
suspect, however, Officer #172 was knocked down on the ground. He still managed to 
draw his weapon and, up until this moment, was still moving forward with the decision to 
use deadly force, explaining: 
So, I landed on the ground and I fell on my butt, and then when I got up and un-
holstered my weapon the fight was over. . . I popped up ready to fight and [the 
suspect is] not anywhere where I can shoot him anymore. . . If I’d shot him it 
would’ve been murder even at this point. 
 
As one can see, this officer had made the decision to use deadly force, yet when 
other officers were able to fire rounds at the suspect before he could, Officer #172 made 
the decision to refrain from shooting. This example demonstrates two important points to 
consider. First, an officer’s determination that deadly force may be necessary and their 
decision to use or not use deadly force are not always made at the same point in the 
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encounter. Although Officer #172 determined that he was going to use deadly force 
against the suspect when he spotted that the assailant had a weapon in his hand, he did 
not immediately fire, instead holding off on pulling the trigger until his fellow officers 
were out of his line of fire. Second, decisions made by the other officers on scene (i.e., 
the decision to shoot) ultimately altered the original decision he had made, leading 
Officer #172 to hold fire as opposed to following through with his original decision 
which had been to use deadly force. 
Another example of how other officers’ decisions to fire caused an officer to 
decide to hold fire was observed in Officer #185’s account of his participation in Incident 
124, the one in which four officers in the sample were executing the search warrant of a 
home suspected of being using to house illegal narcotics. Officer #213, one of the first 
officers in the entry line, quickly spotted one of the shooting assailants and fired shots. 
Another officer, Officer #185, explained that once gunfire rang out and officers saw a 
fellow officer drop out of the line because he had been struck by a bullet from one of the 
suspects, “everybody went into defensive mode.”  
Officer #185 helped a few other officers carry the downed officer out of the house 
to safety, but then quickly made his way back into the home, weapon drawn, and ready to 
apprehend the suspects who had opened fire on them. Once he entered the home for the 
second time, however, he soon found another officer near one of the suspects and 
determined that the use of deadly force was no longer necessary, describing that “the guy 
was down. He was dead.” During the interview, the interviewer asked Officer #185 if he 
could have fired at the suspect prior to exiting the house with the downed officer, to 
which he responded, “Oh, yeah,” but made the decision not to, explaining: 
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Well, you don’t – first of all, initially you had three people who discharged their 
weapon, then down to two, then you’re – because you’re in the back, you don’t 
want to reach over somebody or somebody getting in front of you. . . 
 
 
 Officer #185 recognized that multiple officers were returning fire at the suspects 
in the home and, even if he had made the decision to fire, he was in the back of the entry 
line. Based on his positioning then, he had other officers in front of him engaging in a 
very dynamic situation. There was no guarantee that if he had used deadly force that a 
fellow officer would not have inadvertently crossed into his line of fire. In sum, Officer 
#185 explained that although he identified this as a situation that warranted the use of 
deadly force, he decided not to shoot because other officers had already fired. 
 
OTHER OFFICERS AND THE CONSIDERATION OF DEADLY FORCE  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, 16 of the 37 officers who did not shoot 
never even considered firing during their respective incidents. Similar to how the 
presence and actions of other officers on scene impacted the decision-making of officers 
in the sample who made the conscious decision to fire or the conscious decision to hold 
fire, other officers played a pivotal role with regard to the decision-making of officers 
who never considered using or not using deadly force. 
 How is it that an officer can impact whether another considers using deadly 
force? When analyzing the decision-making processes of the 16 officers who did not 
consider shooting, it became clear that the presence of (or actions of) other officers can 
eliminate the need for another officer to consider whether to use deadly force. Of the 16 
officers who did not consider shooting, six (6) of these officers found themselves in such 
a position because of decisions made early in the encounter or because of situational 
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circumstances that were beyond their control. That is, three (3) of these six officers did 
not consider using or not using deadly force because they did not have their firearm 
drawn and ready by the time other officers took the suspect under fire, one (1) officer 
explained that he never had to make the decision to shoot or not to shoot because of the 
position of the suspect in relation to himself, one (1) officer reported that he simply did 
not have time to consider using deadly force before the conclusion of the incident, and 
one (1) officer reported that he did not have to consider whether to use deadly force 
because by the time he came into contact with the suspect in his incident, the suspect had 
committed suicide.  
The remaining 10 officers who did not contemplate whether to fire, however, 
were arguably in that position either because of actions undertaken by other officers or 
because an injured officer on scene needed assistance. For example, three (3) of these 10 
officers were unable to consider whether to shoot or hold fire because they were 
preoccupied by someone else on scene at the time that another officer (or officers) fired. 
A clear example of this was observed in the account of Officer #34, who was involved 
with 15 other officers in Incident 20, wherein officers searched for a suspect who had 
fired at one of their sergeants. After the first gunfire exchange between arriving officers 
and the suspect, officers continued to pursue and fire at the suspect, who eventually 
collapsed on the ground and officers converged around him. At this time, Officer #34 had 
his weapon drawn, pointed at the suspect, and was prepared to use deadly force if it was 
necessary, but soon noticed that the officer next to him was “not focused” on the downed 
suspect but instead was examining his shirt. Officer #34 asked this officer what his 
problem was, only to find out that this officer had been struck by the suspect’s bullets 
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during the first exchange of gunfire. At this point, Officer #34 decided to transport the 
injured officer to the hospital and removed himself from the scene of the incident. In this 
case then, Officer #34 never made a decision regarding whether to shoot or not to shoot 
at this point because his focus was on attending to a fellow officer who he believed to be 
seriously injured. 
The additional two officers who did not consider using deadly force were 
involved in Incident 124, the incident in which multiple officers were executing a search 
warrant of home suspected of housing illegal narcotics. While one of the officers 
involved in this incident (Officer #213) made the decision to fire at the suspects to 
prevent other officers from being injured or killed, two other officers in the line-up, 
Officers #183 and #184, never made a decision regarding whether to shoot because they 
made the decision to attend to the downed officer and remove him from the house. By the 
time these two officers had safely removed the injured officer and went back into the 
home, the incident had concluded. 
As one can see in the two just-mentioned incidents, these three officers had 
focused their attention on someone else besides the suspect in their respective incidents, 
thus removing the need for them to make a decision about whether to use deadly force. 
But they were able to do this because other officers were involved and focused on the 
suspect. In fact, when recounting his incident and his decision to leave the scene and take 
his fellow officer to the hospital in Incident 20, Officer #34 explained that once they 
arrived at the hospital, he made the decision to stay there with the injured officer because 
“nobody [else] would have been with him for a period of time.” Officer #34 felt that it 
was important that he did not leave this other officer alone, but made it clear that he felt 
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comfortable staying at the hospital and not returning to the scene because there had been 
enough officers there to handle the situation. When asked if he would have made the 
same decision (i.e., to take the injured officer to the hospital) if he and that officer had 
been the only ones on scene, Officer #34 replied, “Oh, that’s hard. I don’t know. . .I don’t 
know. . .” 
These three cases demonstrate how the mere presence of other officers can impact 
a single officer’s decision-making during a dangerous police-citizen encounter, giving 
him or her the opportunity to direct their attention to an individual other than the suspect. 
As exhibited in the cases described above, this can eliminate the need for an officer to 
make a determination that deadly force is or is not necessary and a decision to use or not 
use deadly force because he or she is focusing on another issue on scene. Furthermore, 
one could argue that these three officers may not have made these same decisions had 
they been the only officers on scene at the time that the suspect in their respective 
incidents took them under fire. 
The additional seven (7) officers who never found themselves in a position to 
make a decision regarding whether to use deadly force represent an important finding that 
emerged from this study. Remember, Binder and Scharf (1983) identified a number of 
social influences that they believed could impact an officer’s decision-making in each of 
the four phases in their model. For example, in the anticipation phase, Binder and Scharf 
argued that from whom officers receive information and whether they believe it to be true 
can impact their decision-making at this early point in the police-citizen encounter. Upon 
arriving on scene, an officer’s perception of his or her safety can impact the decisions he 
or she makes in the entry phase. Should an officer verbally communicate with the suspect 
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during the information exchange phase, the suspect’s response (or lack thereof) can 
influence the officer’s decisions at this point in the incident. Lastly, an officer’s decision 
in the final frame may be influenced by the suspect’s movements, behavior, or the overall 
level of threat he or she poses to the officer at the time the officer makes the decision to 
fire or hold fire.  
An additional social influence that emerged from this analysis, however, that 
Binder and Scharf failed to identify was an officer’s perception of his or her role or his or 
her assigned role during an incident. The following section will explain how officers’ 
decision-making during a high-risk police-citizen encounter can be influenced by their 
perceived or assigned role during the incident, why this behavior occurred, and why this 
finding is an important contribution to what we know about police officers’ use of deadly 
force. 
  
THE IMPACT OF ROLE DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT ON WITNESS OFFICERS 
Of the 10 officers who never considered shooting or not shooting, seven (7) of 
them were influenced by their perceived or assigned role during their incident. Because 
of these officers’ perception of their role or their assigned role during their respective 
incidents, they did not have to make a decision regarding whether to use deadly force 
during the final frame phase of the encounter. For example, four (4) of the officers in the 
sample described taking a leadership role during their incident and noted how this role 
influenced their decision-making throughout the incident, including eliminating their 
need to consider using deadly force. While their perception of their role as one of 
leadership or scene management ultimately prevented them from entering the final frame 
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phase of the encounter, their adoption of their perceived role also influenced their 
decision-making in early phases during the encounter.22 
An example of how an officer’s perception of his or her role during an incident 
can eliminate his/her need to make a decision regarding the use of deadly force was 
found in the account of Officer #7, who was serving as acting sergeant during Incident 8, 
which included three other officers in the sample. Officers received a call alerting them to 
a suicidal subject who had shot himself in the buttocks at a local residence. They were 
also told that there were others in the residence with the subject when the shooting had 
occurred. Officer #7 decided to drive to the location of this call and, en route, alerted 
other officers who were on their way to the scene to wait for him to arrive before 
approaching the residence.  
Upon arrival, Officer #7 described how he immediately took the lead on scene. 
This was observed in his decision to direct other officers to various locations around the 
suspect’s home. Shortly after arriving at the location, officers heard another shot ring out 
from the house, indicating to them that the suspect had not been successful in his suicide 
attempt and was currently a danger to himself and anyone else in the home. Officer #7 
then made the decision to speak with other officers on scene to draft a plan of entry into 
the home should they need to rescue innocents from the residence. 
Officers soon saw that the suicidal subject had exited the home with a gun in his 
hand and at that point, Officer #7 made the decision to initiate verbal contact with him, 
explaining:  
I start talking to him [and] the other officers are trying to get a position of cover. I 
confront [the suicidal subject] an tell him to put the gun down, start trying to talk 																																																								22	The influence of an officer’s perception of his/her role was not only limited to witness officers, but was 
observed among officers who used deadly force as well.  
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to him about putting the gun down [and] about what’s going on. . .	I’m trying to 
get people situated where I need them to go to set up a perimeter.  Um, so not 
only am I sitting there talking to him watching what he’s doing but I’m also on 
the radio uh at times, um, out on the phone trying to figure out where we need to 
put out people and where was best to put everybody to get this maintained. 
 
 
 Officer #7 then described how he was aware that he was the only supervisor 
working that night. Although he had taken it upon himself to issue commands to the 
suspect and attempted to continue this dialogue with the armed individual, he also 
explained that he felt his role as the supervisor was not to be intimately involved in the 
incident (i.e., in terms of using deadly force against the suspect), but rather to focus on 
scene control, saying: 
Being as I’m the only supervisor working that night. . .and my thought process 
was this: I need to get this contained and I need to get somebody to replace [me] 
so I can step back and start taking incident control. Start doing the command 
control of it. Um, so I just wasn’t solely focusing on what was going on between 
me and him, but also trying to get the whole picture in, you know?  I had a lot of 
stuff to deal with at that time. 
 
 
 Officer #7 then requested that a specific officer he knew to have solid 
communication skills drive to the scene and take over communication with the armed 
man. Shortly after, the suspect made his way back into his home and fired another shot 
from his rifle, leading Officer #7 to instruct nearby officers that they were going to form 
a team to enter the house and rescue the residents. The officer who Officer #7 had 
requested to take over commands, Officer #8, then arrived on scene. These officers saw 
the suspect manipulating his weapon (appearing to move the slide in his rifle to load 
another round) and Officer #7 decided at this point that this incident had gone far enough, 
stating: 
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I look at [Officer #8] and I said, “This is going to end pretty quick. I want you 
take over commands. I want you take over what to do.” Basically putting him in 
line as the shooter. . .we were both on the same page. So, at that point [Officer #8] 
starts giving him commands. The [armed individual] starts doing the same thing 
[i.e., manipulating his weapon], at which point I’m turning around looking to see 
who I have available, at which point the round goes off from [Officer #8]. 
 
 
 Because Officer #7 knew he was the only supervisor on duty, and thus the only 
supervisor available to attend to this incident, he made the decision to try to remove 
himself as much as possible from interactions with the suicidal subject because he felt his 
attention should be centered on overall scene management and control. This mindset 
ultimately led him to call on an officer who he trusted to take over verbal communication 
with the suspect, Officer #8, which later led to the two officers having a conversation 
about the incident and coming to an agreement that Officer #8 would use deadly force if 
the armed individual continued to manipulate his weapon and attempt to move from his 
currently location (thus putting officers in danger). Because of his decision to essentially 
step back and supervise, Officer #7 designated another officer, Officer #8, to make the 
decision to use deadly force should the man’s behavior call for such action.23 Therefore, 
Officer #7 never had to make a decision regarding whether to use deadly force, as he 
delegated that task to another officer.  
 Another example of how an officer’s perception of his role eliminated his need to 
make a decision about whether to use deadly force was Officer #35, who was one of the 
16 officers involved in Incident 20. Officer #35 was the officer who initiated the incident, 
as it was his decision to make initial contact with the suspect involved. He explained: 																																																								23	Of the four officers who participated in this incident and were interviewed, only one (Officer #8) fired 
shots. 	
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I see this guy walking by. I see he’s heavily tattooed. He’s got the big mustache, 
bald head, definitely a parolee. No doubt in my mind the guy’s been to the joint. 
He knows who I am, I know who he is, we lock eyes. Clearly identify our roles in 
society. I continue to drive eastbound at a very slow speed, but I clearly see him 
in my rearview mirror, looking over his right shoulder to see what my move is 
going to be. 
 
 
This man’s behavior toward the sighting of an officer led Officer #35 to turn his 
car around and make contact with the individual. When Officer #35 exited his car and 
tried to catch the man’s attention, the man immediately dropped what was in his hand and 
took off running into a local neighborhood. Officer #35 made the decision to give chase 
on foot, explaining that this was his “ten thousandth [pedestrian] stop. On a scale of one 
to ten, my alertness was up to about a seven, only because the guy is a gangster, I think 
he’s a parolee, so it’s not just stopping granny.” No sooner had he engaged in a foot 
chase than the man he was chasing drew a firearm out of his waistband and fired shots at 
Officer #35. Rather than drawing his weapon and firing back, Officer #35 decided to seek 
cover behind a nearby vehicle and radioed for assistance from other officers. 
Because this incident continued until officers eventually caught the suspect, 
Officer #35’s original encounter with the suspect was not the only opportunity he had to 
make contact with the suspect. As other officers arrived on the scene, however, rather 
than joining in on the search for the suspect with other officers, Officer #35 focused on 
ensuring that arriving officers were establishing a perimeter in order to contain the 
fleeing suspect, explaining: 
I had already formed in my mind that. . .we’re going to lock it down, we’re going 
to set up a command post right here. . .my intent now was not to run down here to 
help these [other officers]. My intent was to keep [the suspect] corralled. My 
thought was he’s going to shoot at these [officers] and run back towards me. So 
I’m trying to corral [this street] here. Keep a tight perimeter. Unbeknownst to me, 
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he’s running northbound, but my goal is to get enough forces over here to hold 
this so we keep him corralled.  
 
 
While other officers eventually located the suspect and shots were exchanged 
between some of these officers and the suspect, Officer #35 continued to focus on 
making sure other officers were keeping a tight perimeter in case the suspect continued in 
his attempts to flee. Officer #35 soon heard a barrage of gunfire. At this point he 
communicated with a lieutenant who was on scene (and near where the gunfire had 
occurred) and received an update from him that the suspect was down. He soon received 
word via the radio that a fellow officer had been shot by the suspect. Again, instead of 
focusing on whether he was needed at the location where other officers had shot the 
suspect, Officer #35 decided not to get involved in that aspect of the incident and instead 
concentrated on the status of the injured officer and communicated with the lieutenant 
about how to handle the scene and direct officers in post-shooting procedure.  
Similar to the experience of Officer #7 in Incident 8, Officer #35 in Incident 20 
never considered whether to fire. Instead of running after the suspect who initially fired 
shots at him, Officer #35, being a supervisor, perceived his role as one of scene 
organization and management. Because of this, he decided to place his attention on 
directing arriving officers in the direction where the suspect fled in an attempt to set up a 
perimeter and capture the suspect. Officer #35 was still focused on this when he heard 
other officers firing shots at the suspect and, therefore, did not have to make a decision 
regarding whether to shoot at that point either. He was preoccupied with tasks that he 
perceived to be his job based on his position within the department.  
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Another example of how an officer’s perceived role can influence his or her 
decision-making was observed in Incident 47, the incident in which four officers in the 
sample were patrolling a high-crime area and made contact with an elderly man acting in 
a strange manner.  
The officers began to make contact with the man but, unbeknownst to them, he was 
armed with a gun and quickly drew the firearm out of his waistband and fired at one of 
the officers (Officer #127).  
Three officers, including the officer who was fired at, fired back at the suspect, 
but Officer #103, the supervisor in charge of the unit, never drew his weapon. This 
officer believed that because he was the supervisor it was his duty to attend to the officer 
who fell to the ground instead of firing at the suspect. Officer #103 described that he 
could not fire at the suspect and attend to the downed officer simultaneously and 
protecting his fellow officer took precedence, saying: 
My first [thought] here is I’ve gotta protect [the downed officer]. I’m moving 
forward. I’m not shooting. My weapon’s out, but I can’t [attend to the officer] and 
pay attention to [the suspect] too. [The other officers] are moving in, doing what 
they’re doing, but I’ve got to get up there and defend my officer.  
 
 
 In his account, Officer #103 made it clear that his role as supervisor of this unit 
had bearing on his decision-making and the actions he took at this point during the 
incident. He also stated that although it did not appear that he had a clear shot at the 
suspect at the time, he did not feel he needed to worry about shooting at the suspect 
because he placed his trust in his team. This then allowed him to fulfill his duty as a 
supervisor, which he thought was to focus on attending to the downed officer and 
protecting him from additional gunfire from the suspect. This officer could have made the 
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decision to change positions to have a clear shot at the suspect, as this was an option, but 
he chose to attend to the fallen officer. Thus, Officer #103 did not make any 
determination that deadly force was or was not necessary because he never considered 
using deadly force, as his attention was placed on protecting his subordinate. 
One last example of this observed pattern was captured in the account of Officer 
#80 who participated in Incident 59, the incident involving an armed student barricaded 
in the classroom of a high school and in which four officers in the sample participated.  
Officer #80 had experience with being a crisis negotiator for the department’s SWAT 
team, so upon his entry into the high school and after locating the suspect barricaded in a 
classroom, he took it upon himself to make verbal contact with the young suspect and 
attempted to convince him to drop his weapon and exit the classroom.  
According to Officer #80, he continued negotiations with the armed student for 
about 90 minutes. During this time, Officer #80 explained that the suspect was “going 
back and forth” in terms of his attitude toward the police. At times Officer #80 thought 
negotiations would be successful and that he was making progress with the suspect. 
During other times, he felt that the suspect was going to be non-compliant and considered 
the possibility that this incident would end in police use of deadly force. Eventually, the 
armed suspect attempted to come toward the officers outside the classroom with his 
weapon raised in his hand, leading officers to fire shots. Officer #80 did not fire, but it is 
important to note that because of his role as the negotiator, he did not consider firing, 
explaining: 
Well and I didn’t shoot him at that point because I had put my weapon away. I 
was doing the negotiation. . . It was [other officers’] job to protect me, but my job 
to [negotiate with the suspect].  
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Because of his role as negotiator during this incident, Officer #80 had made the 
decision to re-holster his weapon when he began conversing with the suspect. As one can 
see from the aforementioned quote, Officer #80 perceived his role as negotiator as one 
that required him to focus on talking the suspect down. As a consequence, he did not 
have to make a decision regarding whether to fire because he had previously put away his 
weapon. Officer #80’s success as a negotiator would likely impact the decisions that 
other officers would subsequently make later in the encounter, but it appears that he also 
recognized that if deadly force was going to be used, that task belonged to the other 
officers, not him. 
In addition to officers’ perception of their roles during an incident, three (3) 
officers in the sample did not have to make a decision whether to use deadly force 
because of an assignment they were given prior to police gunfire. In the sample, such 
assignments arose out of incidents involving the use of special weapons and tactics 
(SWAT) teams. The use of such specialized units may require participating officers to 
have designated roles during an incident. Therefore, as the findings from the analysis 
suggest, the decision of whether or not to shoot is, at times, a function of the role to 
which officers have been assigned. 
The three (3) officers who did not have to make a decision regarding whether to 
use deadly force because of their assignments were involved in the same incident 
(Incident 127). Members of the SWAT team were called to respond to an incident 
involving a man armed with a knife who had barricaded himself in the room of a local 
motel. Officers had been trying to negotiate with the individual, but he was unrelenting 
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and the leader of the SWAT team made the decision that an element of SWAT officers 
would need to enter the motel room to apprehend the suspect.  
Four of the officers in the sample participated in this incident and each recounted 
the entry plan that they were asked to execute: the windows to the motel room would be 
broken and two officers would stand outside the windows and discharge TASERs to 
subdue the armed individual. Once the suspect was briefly incapacitated by the TASERs, 
three officers would make entry into the motel room and apprehend the suspect. Of these 
three officers, two were assigned to “go hands,” meaning that one would physically hold 
the suspect down while the other placed handcuffs on him. The third officer was assigned 
“lethal cover”, meaning that if at any point during the encounter the armed individual 
posed a deadly threat to anyone on scene, it was this officer’s job to shoot him. 
Officer #186 was one of the two officers assigned to use less lethal force (i.e., 
discharge the TASER) on the suspect and Officers #187 and #212 were the two officers 
assigned to enter the motel room and physically apprehend the suspect and take him into 
custody after the TASERs had been deployed. Lastly, Officer #211 was also tasked with 
entering the motel room and assigned to provide lethal cover should it be necessary. 
 The plan was put into motion and Officer #186 (along with another officer who 
was not interviewed) deployed their TASERs at the suspect. Officers #187, #211, and 
#212 soon made entry into the motel room where they encountered the armed individual. 
Officers #187 and #212 moved toward the suspect to take him into custody, but the 
TASERs had only briefly tempered the suspect who still held on to the knife in his hand. 
The suspect made a movement toward one of these officers, which led Officer #211 to 
shoot the suspect. 
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 Officer #187 (one of the officers assigned to take the suspect into physical 
custody) explained that the role assigned to him essentially eliminated his need to make a 
decision regarding whether to fire. He explained: 
I had come in there with both my hands empty because to effectively and 
aggressively handcuff someone, I am going to need both hands for that. And the 
other part is that with this specific task assigned [to me], I had full faith and 
confidence with the officer whose job it was to provide us with lethal coverage 
that he was going to be able to do that. I knew I had lethal cover, so I basically 
relied on [him]. 
 
 
Because of his assigned role, Officer #187 never considered shooting. He was 
focused on his assigned task, which required him to have his hands available to handcuff 
the suspect. He made it very clear, however, that he knew another officer had been 
assigned the task of shooting if it became necessary to use deadly force against the 
suspect. Furthermore, Officer #187 emphasized that he completely trusted the officer 
who was assigned lethal cover (Officer #211), that he would shoot if necessary. 
 Officer #212, the other officer who was assigned to take the suspect into physical 
custody, mirrored Officer #187’s response in that his assignment in this incident required 
him to go into the motel room with his hands free. Although he had his weapon with him, 
and he could have drawn it and fired if he felt the need, Officer #212 never reached that 
point, saying: 
Obviously if I felt that I needed to draw my weapon that I could have freely done 
it, [but] my focus was hands. We try to control the amount of gunfire that may 
happen on a scene. It’s not necessary for everybody to get into gunplay. We try to 
keep that under control. And my job was to go hands. I knew I had lethal 
coverage. So, I basically relied on them. 
 
 
 While an officer may be assigned to a role (re: the use of deadly force) during an 
incident, Officer #212 made it clear that he could have strayed from the requirements of 
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his assignment (i.e., having his hands free) and could have drawn his firearm if he wanted 
to, but he knew another officer had been assigned the job of providing lethal force and he 
trusted that officer to make that decision if it were necessary. Therefore, an officer’s 
assignment may impact his or her behavior and decision-making to a certain extent, but a 
key factor that may also have bearing on an officers’ decision-making process regarding 
the use of deadly force is the amount of trust they place in those officers assigned to 
provide lethal cover. Should there be a lack of trust in that officer, for whatever reason, 
one could argue that an officer assigned to a task other than lethal force may forego their 
assignment and take it upon themselves to use deadly force should they decide it is 
necessary. 
 
THE IMPACT OF ROLE DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENTS ON SHOOTERS 
 It is important to note that officers’ perception of their role or their assigned role 
during an incident and the impact this can have on their decision-making was not limited 
to the witness officers in the sample. When analyzing officers’ decision-making during 
the final frame phase, it was clear that the perception of one’s role during the incident 
also influenced some officers’ shooting behavior.  
 An example of how an officer’s perception of his role impacted his decision-
making throughout the incident, and specifically in the final frame, was found in Officer 
#16’s account of his participation in Incident 9. As previously mentioned, this incident 
involved four officers in the sample who were attempting to make contact with a man 
suspected of committing multiple robberies of gas stations around town. When 
recounting his participation in the incident, it was clear in Officer #16’s account that his 
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rank (he was a sergeant at the time) drove his decision-making during crucial parts of the 
incident.  
For example, during the entry phase when the two additional officers arrived on 
scene, Officer #16 took it upon himself to provide these officers with details about the 
robbery case and what they knew about the man suspected of committing the crimes. He 
also made the decision to assign these two officers (Officers #13 and #14) to cover the 
back while he and his partner stayed at the front of the home and made contact with the 
suspect. This decision seemed to be guided by the fact that Officer #16 viewed this as 
“their” (he and Officer #9’s) investigation and, therefore, they should be the ones who 
took the lead on the operation. He explained that he and his partner agreed that his 
partner (Officer #9) would approach the front door and attempt to make verbal contact 
with the suspect, but that he would be close by, saying: 
I used the front of that truck [for cover].  I thought well, we knew it was an armed 
robbery, the guy used a handgun, [and] somebody’s got to knock on the door and 
since I’m sergeant, I’m taking the front of the truck. [Officer #9] said he’d knock 
on the door and I will cover him. . .and the truck engine or a car engine is one of 
the best covers you can have. So, your rank has its privileges sometimes. 
 
 
 When Officer #9 knocked on the suspect’s door and was confronted by the 
suspect armed with a pistol, he alerted his fellow officers that the suspect was armed by 
shouting, “Gun!” Officer #16, who was behind a truck near the front of the house, also 
saw that the suspect was armed and believed he was about to shoot his partner, Officer 
#9. Both he and Officer #9 fired shots at the suspect at this time, and soon after, Officer 
#13 came to the front of the home from around the back to assist these officers and 
eventually fired shots at the suspect as well. 
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 As Officer #16 described his decision to fire, he explained that he felt a high level 
of concern for his fellow officers at the time he pulled the trigger, particularly for Officer 
#9 whom he believed may have been struck by the suspect’s gunfire, but that he did not 
feel any fear for his personal wellbeing. He stated: 
I’m always concerned. I was a supervisor. This was my unit and I’m trying to take 
care of my people, you know?  I feel like I’m, I mean, I’ve had my own kids and 
that, but I feel like, you know, these are my people to take care of, to make sure 
they’re good. . . and I’m not trying to say that I’m some super hero or anything 
like that. I think I’m thinking more of this is what we’ve got to do and we’re 
going to take care of business and I want to make sure that my people are safe. 
 
 
 Officer #16 explained that he fired at the suspect to protect his partner, Officer #9, 
and to prevent the suspect from firing additional bullets at the officers on scene, but as 
one can see from the aforementioned quote, Officer #16 felt very protective of the 
officers during this incident because of his rank and the perception of his job that is 
attached to that rank. There is a protective factor that he associated with the rank he held 
at the time, leading him to make decisions that, in his mind, would preserve the safety of 
his fellow officers. One such decision was to use deadly force against the armed suspect 
with the goal of protecting Officer #9, who was directly in the suspect’s line of fire.  
 One last example of how an officer’s perception of his or her role influenced his 
or her decision to use deadly force was captured in the account of Officer #213 who 
participated in Incident 124, wherein four other officers in the sample were executing the 
search warrant of a home suspected of housing illegal narcotics. Participating officers had 
met prior to attempting to enter the home and had drafted and reviewed their plan for 
entry. Officer #213, who had been involved in the narcotics investigation associated with 
the home, wanted to be the first officer to enter the home. After talking with other 
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officers, however, it was decided that another officer would hold the first position, as he 
had more experience with this kind of operation. This left Officer #213 to be the second 
officer in the entry line-up. When recounting his experience in this incident, Officer #213 
explained that in his mind, being second in the entry line-up meant that his job was to 
provide lethal cover, should they need it, to the officers behind him in the entry line-up.  
Unfortunately, the officer tasked with breaking down the front door took longer 
than expected to break through, which gave the occupants of the home time to figure out 
what was going on. Soon after entering through the front door, the officers were 
ambushed by gunfire from two assailants in the house. Officer #213 explained that the 
third officer in the line-up (who was right behind him) was struck by the assailant’s 
gunfire and Officer #213 immediately started returning fire in the direction of the armed 
suspect. This officer reported that even though he thought he was the one being targeted 
by the suspect, he did not have any fear for himself, but was very fearful for the safety of 
his fellow officers. To explain this, he recounted an exchange he had with a fellow officer 
prior to being involved with this incident, saying: 
[A] close friend of mine, we’ve talked about running warrants and I’ve been in. . 
.in one of my incidents, you know, he shot a guy and it was a good shooting, but 
you know, the guy wasn’t armed. It was just the way it went down. It was cleared. 
After the shooting was over with, I went and met with him and I was like, “Man, 
you shot an unarmed dude.” And I wasn’t wanting to. . . I had a little bit of a 
problem with it. . .and my buddy told me, he goes, “Dude, you’re here telling me 
this.” And he said, “Wouldn’t you rather be pissed that [I] shot an unarmed dude 
than pissed that [I] didn’t shoot?” And it really. . .it rang true and hit home for me 
as far as he was point. He went home that night. . .so, when I got asked to run 
point, I liked what he said. I agreed with what he said. I thought I could deal with 
making a mistake and shooting somebody, but I couldn’t deal with not [shooting] 
and somebody getting hurt as a result of it. So, I wasn’t worried about me. I was 
worried about, “They put me here. They gave me this. This is my job. I’ve got to 
deal with this shit.” 
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 Officer #16’s conversation with the fellow officer mentioned above drove his 
perception of his role during Incident 124. He perceived his role as one of the first 
officers in the line-up to be one of protection. His aforementioned comments also suggest 
a sense of responsibility that he felt to provide this protection to his team because, in his 
mind and based on a previous conversation with another officer, that was the job of the 
officers who entered the location first. Therefore, that was his job during this incident. He 
was there to provide lethal cover should it be necessary to protect his fellow officers from 
being seriously injured or killed as they entered the house. This perception of his role is 
also supported by the fact that although one of the suspects was specifically targeting him 
and firing shots at him, his concern did not lie with himself, but with the officers behind 
him who could have been, and were, struck by these bullets. 
 Finally, there was one officer in the sample whose decision to use deadly force 
was directly influenced by his assigned role during the incident in question. Incident 127 
involved four officers in the sample and the accounts of three of these officers (Officers 
#186, #187, and #212) were discussed in the previous section detailing how officers’ 
assigned roles can preclude them from making a decision about whether to use deadly 
force. The fourth officer, Officer #211, was the officer assigned to provide lethal cover.  
 To briefly recount the incident, members of the SWAT team were called to a 
motel where officers were attempting to negotiate with a mentally unstable individual 
who was armed with a knife and who had barricaded himself in a motel room. After 
negotiations failed to convince the knife-wielding man to come out of the room, members 
of the SWAT team drafted a plan to first use TASERS to subdue the suspect, then have a 
three-man team enter the motel room to take the man into physical custody;  two officers 
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did not have their guns drawn (as it was their assigned task to physically overcome the 
suspect and place him in handcuffs and, therefore, they needed both their hands) and one 
officer, Officer #211, who carried a .223 rifle because he was assigned to use deadly 
force against the armed individual if it was necessary. 
 Once they entered the room, the suspect, who had been hit with the TASERs fired 
from officers outside through the broken window of the motel room, was slightly 
incapacitated by the less-lethal force, but was still able to stand up and get close to the 
two officers who were assigned to bring him into physical custody. Because of this, and 
the fact that the motel room was small and the officers and the suspect were in close 
quarters, Officer #211 knew he was going to have to make a decision, explaining: 
I saw the knife that was in [the suspect’s] hand. My first thing was not about me – 
it was about the officer that was close. [That officer] was unarmed. He was 
basically going hands, so he didn’t have a weapon in his hands at the time. We 
designate certain roles. . . I was up front on lethal. I figured [that officer] was so 
close that if [the suspect]. . . but I mean, there was no doubt in my mind that if he 
went direct[ly] at us, I was going to start shooting [the suspect] right then. 
 
 
 Although Officer #211 ultimately had a choice regarding whether to use deadly 
force, his decision-making process appears to have been greatly influenced by the fact 
that he had been assigned to provide lethal force if it was necessary. This was coupled 
with the fact that, due to their assigned roles, the two officers inside the motel room with 
him did not have their weapons drawn at the time. Therefore, this case highlights two 
very interesting findings: the first that an officer’s assigned role during an incident can 
impact his or her decision to use deadly force, and second that other officers’ assigned 
roles may increase or decrease the likelihood that another officer on scene may need to 
shoot. 
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SUMMARY 
The results from the analysis discussed in this chapter provide a unique 
perspective regarding police use of deadly force: how officers’ decision-making 
processes can be impacted by the presence of or decisions made by other officers 
involved in the same incident. When multiple officers are involved in the same 
encounter, it can be argued that officers may make decisions they may not otherwise have 
made had they been the only officer involved in the encounter. Furthermore, the presence 
of other officers allows each individual officer, in a sense, to adopt their own social role 
within the context of the incident.  
First, findings from this study demonstrate more broadly that the mere fact that 
other officers are involved in the incident may have direct implications for officers’ use 
of deadly force. For example, many of the officers who did choose to use deadly force 
did so not to protect themselves, but to protect a fellow officer from serious injury or 
death. In addition, many of the officers who chose not to shoot did so because another 
officer on scene had already fired and, therefore, eliminated the need for other officers on 
scene to shoot. Finally, some officers in the sample did not have to make a decision 
regarding whether to use deadly force because of decisions made by other officers on 
scene. This finding demonstrated that not all officers in a potentially violent police-
citizen encounter make a decision about whether to use deadly force, thus never entering 
the final frame phase of Binder and Scharf’s framework.  
To craft a more accurate deadly force decision-making framework then, Binder 
and Scharf’s model would need to be adjusted to address these findings. Binder and 
Scharf’s framework, as it stands now, only addresses instances in which an officer 
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consciously made the decision to fire, made the conscious decision to hold fire, or 
unconsciously fired. The framework does not account for cases in which an officer 
neither considered using deadly force nor holding fire, but for whatever reason did not 
consider either option.  
Furthermore, that the Binder and Scharf model does not account for the present 
finding that officers’ perceived or assigned roles influence their decision-making during 
high-risk encounters is another weakness of this model. More specifically, an officer’s 
perception of his or her role during an incident has the ability to shape their decision-
making not only during the final frame phase (should they enter it), but in earlier phases 
of the encounter. These perceptions, at least among the officers in the sample, were often 
driven by officers’ rank or supervisory position, which influenced where their focus was 
directed on scene (e.g., toward the suspect, to scene management/organization, 
negotiation, or toward the safety of other officers), which, in turn, eliminated the 
perceived need for them to make a decision regarding the use of deadly force.  
The results from the analysis also demonstrated how an officer’s assignment 
during a potentially violent police-citizen encounter can influence their decision to use or 
not use deadly force. This finding may be especially relevant to SWAT teams or other 
specialized units, but the role assignments carried out by four officers in Incident 127 
showed how a task handed down to an officer can increase or decrease the likelihood that 
they will use deadly force. In addition, the roles assigned to other officers on scene can 
inadvertently impact decisions available to other officers on scene. Because two of the 
officers in this incident were assigned to take the suspect into physical custody, which 
requires the use of both hands, they did not have their weapons drawn when they 
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confronted the knife-wielding assailant. The officer who was assigned lethal cover fully 
acknowledged that because of their assigned roles, these officers could not have had their 
weapons drawn, leaving him to be the only viable option for the use of deadly force. He 
recognized this role, the decision he had to make, and ultimately chose to fire shots at the 
suspect to protect his fellow officers. 
It is imperative to note that the aforementioned findings are derived from officers 
who were involved in an incident wherein other officers were present and participating. 
This may explain why these findings were not addressed by Binder and Scharf, as most 
of their analyses were limited to police-citizen interactions that ended in police gunfire or 
could have ended in police gunfire, but only involved one officer. While it is possible for 
potentially violent police-citizen encounter to involve only one officer and one suspect or 
one officer and multiple suspects, the results from this analysis provide insight into how 
individual officers’ decisions may be impacted by other officers. In many of the incidents 
captured in this sample, it was clear that a difference in the use of deadly force was not 
due to significant differences in the way officers processed the events in which they were 
involved, but rather greatly hinged on other officers’ presence and actions.  
Because of this, incidents involving multiple officers that conclude in police 
gunfire may be best understood as social events in which multiple individuals play off 
one another. One could argue that had other officers not been present in the incidents 
captured in the sample, many – if not all – of the officers would have arguably made 
different decisions. For example, three (3) officers in the sample made a conscious 
decision to hold fire during their incidents because a fellow officer was in their line of 
fire and they did not want to compromise the safety of another officer. Had another 
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officer not been involved in the incident, would these three officers still have held fire? In 
addition, seven (7) officers reported holding fire because another officer on scene had 
already used deadly force against the suspect. Had another officer not been there to fire 
first, would these seven officers have still made the decision not to shoot? It seems 
apparent that the answers to both questions is no, that but for the presence of other 
officers these witness officers would have shot. 
The same sort of question can be raised and answers given regarding officers’ 
perceived or assigned roles. Some of the officers in the sample who held ranked positions 
in the department or played supervisory roles attended to on-scene issues other than 
deadly fire (e.g., scene management/organization), but their perception of their role may 
not have had the impact it did on their decision-making and their behavior had they been 
the only officer involved in the incident. In addition, the impact of role assignment would 
not be relevant in cases involving a single officer, as this officer would not be formally 
assigned a role during the incident, but instead would, by definition, have to make a 
number of independent decisions throughout the duration of the encounter. 
In sum, although the aforementioned findings may only be applicable to deadly 
force incidents involving multiple officers, many high-risk police-citizen encounters 
involve multiple officers. Therefore, it is important that scholars work hard to understand 
the contextual and situational conditions present during officer-involved shootings that 
involve more than one officer and the impact this has on individual officers’ decision-
making throughout this type of incident. Doing so will substantially expand our 
understanding of how police officers make decisions to use deadly force or to hold fire. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DEADLY FORCE DECISION-MAKING AMONG MULTIPLE 
OFFICERS 
 
Having established that the presence of other officers can influence a given 
officer’s decision regarding the use of deadly force during multi-officer high-risk 
encounters with citizens, attention turns to the moments that precede the final frame. As 
previously noted, the Binder and Scharf model posits that differences in how officers 
process information and act during high-risk interactions prior to the final frame account 
for whether an officer shoots or holds fire. Because Binder and Scharf focused on officers 
as singular actors, they did not consider the possibility in depth that the presence and 
actions of other officers might influence how any given individual officer acts during 
high-risk police-citizen encounters. This chapter does so and thus seeks to shed light on a 
potentially important matter that is missing from Binder and Scharf’s deadly force 
decision-making framework. 
To accomplish this, the interview transcripts of each of the 83 officers in the 
sample were grouped according to their corresponding incident and were coded at the 
incident-level. That is, officers’ decisions and factors impacting their decision-making 
were compared to the decisions made by other officers involved in the same incident. 
This allowed for similarities and differences in decision-making among officers present 
at the same police-citizen encounter to be identified within the confines of the three 
antecedent phases of Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework. The 
results will be presented below in terms of patterns that emerged in each of the three 
phases - anticipation, entry, and information exchange – in their temporal order.  
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ANTICIPATION 
 To recap, according to their assessment of high-risk police-citizen encounter, 
Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) state that the anticipation phase begins when an officer is 
notified or dispatched to a call and ends when the officer arrives on the scene of the call. 
They define this phase as “crucial” to early decision-making, as this is the time when 
officers are attempting to collect as much information as possible about the incident and 
the suspect they are about to encounter. Because of this, Binder and Scharf identify mode 
of information as an important factor that can impact an officer’s decision-making in this 
phase. Is this information coming from dispatch? Directly from the citizen? Or via some 
other vector? 
 One possibility that Binder and Scharf did not address, but was a pattern that 
emerged in some of the officers’ accounts during this phase, was that an officer can be 
specifically requested by another officer to become involved in an incident. Ten (10) of 
the officers in the sample reported that their involvement in their respective incidents 
began when they were personally requested to make their way to the scene by another 
officer in their department. These officers were personally requested by other officers to 
provide support for a number of reasons, such as a type of expertise they held that was 
recognized by the officer(s) requesting assistance, their access to and experience with a 
specialized weapon (e.g., department-issued rifle or shotgun) that other officers thought 
would be useful in the specific incident at hand, or simply based on past experiences with 
the officer(s) requesting their help.  
This is an important finding because being personally requested by a fellow 
officer may increase the chances that an officer would agree to participate in an incident, 
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thus influencing their decision to become involved in the encounter. In fact, some of the 
officers who noted that they were requested by a fellow officer and asked to become 
involved in the incident in question noted that their personal connection to the officer 
who requested their assistance is what drove their decision to respond to the call.  
An example of this mindset was expressed by two officers involved in Incident 
90, a case in which a surveillance operation led to a vehicle pursuit that ended in a wild 
shootout and involved three officers in the sample. Officers #112 and #167 were 
requested by a fellow officer, Officer #123, to assist him in apprehending a known gang 
member who was suspected of being involved in multiple armed robberies around town 
and in possession of a stolen car. Officer #167 had previously worked with Officer #123 
in his department’s gang unit, but was now assigned to the agency’s narcotics unit. He 
detailed his mindset the night he received a call from Officer #123 asking for his help in 
observing the residence he believed the suspect to be residing in. Officer #167 explained: 
I was on my way home and my wife was eight months pregnant. I kind of wanted 
to get home and got a call from [Officer #123] who said, “Hey, we’ve got a stolen 
car down here and I need [an undercover] car to sit on it.” And I said, “You know, 
I’m going home,” and he said, “No, I need a car down here dude, come on.” So I 
finally turned around, threw my vest on real quick. I was in plain clothes, had a 
beanie, and just a jacket on and turned around. 
 
 
 After reporting that he was initially reluctant to help out Officer #123 because he 
wanted to go home to his wife, the interviewer asked Officer #167 why he agreed to 
assist the officer, to which Officer #167 replied: 
[It was] personal. [Officer #123] was my best friend and my partner and I worked 
with him every night, and off duty we drink beers together, and [we were] good 
friends, and he would do the exact same thing for me. . . I didn’t want to go. I 
figured this is just another stolen car at a doper’s house. Big deal. Why did they 
need me? [But my] buddy was like, “I need [an undercover] guy and I need you.” 
This [suspect] is supposed to be a bad dude and [Officer #123] needed [my] help. 
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The aforementioned excerpt demonstrates how Officer #167’s personal 
relationship with the officer who requested his help drove his decision to become 
involved in the incident.  Although he did not initially want to get involved, he made it 
clear that he knew Officer #123 would have been there to help him had he asked him to, 
so he made the decision to turn back around and head to the location of the suspect’s 
residence. 
Once Officer #167 arrived on scene and made radio contact with Officer #123, 
both officers agreed that because they were both in undercover vehicles and thus may not 
be recognized as law enforcement, they should call a uniformed officer in a marked 
police vehicle to assist them. In fact, Officer #167 insisted “that we need[ed] to have a 
marked car there” in case the suspect initiated a pursuit. Officer #167 then called a patrol 
officer he had worked with in the past, Officer #112, and asked him if he would make his 
way to the location of the suspect’s home. When asked why he made the decision to 
oblige the officer’s request for assistance, Officer #112 stated: 
I mean I was a brand new baby cop and those two guys were really good friends 
of mine. One of them I went to the police academy with [and] socialized [with]. 
Good friends of mine. And I would have done it for anyone, but I especially. . 
.they’re my buddies asking for help. I would do it in a minute. 
 
 
 While Officer #167 was honest and shared his initial reluctance to respond to his 
friend’s request for assistance, Officer #112 stated that never once did he consider not 
responding to Officer #167’s request for help. He also noted that although he would have 
helped any officer who had asked, a request from Officer #167 had more meaning to him, 
as the officers he would be assisting were personal friends of his. The officers later 
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engaged in a vehicle pursuit with the suspect, during which the suspect fires shots at the 
officers. At the termination point of the pursuit and still believing the suspect to be a 
lethal threat, two officers fired shots (Officers #123 and #167) and one held fire (Officer 
#112). In sum, the decisions made by Officers #167 and #112 demonstrate how their 
personal relationship with a fellow officer who requested assistance influenced their 
decision to become involved in this incident.  
 
INITIATING THEIR INVOLVEMENT: IS IT ALWAYS A CHOICE? 
 In addition to having a personal relationship with the requesting officer, some 
officers reported that a request for their participation by a supervising officer initiated 
their involvement in their incident. That is, five (5) officers in the sample reported that 
they initially became involved in the incident in question because their assistance was 
requested by a direct supervisor or an officer holding a ranked position (i.e., was their 
superior).  
An example of this was demonstrated among three (3) of the officers who were 
present at Incident 26, the incident in which four officers attempted to take a wanted man 
into custody at a bail bond agency. Officer #172, the sergeant who received the initial call 
alerting him of the location of the suspect, decided to call three additional officers to help 
apprehend the suspect: Officers #48, #54, and #180. Interestingly enough, these three 
officers did not elaborate on their decision to respond to their sergeant’s request, but 
perhaps this finding highlights a reflexive response to a superior’s request that may be the 
result of the sergeant-line officer relationship. For example, Officer #180’s account of 
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how his sergeant notified him of this incident suggested that he had a choice regarding 
whether to become involved, saying: 
My sergeant just sends me a text message asking if I was busy. I call him on the 
phone and he says, “Hey, a bail bondman calls the station” and says, ‘Hey, I got 
this guy that’s got a warrant.  . .I think he’ll skip bail,’” so if we wanted to come 
get him, to come get him. So [instead of] sending patrol, sergeant says, “Hey our 
guys will do it.” So he calls me on the phone and says, “Hey, do you want to join 
in?” So then we get to the gas station that’s near the location to meet up and talk 
about the incident. 
 
 
  Officer #180 does not expand on his decision to respond to his sergeant’s request, 
but clearly he made a decision to drive to the gas station, meet up with this superior, and 
draft a plan of entry into the bondsman’s office to apprehend the suspect.  
  Officers #48 and #54 also offered brief explanations as to how they became 
involved in Incident 26. Officer #48 explained: 
Our supervisor, or sergeant, he gives me a call, says, “Hey, I got a guy that called 
up to the station that says he’s a bondsman. He’s got a guy coming in to. . 
.reconfigure his bond,” which they don’t do. The [bondsman] knew he had a 
felony family violence warrant out for assault and he wanted us to go pick him up. 
[My] supervisor said, “Hey, meet me.” We met about a mile and half from the 
actual location to develop our plan. 
 
 
  Officer #54 had a similar account of this initial call from his supervisor, stating: 
 
We were on patrol. Some of the other officers were helping a deployment on a 
deal and our Serg called us and said, “Hey, got a warrant. Family violence 
warrant. We need to go pick this guy up. He’s supposed to be showing up to the 
bail bonds place. . .” So he’s like, “Meet me here. Meet me at this location and 
we’ll discuss it.” 
 
 
Contrary to Officer #180’s account, these officers’ recollections of how they 
became involved in the incident appear to have been orders issued by their supervisor, 
Officer #172. While one may argue that officers are independent actors and, as such, 
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make their own independent decisions, one can also argue that an individual’s decision-
making process regarding whether to initiate involvement in an incident has the potential 
to be influenced by who is either requesting their assistance or issuing orders for them to 
respond to an incident. Binder and Scharf do note that mode of information is an potential 
influence on officer’s decision-making during the anticipation phase, but they do not 
specify whether (and how) other officers’ position in the department hierarchy can have 
bearing on whether officers comply with their requests or orders to respond to an 
incident. 
The accounts of other officers who chose to become involved in their incidents 
and who fell into this category were more explicit in the role their supervisor played at 
this point in the encounter. Officer #23, who participated in Incident 8 (the incident in 
which officers responded to the call of a suicidal subject possibly posing a lethal threat to 
innocents in his home), described how he was initially handling another call that had 
been assigned to him when his superior instructed him to attend to Incident 8, explaining: 
I remember. . .my first call and what I was on. It was just like a property damage 
[incident] at [a local hotel]. So, I was there and my sergeant came by. . .and then 
that call came out for a subject that shot himself in a basement. Our sergeant said 
he was going to that [and to] just leave this [incident] alone for right now. And 
then. . .so I just left that call and then followed him over there. 
 
 
 In the aforementioned example, it appears that Officer #23 did not have much of a 
choice but to become involved in Incident 8, as his sergeant directed him to end the 
incident he was involved in and make his way to the location where a male had attempted 
suicide. Again, Officer #23’s behavior suggests that in certain cases, an officer’s 
“decision” to become involved in an incident may not be a decision at all, but better 
understood as a following through of an assignment or command handed down from a 
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superior officer. In order to fully understand how police officers initiate or become 
involved in potentially violent encounters with citizens, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that other officers in supervisory or ranked positions may impact individual officers’ 
decision-making. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
 Another pattern that was common in the anticipation phase among officers 
involved in the same incident was the use of communication prior to arrival on scene. In 
their writings, Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) acknowledge that at this stage of the 
encounter, officers are often attempting to collect as much information as possible about 
the situation and/or suspect they are on their way to deal with. Possible sources of 
information identified by Binder and Scharf include dispatchers, direct calls from 
citizens, prior direct contact with the suspect, or other officers. The latter was a strong 
pattern observed among officers in the sample, both shooters and witness officers. 
Twenty-two (22) officers in the sample engaged in communication with a fellow officer 
during this phase. They did so for three main reasons: to update other officers about any 
information they had regarding the incident and/or the suspect involved (to make sure all 
officers were on the same page prior to arriving on scene), to confirm information about 
the incident and/or the suspect they had received, and to preserve the safety of other 
officers who would be arriving on scene.  
The majority of these 22 officers used communication to update their fellow 
officers on information about the incident and/or the suspect that they had received en 
route to the location of the call (n=14). Some of the officers involved in Incident 20 (the 
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one involving 16 officers in the sample who were pursuing a man who fired shots at a 
fellow officer) reported using communication to receive updates on the “shots fired” call 
they had been alerted to and directions on where they should deploy upon arriving on 
scene. For example, Officer #39 reported that he used the broadcasted information to 
decide where he should deploy, explaining: 
[Officer #35] was giving out a location and at some point he said. . .I think he had 
lost the guy, and so he started to set up a perimeter and other units started 
arriving. And um, they’re just trying to set up a perimeter and [announcing] where 
we need to be and where [the suspect]. . .[where officers] thought he was going to 
be. And then um. . .at that point, I had decided where I was going to go based on 
where everybody else was going. 
 
 
 Officer #36, who was also involved in this incident, reported similar behavior, 
using the information broadcasted by Officer #35 (the officer who was originally shot at 
by the assailant who had taken off on foot) to determine where he was going to arrive on 
scene, saying: 
So “shots fired” call comes out. I immediately hear where. I was probably a mile 
and half away, two miles away. I responded to the scene immediately. I was 
hearing other officers respond and as they were responding and setting up for 
containment, I was hearing where everybody was at. . . and I wanted to make sure 
that I set up a. . .there was no other officers in that area and I wanted to make sure 
I set up for containment. 
 
 
 Arriving officers knew of the plan to set up a containment perimeter because 
Officer #35 had communicated this plan to all officers via the radio. The two officers 
mentioned above used the information communicated by Officer #35 to make decisions 
regarding the routes they would take to get to the scene and where they would park their 
cars to set up a containment perimeter upon their arrival. In sum, many of the first 
officers who arrived on this scene relied on communication with one another when 
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choosing their initial deployment locations on scene and receiving situational updates 
from those who had already arrived at the location. 
 Another example of how communication impacted officers’ decision-making 
during the anticipation phase was observed among multiple officers involved in Incident 
105. This incident involved four officers in the sample who were members of a street 
crime unit. They were tasked with patrolling (in unmarked cars) an area that had been 
experiencing an increase in auto thefts and break-ins during the day with the goal of 
catching the thief in the act. Each officer was in a different undercover vehicle and was 
driving around the area when one of the officers used the radio to alert the others that he 
had spotted someone he believed to be breaking into a car. Based on this information, 
each of the four officers immediately turned around and headed to that location with the 
goal of confirming whether that was their suspect and, if so, placing him under arrest. 
Officer #154 explained: 
And a guy who was no longer with our department called and said, “Hey, I have 
this minivan that just came down.  The guy parked.  It was a black male.  Got out, 
went up and checked one of the van doors –” like the white construction vans. 
“Checked the van door, walked down, checked another van door. Came back and 
got in the minivan he drove up in and then drove down the street.”  So I remember 
thinkin’ this is good. . .so we all started convergin’ on that specific area. 
 
 
 Officer #166, another member of the street crime unit involved in Incident 105, 
echoed Officer #154’s experience, saying: 
And from what I remember, probably about – I’d say no more than 20 minutes 
into us sitting there, one of the other officers got on the air and said that he’s – he 
had eyes on a black male who was going into one of the construction vans.  He 
reported this and he was probably about – I want to say about three to four blocks 
away from me. . . So pretty much everyone got mobile. 
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 The officer who spotted the presumed suspect used communication not only to 
alert officers of his observation, but also to report why he believed the man he was 
observing to be the suspect (i.e., he matched the physical description of the suspect they 
had all received and was currently breaking into a vehicle). The other officers then used 
this reported information to all make the same independent decision to head to the 
location called out by the observing officer. Soon after, all officers converged on the 
suspect’s location and attempted to bring him into custody using an apprehension plan 
they had drafted prior to going out on patrol that day. Unfortunately, the suspect was non-
compliant and nearly ran an officer over with his vehicle, thus initiating police gunfire. 
 One last example of how some officers in the sample used communication during 
the anticipation phase and how this influenced their decision-making was captured in 
Incident 124, the one in which officers were tasked with executing a search of residence 
suspected of being used to house illegal narcotics. Two officers assigned to the narcotics 
unit (Officers #183 and #213) had been involved in the investigation of the home and its 
residents. These officers had called on the assistance of other officers who did not 
typically work with them in the narcotics unit and thus did not have access to the 
information they had collected during the investigation. Officer #213 took it upon himself 
to share this information with these officers prior to driving to the home and executing 
the search, explaining: 
We briefed that morning. . .I think at 6 o’clock. My partner and I had shot the 
location the day before with one of our narcotics trainers. He brought out his 
video camera so we could film it and he was taking still pictures as well. Drove 
by it a few times – got some photos, got some video. So we could. . .the 
information was that the house was a stash house and while we were there that 
day. . .and that people didn’t live there. They frequented it, but nobody stayed 
there was what we had been told.  
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 Officer #185, another officer involved in Incident 105, reiterated Officer #213’s 
account of this phase of the incident, saying: 
[Officer #213] said, “Okay, we’re gonna do this and this is what we’re gonna do.” 
We’re good with it. I say, “Okay.” So, we all briefed. . .this is the position we’re 
gonna be in the stack to go hit the door, and so we approach like we normally did, 
like we planned. 
 
 
 Officer #184 also briefly described this briefing process, highlighting their use of 
additional officers (who were not members of the regular warrant-serving team) and how 
they provided these officers with necessary information, stating: 
Yes, sir, we briefed. We were actually short a couple of guys so we actually asked 
a couple officers – actually, the officer that got injured we asked him to come up 
and him and his partner met us. We briefed them with our raid plan, what we were 
gonna do. He volunteered to run point. So, we briefed it. 
 
 
 Each of these examples from the officers who participated in Incident 105 
highlight how officers can use communication during the early part of the incident to 
share information, discuss plans, and ensure that all officers are on the same page prior to 
arriving on scene and making contact with the suspect(s). The investigating narcotics 
officers who had conducted surveillance knew, based on this collected information, that 
this residence housed drugs and that those who lived in the residence were typically not 
home during the day (see Officer #213’s account above). This information was not only 
distributed to the participating officers, but was used by the officers when planning how 
they were going to execute the search warrant (i.e., during the day when the residents 
were not home). Unfortunately, upon their entry into the home, two individuals were 
home and began firing shots at the arriving officers. 
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 In sum, the experiences of 14 officers demonstrate that communication with other 
officers during the anticipation phase is just as crucial as communication with dispatchers 
or citizens who are phoning in a situation. This finding is especially relevant for police-
citizen interactions that involve more than one officer. If multiple officers are assigned to 
a call, it is logical that officers would want to converse and exchange known, pertinent 
information prior to arriving on scene. Perhaps most importantly, the information 
collected from other officers can influence individual officers’ decision-making at this 
point in the encounter, as well as in subsequent phases. It is necessary then to note the 
potential impact of information collected from other police officers and its significance as 
a possible social influence on officers’ decision-making during the anticipation phase of 
the violent police-citizen encounter. 
 
CONFIRMATION 
 Another way in which some officers in the sample used communication during 
the anticipation phase was to confirm initial information they had received about the 
situation and/or the suspect involved, as well as receive confirmation from other officers 
to validate their decision-making. Five (5) officers in the sample exhibited this behavior 
during the anticipation phase of their incident, relying on responses from other officers to 
dictate their decision-making.24 
 Two officers who used communication to confirm details about the situation they 
were preparing to enter participated in Incident 20, in which 16 officers in the sample 																																																								24	A total of 22 officers engaged in communication during this phase, but a few officers used 
communication for more than one reason. Therefore, these counts will not add up to 22 (but 
rather will add up to 24), as two of these officers utilized communication to both update 
officers/provide information and preserve officers’ safety. 	
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pursued a man who fired shots at a fellow officer. Both of these officers were 
preoccupied with another incident when they heard the broadcast from Officer #35 
reporting that shots had been fired and back-up was needed. Officer #42 was with his 
partner searching the vehicle belonging to some individuals who were suspected of using 
stolen credit cards at a local auto shop when they both heard the broadcast from Officer 
#35. As Officer #42 explained: 
I heard. . .well, I thought I heard somebody yell out, “Shots fired!”. . .and I go, 
“No.” I was a little in disbelief. I was like, “Nah, that’s not what they said.” I 
stopped, I looked back at [my partner] and I said, “Did they just say ‘shots 
fired’?” He goes, “Yeah, that’s what I think they said.” And I said, “Oh shoot” 
and gave back these guys’ IDs and everything and I said, “We’re out of here.” 
And we responded. 
 
 
 His partner, Officer #28, reported this same verbal exchange in his account of the 
incident, stating: 
We’re searching their car [and] we hear [Officer #35] get on the radio and yelling. 
So we kind of looked at each other because he didn’t come through clear. “Did he 
just say something? Is he in foot pursuit? Did he just say, ‘Shots fired’?” And I 
look at the officer who is handling that case and said, “We need to go.” And he 
said, “Ok yeah, let’s go.” Because [Officer #35] wasn’t that far from us. Less than 
a mile away. So we just [released] those guys. . .I think he even gave back the 
credit cards and everything and we just took off. 
 
 
 In the aforementioned example, these officers, who were partnered together that 
night, relied on one another to confirm the information that had been broadcasted by a 
fellow officer. It is clear that both officers were originally unsure of what they had heard, 
but each officer reported a different reason behind this confusion. Officer #42 reported 
that he was in disbelief that this type of incident (i.e., shots fired by or at another officer) 
was taking place and that the officer involved needed assistance, while Officer #28 stated 
that his perplexity about what he heard in the broadcast was due to an unclear radio 
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transmission. Regardless of the reason behind their need for clarity, the behavior of these 
officers demonstrates that, during the anticipation phase of encounters, officers may rely 
on one another to confirm information they have received about an incident that requires 
their attention. 
 In addition to relying on one another to confirm information, three officers in the 
sample described how they used communication with other officers to provide them with 
confirmation about their decision-making in this phase. A good example of this pattern 
was found in the behavior of Officer #104 who was involved in Incident 46. He was one 
of two officers who were working a traffic detail when a call came out reporting shots 
being fired at a nearby community center. When he heard this information, Officer #104 
described how he immediately looked to a fellow officer, who was a sergeant at the time, 
for confirmation that they could respond to the call, explaining: 
Call comes out on the radio. . .shots fired at the community center. And we get, 
you know, we get these calls not all the time, but you know, it’s ok, shots fired 
and radio dispatches a couple of other cars to respond. . . we were tied up and so 
the other officers are going, no big deal. . .radio then advises us that they’re 
getting multiple calls, that they have a woman down, and that they have a man 
with a shotgun running around the center. We now go from the typical shots fired 
call to pretty much a confirmed shots fired call. I looked up at my partner, the 
acting sergeant at the time, and he was like giving me the signal, “Go, go, go, 
go!” [We] got in my patrol car, spun around, drove down the block to the end of 
the road, made a left and we were there. 
 
 
 This example not only demonstrates how Officer #104 searched for confirmation 
from another officer before making the decision to respond to a call, but it also represents 
a relationship dynamic that may very well have played a role in this interaction: the 
officer he was seeking confirmation from was a sergeant. Officer #104 does not explicitly 
say that this power dynamic played a role in his choice to seek approval for his action 
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from his partner that day, but the fact that he mentioned his partner’s rank in the 
description above suggests it may have played a role in this interaction. Regardless of 
whether his partner’s seniority influenced his behavior, Officer #104’s experience 
demonstrates that when an additional officer is present and available, an individual 
officer may seek confirmation from him or her before making the decision to become 
involved in an incident. 
 Another example of officers relying on communication with one another to 
confirm their thoughts or decision-making during the early phases of an encounter was 
observed in Officer #9’s account of his involvement in Incident 9, the incident in which 
officers attempted to apprehend a suspect wanted for a recent string of gas station 
robberies. Officer #9 described how he and his partner planned to drive to this 
individual’s home with the hope of talking to him and seeing whether he matched the 
description they had of the robbery suspect. In the midst of this planning, Officer #9 
reported that he and his partner talked about potential outcomes of the situation and 
decided that it would be best if they called and requested two additional officers to help 
them, explaining: 
Before we do anything, before we approach, we want[ed] to get additional 
officers. Absolutely, we don’t know who’s in [the suspect’s house]. There could 
be seven, eight, nine guys inside that house, you know, uh, who knows, you 
know? And there’s another thing to it. I mean, let’s say it is just him, we would—
what we would normally do, if someone gives us consent, you know, we’ll step 
outside, two detectives can talk to you and the other two can go inside and do the 
search, you know?  That’d be preferable to us, uh, and it’s time-proven and it 
works for us.  So, that’s why we wanted more people out there as well. 
 
 
 While Officer #9 did not go into detail about the “what if” scenarios he and his 
partner had talked about, he does make it clear above that one of the potential outcomes 
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they considered was that they could arrive at the suspect’s house, only to be outnumbered 
by others who could possibly be in the home. Because of this, these officers agreed that 
requesting additional officers to travel with them to the suspect’s home was the best 
course of action and Officer #9’s partner took it upon himself to make the request.  
 It is necessary to note that while this behavior only occurred among a small 
number of officers in the sample, it still highlights an important finding: when officers 
are working together, they are able to take advantage of a second opinion regarding the 
actions and/or decisions they are considering in the anticipation phase. This feedback 
provided by a fellow officer may influence the decision(s) an individual officer will 
ultimately make. Therefore, it is important to consider that individual officers may rely 
on other officers’ feedback about thoughts they are having or decisions they are 
contemplating at this stage of the potentially violent police-citizen encounter. It is also 
important to examine more closely how feedback from other officers may impact 
individual officers’ decision-making. 
 
SAFETY 
The final way in which officers used communication with one another in the 
anticipation phase was to preserve their own safety of the safety other officers who were 
either already involved, or about to become involved, in their incident. For example, five 
(5) officers in the sample reporting sharing information with other officers or requesting 
that officers make certain decisions with the overall goal of ensuring that they maintain 
safe operations during their encounter. Again, although this pattern was only observed 
among a small number of officers, these findings still represent a theme that emerged 
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from incidents involving multiple officers, and thus enhance our understanding of how 
other officers’ actions can impact an individual officer’s actions and/or decisions early in 
the incident. 
 An example of this behavior was observed in Officer #7’s account of his decision-
making during Incident 8, the incident wherein officers were called to respond to a 
suicidal subject who may have posed a threat to innocents in the home. On his way to the 
scene, Officer #7 learned that another officer had made it to the scene of the call before 
him. Officer #7 advised this officer to wait for additional officers to arrive before making 
his way to the home, explaining: 
We get a call of a suicidal subject who had shot himself and they gave the address 
out. Prior to my arrival, another officer from the other district - cause it’s right on 
the dividing line of the districts - arrived on scene. At that point I advised that 
officer to stop right where the beginning of the block was, cause it was about half 
way down the block where the house is at, so we could all make the approach 
together since shots had been fired. 
 
 
 Officer #7’s communication with the arriving officers was driven by his concern 
for the safety of these officers based on what was known about the incident. Because it 
had been reported that gunshots had already been fired, Officer #7 did not want a single 
officer to handle that type of call alone. Therefore, he requested that the first-arriving 
officer wait to approach the scene until additional officers, including himself, arrived and 
they could proceed together from there. 
 Another example of how an officer relied on communication to preserve officer 
safety was found in Officer #123’s account of his participation in Incident 90, the 
incident in which officers engaged in a vehicle pursuit and shootout with a known gang 
member. At the time, Officer #123 was a detective assigned to a multi-agency gang task 
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force. One of his informants had alerted him to the location of a gang member who was 
suspected of committing a number of armed robberies that had occurred across town. 
Given all this information, Officer #123 described how it factored into his decision to 
preserve his own safety by requesting back-up, saying: 
Well, [the informant] calls at, I wanna say at 12:30 that night and says we're at 
this house, dope house in the mornings that I was well aware of, and the car's 
parked in the driveway and oh, by the way, he's got a gun and he's been doing 
jewelry store robberies So I called dispatch just because I thought things might 
get a little sideways and say, “Hey, we're in this area. If we start yelling for 
anything, this is what's going on.” And I come to find out as I was on the phone 
with [the informant], she was telling me more and more about that day, that the 
suspect had already shot at a homeowner who came out and interrupted a car 
prowl. And so I’m trying to formulate a plan and I was like okay, this guy's nuts. I 
mean, he's a bad dude and just really has a potential of going stupid. So, I called. . 
.I had my unmarked patrol vehicle and I put my other two partners in a civilian 
car to have the eyes on the house in case the car left and then I called [another 
officer] who was in a marked patrol car and working patrol to come assist. 
 
 
 Upon learning that the suspect he was searching for was currently at a home 
known to be associated with narcotics distribution and that he had fired shots at an 
individual earlier in the day, coupled with the fact that he was suspected of committing 
multiple armed robberies, Officer #123 made the decision to call additional officers and 
ask for their assistance in this operation. The information that Officer #123 had received 
led him to label the suspect as “a bad dude” who “really [had] the potential of going 
stupid.” Therefore, not only did he call additional officers for back-up, but he also alerted 
dispatch of his location and operation. Lastly, it should be noted that Officer #124 also 
requested the presence of an officer in a marked police car in addition to the two officers 
he called for back-up (who were in unmarked cars). This was another safety precaution 
taken by Officer #124, who recognized that should the officers be forced to engage in the 
suspect in a pursuit or place the suspect under arrest, it would be smart – and safe – to 
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have a uniformed officer there in a marked police car so the suspect knew he was being 
pursued by the police.  
 One last example of how communication was used to preserve officer safety was 
observed in Officer #184’s account of his early decision-making in Incident 124, during 
which he and other officers executed a search warrant of a home suspected of being used 
to store illegal narcotics. Prior to serving the warrant and conducting the search, Officer 
#184 drafted a plan detailing how many officers he would need and what each officer 
would be doing during the operation. He ended up requesting the assistance of two 
officers who did not regularly work with his team, explaining: 
We were actually short a couple of guys so we actually asked a couple officers – 
actually, the officer that got injured we asked him to come up and him and his 
partner met us. We briefed them with our raid plan. . .what we were gonna do. 
 
 
 Officer #184’s assessment of the situation was similar to the previous officer’s 
(Officer #9). Based on what he knew about the home and the inhabitants (e.g., “We knew 
that when there’s dope in there they want to be able to destroy the evidence. We knew he 
had a weapon or could have had a weapon in that house”), he wanted to ensure that they 
had enough officers to execute the search warrant safely. Officer #184 recognized that his 
unit was short on officers at the time, so he made the decision to call on two additional 
officers and requested their assistance.  
 In sum, the 22 officers in the sample who communicated with other officers 
during the anticipation phase demonstrated behaviors that were recognized by Binder and 
Scharf in their summary of officers’ actions in this early phase. The analysis revealed that 
officers who did engage in communication in this phase did so for three primary reasons: 
to share information about the incident and/or suspect with one another, to provide other 
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officers with confirmation about the information they received or decisions they were 
considering or had made, and to preserve officer safety. Communication with officers, 
regardless of the reason behind it, impacted individual officer’s decision-making during 
the anticipation phase.  
 
ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT 
 To review, in Binder and Scharf’s framework, the entry phase begins when 
officers arrive on the scene of their incident and continues until the officers makes verbal 
(or non-verbal) contact with the suspect. Moreover, the authors identify multiple factors 
that they believe can influence officer’s decision-making during this segment of 
encounters, such as the officer’s distance from the suspect, the availability of cover (to 
protect the officer should the suspect pose a physical threat to the officer), and the 
officer’s assessment of the suspect’s overall demeanor (e.g., calm, agitated, aggressive, 
etc.). The authors do not, however, discuss whether or how the presence or actions of 
other officers on scene might impact an individual officer’s decision-making once he or 
she arrives on scene.  
 The present analysis disclosed a number of ways in which the actions of other 
officers can influence individual officers’ decision-making during the entry phase. Some 
of the patterns identified among officers in the anticipation phase continued to hold 
strong in the entry phase as well. That is, officers continued to use communication with 
one another to gather information about the situation and/or suspect on scene, to preserve 
officer safety, and to provide confirmation and/or support regarding options and/or 
decisions they were considering. In addition, the results from the analysis suggest that at 
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times, officers followed the lead of other officers on scene when making decisions during 
this phase, thus mirroring the behavior of their fellow officers on scene. Each of these 
four aspects of how fellow officers affected subject officers’ actions are addressed in turn 
below. 
 
COMMUNICATION 
 During the entry phase, officers in the sample continued the communication 
patterns observed in the anticipation phase. Twenty-five (25) officers in the sample 
verbally communicated with other officers during this phase. They did so for one of two 
primary reasons, both of which were observed during the anticipation phase: 1) to share 
information about the situation and/or the suspect and 2) to preserve their personal safety 
and/or the safety of other officers on scene. In addition, a new communication purpose 
emerged among officers in the entry phase. Twenty-five (25) officers communicated with 
at least one other officer to draft a plan to take some sort of specific action (e.g., to make 
entry into a building, to make contact with the suspect, etc.). It should be noted that 
officers’ engagement in these three sorts of communication was not mutually exclusive. 
For example, officers sometimes communicated to both update other officers about the 
situation and/or the suspect and draft a plan with his or her fellow officers.  
 
Situation/Suspect Update 
 Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) state that upon arrival on scene (and their 
entrance into the entry phase), officers begin making direct observations, which lead to 
individual interpretations of the situation at hand. They then take these observations 
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based on interpretations and compare them to the information they received in the 
previous phase (from dispatchers, citizens who reported the incident, or other officers) to 
craft a more complete assessment of the situation at hand. Analysis of the interviews used 
in the present study suggest that when multiple officers are involved in the same incident, 
they often communicate with one another to ensure that they are all working with the 
same information and the same interpretations of the situation in order to handle the 
incident. 
 Upon arriving on scene, 15 officers reported communicating with other 
responding officers about what they knew about the incident, the suspect, and what they 
had observed since their arrival to the location. An example of this behavior was 
observed among all four of the officers involved in Incident 9, wherein the officers were 
attempting to speak to a man suspected of a recent robbery. The two officers involved in 
the robbery investigation, Officer #9 and Officer #16, decided to call two additional 
officers to meet them at the suspect’s residence. Once the additional officers arrived, 
Officers #9 and #16 shared with them the information they had collected from the 
investigation about the suspect and the crime he was suspected of committing. As Officer 
#9 described: 
We briefed them on, you know, the robbery the night before and suspect 
information, [gave] them a description of what the suspect from the night before 
looks like, showed them pictures from [the crime scene] and we came up with 
what we were going to do. 
 
 
 Officer #16, who had worked the investigation with Officer #9 the night prior, 
made similar comments about this exchange with arriving officers, saying: 
We clued them in on what we had and what we were doing, they probably, I think 
they already knew a little bit—we were doing this robbery investigation. . . we 
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want to go up and knock on the door and, and just talk to this guy, but I want two 
people watching the back door. 
  
Officer #10, one of the additional officers who was requested by Officers #9 and 
#16, reported the same information exchange between the officers, saying: 
We met up and discussed what they’d come up with prior to making contact [with 
the suspect]. . . I knew that the robbery [occurred] in our city. They’ve gotten him 
identified, gotten him tracked down to the house out there. All the specifics as far 
as how they had him ID’d. . .how they knew it was him. 
 
 
 Communication about the situation here was key because although Officers #9 
and #16 had played a role in the investigation, the other officers they called to join them 
had not. Therefore, two officers in this incident knew more about the situation and the 
suspect going into the situation. Officers #9 and #16 were cognizant of this and took it 
upon themselves to update the two officers who they asked to join them. At this point, 
they also drafted and discussed a contact plan, which will be discussed later in the 
section. 
 Another example of an officer using communication with other officers to draft an 
updated assessment of the situation and/or the suspect was captured in Officer #15’s 
account of his participation in Incident 12, the SWAT call-up to a home where an armed 
individual was holding his child hostage. Upon his arrival on scene, Officer #15 
described how he tried to get as much information as he could from the patrol and SWAT 
officers already on scene about what had transpired prior to his arrival. He stated: 
I’m starting to put on my gear and a supervisor came up to me and he goes, “Hey 
this guy, he came home from work, got in a fight with his wife,” and. . .he goes, 
“they started fighting and he pulled a gun and started throwing his two year old 
daughter around and threw her into the wall and broke the dry wall”. . .and he 
goes, “He’s negotiating with us, but he’s kind of back and forth.”  
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 After receiving more information from a fellow officer about the suspect and his 
past behavior toward his daughter, Officer #15 began considering what else this man may 
be capable of. Prior to arriving on scene, it appears that the only information Officer #15 
received was that a man was holding his child hostage, the address of the home where the 
incident was taking place, and that he was needed immediately. Once he arrived on scene 
then, Officer #15 took it upon himself to learn more about the situation from officers who 
had been on scene longer than he had and who most likely had more information about 
the suspect. 
During his interview, Officer #15 also voiced his frustration with the negotiation 
process during this incident. In this case, the communication between the negotiator and 
the suspect was not consistently relayed to the SWAT officers who had been tasked with 
making entry into the home should they need to initiate a hostage rescue. Although this 
finding is isolated to this incident, it brings attention to a situational aspect not considered 
by Binder and Scharf. They argue that the entry phase is when the officer is able to make 
direct observations of the suspect based on his or her actions or verbalizations. But what 
if an officer cannot visibly see the suspect or directly communicate with him or her? In 
this case (and in other incidents that involve a barricaded suspect and rely on the use of a 
negotiator), Officer #15 could not make direct observations of the suspect’s behavior or 
hear any of the suspect’s comments. Therefore, his only sources of information at this 
juncture were other officers.  
One last example was noted in Officer #91’s behavior in Incident 68, which was 
the incident that involved three officers in the sample who were called to respond to a 
man with a grenade at a nearby courthouse. In his interview, Officer #91 recounted that a 
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large number of officers responded to the location, but very few were willing to go in 
when he and another officer attempted to form an entry team. He explained: 
I pulled up out front [of the courthouse]. Lots of cops. Everybody is looking in the 
windows and I was like, “Well, this is stupid – he’s inside and we’re all outside.” 
So. . .there was one of the court security guys there and I said, “Is there a way that 
you can bring me inside without going through the front door and getting [the 
suspect’s] attention?” And he’s like, “Sure, follow me.” So I grabbed another guy, 
another officer. We ran after him. We went in. . .we just tried to provide as much 
information and intelligence as possible over the radio. 
 
 
 Eventually, additional officers made their way into the courthouse, one of whom 
was an officer with SWAT experience. When this officer arrived, Officer #91 explained 
that he moved to the location of this officer, as he had found a better location that 
provided officers with more cover should the suspect detonate the grenade. Once he 
moved closer to the newly arriving officer, Officer #91 “just discussed the situation 
briefly” with the SWAT officer and a supervisor before the other officers began issuing 
commands to the suspect to drop the grenade and surrender to police. 
 In this incident, Officer #91 used communication not only to update the few 
officers who eventually made their way into the courthouse, but also used his radio to 
update officers who were outside the courthouse as to what was occurring on the inside. 
Because of the type of deadly weapon possessed by the suspect in this incident, it is 
understandable that those managing the incident did not want a large number of officers 
entering the courthouse. This officer’s perceptions of the early phases of the incident, 
however, imply that other officers who arrived on scene were too nervous or scared to 
become involved in this incident. While this perception cannot be verified25, the fact that 																																																								25	The three officers who were interviewed and participated in this incident were inside the courthouse 
throughout the incident, not outside. Therefore, perspectives representing officers outside the courthouse 
were not represented in the sample.	
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very few officers were inside the courthouse and thus were able to make direct 
observations of the suspect and his actions and demeanor made Officer #91’s 
communication via the radio crucial to other officers’ understanding of the situation.  
 
Officer Safety 
 In addition to using communication with one another to provide situational 
updates, officers in the sample also communicated with each other during the entry phase 
with the goal of enhancing or preserving their personal safety or the safety of other 
officers. In their outline of this phase of the encounter, Binder and Scharf (1980; 1983) 
identify officer safety as a potential social influence on an individual officer’s decision-
making (i.e., an officer being concerned for his or her own safety, thus making decisions 
that enhance their safety, such as maintaining distance from the suspect or seeking 
cover). The results from this analysis, however, suggest that an individual officer may 
also be concerned for the safety of other officers on scene in addition to their own safety, 
which can impact the decisions they make during this phase of an incident. 
 Upon their arrival on the scene of their respective incidents, 10 officers in the 
sample communicated with other officers in order to promote both personal safety and 
that of the other officers present. An example of this behavior was observed in the 
account of officers involved in Incident 47, during which four officers encountered and 
later engaged in a gun battle with an elderly man. Officer #103 first noticed the elderly 
man, who was making his way toward a few of the officers who were engaged in 
conversations with other citizens. Officer #103 reported feeling uncomfortable about this 
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man, stating that “if I feel uncomfortable, [my officers] need to feel uncomfortable.” He 
explained: 
And this guy comes up and for some reason both Scout and I just caught a 
glimpse of him. I remember that because we just sort of. . .something didn’t seem 
right. And I said to Will, I said, “Will, pay attention”. . . when I first paid attention 
to the guy and when I told Scout to catch on him, and then I sort of pointed to 
Will who was off to the right. It’s just an automatic thing. It was we know what to 
do, but I’m still making sure that other people are paying attention to what I’m 
paying attention to. 
 
 
 The behavior of the elderly man that first caught Officer #103’s attention was him 
actively avoiding the officers on scene by taking a roundabout path out of the area instead 
of simply walking straight through on the cleared, paved pathway. As Officer #103 
mentioned above, there was something about this behavior that did not seem quite right 
to him and he made the decision to communicate this feeling of uneasiness to other 
officers by alerting them to the man’s presence. Soon after, the elderly man began to 
urinate on a tree, at which point other officers made their way toward him and instructed 
him to stop. The man then pulled a firearm out of his waistband and fired in the direction 
of the officers. Three of the four officers interviewed fired shots back at the man. 
 Two other examples of officers communicating with one another to preserve their 
safety were captured in the accounts of two officers involved in Incident 20. This 
incident, which involved 16 officers in the sample, was unique in that some participating 
officers initiated and engaged in Binder and Scharf’s four phases at different time points 
based on their arrival on scene. For example, some of these officers were the first to 
arrive on scene after one of their fellow officers reported shots had been fired and, as 
such, these officers were present when the suspect first engaged them in gunfire. Some of 
these officers fired back at the suspect, thus entering the final frame phase. The incident, 
172		
however, did not conclude there, as the suspect continued to flee down the street and 
officers gave chase. As this was happening, additional officers were arriving on scene 
and initiating their involvement in the incident at this point. Therefore, although some 
officers had already made it to the final frame phase, others were just beginning the entry 
phase. This is important to note, as the two examples that will be discussed here involve 
two officers who entered the entry phase at two different time points during the same 
incident.  
 Officer #34 was one of the first officers to arrive on scene. Instead of responding 
to the exact location that Officer #35 reported, Officer #34 explained that he decided to 
report a few blocks down from the location with the goal of adding to the police 
perimeter that Officer #35 was attempting to organize. Once he stepped out of the car, 
Officer #34 was contacted by a resident who told him that she believed she saw a man 
running in the area and that he was hiding in some nearby shrubbery. Officer #34 quickly 
relayed this information on the radio, stating: 
I immediately called that out. . .dispatch responded and I said, “Hey, I have a 
suspect. Suspect may be here at this location. I need [assistance.]” And 
immediately heard sirens in the background headed my way. So the information 
turned out to be correct in the long run. 
 
 
 Soon after communicating this information via radio, additional officers joined 
Officer #34 at his location. In his interview, Officer #34 made it clear that because he 
believed the suspect to be nearby in the bushes, he was careful to use his car as cover 
while talking to arriving officers in case the suspect fired at officers. One of the arriving 
officers was a rookie whose actions upon arrival concerned Officer #34. He explained: 
And there was at least one unit, came down the street and parked here, and it was 
Jackson, who is one of our SWAT officers, and he had a trainee. Brand new guy. 
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And then brand new guy gets out and he’s standing right here next to his car, 
because he’s new, he’s waiting for direction from his training officer. And I didn’t 
know that guy’s name. So I started yelling at Jackson, who had also gotten out. . 
.and I remember yelling at Jackson, “Move! Move!” because I didn’t know this 
kid’s name and I knew if I told Jackson to move, the kid would follow. “Hey 
move! The guy’s right here! The guy’s right here!” and in the process of me 
saying that, the guy jumps out of the bushes [and shoots]. 
 
 
 This example illustrates two instances where Officer #34 used communication 
with his fellow officers during the entry phase. First, shortly after arriving on scene and 
talking with a witness who believed she saw the suspect and knew his location, Officer 
#34 communicated this information with his fellow officers over the radio. In this 
instance, Officer #34 used communication to share information about the situation and 
the suspect, perhaps with the goal of ensuring all officers (incoming or already present on 
scene) were working with the same information. After he broadcasted this newly 
acquired information about the suspect’s possible whereabouts, other officers began to 
drive to his location. Once they arrived (and as described above), Officer #34 then used 
communication to warn officers that they needed to be aware of their surroundings and 
use cover in case the suspect was, in fact, nearby in the bushes and posed a threat to the 
officers.  
 One of the officers mentioned in Officer #34’s account was Officer #29. He was 
the training officer to the trainee whose lax behavior on scene concerned Officer #34. In 
his account of the incident, Officer #29 reported that Officer #34 did alert him to the 
potential threat that the suspect posed if he was, in fact, nearby in the bushes, but the 
behavior of the other officers led to some confusion on Officer #29’s part. He explained: 
I yelled at my [trainee], “Get my shotgun!” So he goes in my trunk and gets my 
shotgun. Just as he’s walking up to hand it to me. . .there were four cops there. . 
.one of the cops there yells at me, “Hey, those are the bushes right there. Get 
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cover!” And it didn’t really sink in because all four of them were standing straight 
up behind the trunks or engine compartments and if they were so worried about it, 
why didn’t they crouch down? So it didn’t really sink in. . .and it didn’t really 
seem like a threat because they weren’t covering, so I turned to [my trainee] to get 
my shotgun and. . .just as he’s handing it to me [the suspect] busts out through the 
hedge. 
 
 
 Both Officers #29 and #34 provide similar accounts of Officer #34’s use of 
communication to alert Officer #29 and his trainee of the suspect’s possible location and 
the importance of seeking cover in case the suspect decided to ambush the officers. 
Officer #29’s read of the situation, however, was interesting in that although he may have 
been aware that they were close to the suspected location of the armed man, he did not 
immediately seek cover or report being outwardly concerned about safety because based 
on his observations, the other officers were not all that concerned either. This example 
not only demonstrates the pattern of communication for the sake of preserving officer 
safety, but this is also an example of how other officers’ behavior can shape the behavior 
and choices of individual officers, which will be discussed in a subsequent subsection of 
this chapter.  
 One last example of how officers used communication to preserve and/or enhance 
the safety of other officers was captured in the account of Officer #37 who was also 
involved in Incident 20. She was, however, one of the later-arriving officers. This means 
that she did not arrive on the scene until after the suspect had fired shots at the group of 
officers (as described in the example above). In fact, in her description of her initial 
arrival on scene, she reported that she could hear gunfire as she was driving in her 
vehicle, but she was not present for, nor a part of, this initial police-suspect exchange.  
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 By the time Officer #37 saw the suspect, he was down on the ground and 
wounded from shots fired by other police officers. Although some of these other officers 
had fired, thus entering the final frame phase, Officer #37 had just arrived on scene and 
had not yet made verbal contact with the suspect, placing her in the entry phase of Binder 
and Scharf’s framework. At this point during the incident, Officer #37 was one of the 
officers who made the decision to surround the downed suspect. She soon noticed that a 
fellow officer was in a crouched down position in front of her, thus placing him in her 
line of fire should he decide to stand up and she decide to shoot. At this point, she used 
communication to alert this officer of her position behind him, saying: 
There’s an officer, and I don’t remember when he got there, whether he was right 
in front of me or he was already there. . .and I don’t even know. . .he was just in 
front of me. . .but I don’t remember seeing him stop. I just remember when I got 
there, he was stopping or he was in front of me. . . I also didn’t remember at the 
time, until the other officer told me that that. . .it’s actually a Sergeant that said 
that when I came up behind him and I put my hand on his shoulder because he 
was crouched down and said, “It’s Denise.” I didn’t remember doing that and then 
when he told me I did it, that’s when I remembered I did it. 
 
 
 In this instance, Officer #37 relied on communication to alert the officer in front 
of her of her position. Therefore, Officer #37 took it upon herself to tell this officer of her 
position so as to avoid injuring or killing another officer because this officer was unaware 
of her presence. As an aside, it is interesting that Officer #37 did not remember engaging 
in this behavior until another officer brought it to her attention after the incident.  
 To conclude, the present analysis highlights that officers rely on communication 
with one another during the entry phase to preserve or enhance the safety of their fellow 
officers. Again, this is a finding that is specific to incidents involving multiple officers, 
but is a contribution to Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework. 
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Binder and Scharf argue that a concern about safety is a factor that can impact an 
individual officer’s decision-making during the entry phase. Rather than viewing this as 
limited to a concern for that officer’s personal safety, the results from this study indicate 
that officers’ concern for the safety of their fellow officers can also impact the decisions 
officers make and the behaviors they engage in during the second phase of the encounter. 
 
Planning 
 Analysis of the transcripts disclosed a new pattern of communication that affected 
officers’ decision-making and behavior during the entry phase. In addition to using 
communication with other officers to provide them with situational updates and/or 
preserve or enhance their safety, individual officers also used communication with other 
officers during this phase of encounters to craft various types of plans. Such plans 
included: how to make entry into a structure, how to establish a search perimeter, how to 
establish verbal communication with a suspect, and how to apprehend a suspect. In total, 
25 officers in the sample reported discussing plans with their fellow officers at this time, 
which ultimately impacted their decision-making during this phase, as well as in 
subsequent phases of the encounter. 
 This is exemplified in Incident 118, which involved two officers in the sample 
who, as previously mentioned, were homicide detectives searching for the suspect in a 
recent homicide. When the officers eventually spotted a man who matched the 
description of their suspect, they began conversing with one another about what they 
should do: should they exit their vehicle, make contact with the suspect, and apprehend 
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him? Or should they call for back-up and wait to contact the suspect until other officers 
arrive? Officer #217 explained: 
I grabbed the radio and I spoke to our detective group, which is not monitored by 
dispatch, and I said, you know, “I’ve got the suspect. This is where he’s at. He’s 
on the move. He’s moving in this direction.” . . . I start to hear sirens. And the 
sirens are coming in. And my partner and I are going back and forth in our very 
short. . .I don’t even remember the words we used, but I’ve been working with my 
partner long enough that we don’t have to say much. We’ve got a pretty good 
sense of what the other is thinking and going to do. And we were discussing do 
we want to take him down? Do we want to wait for patrol? That was the first 
decision we were trying to make and that’s when the sirens started coming in. 
And I think I verbalized something similar to, “He’s going to run when those 
sirens get much closer.” And I don’t know how we communicated, but we agreed, 
“Ok, we are going to contact this guy. We are not going to wait for the arrival of 
patrol.” 
 
 
 Once the partners agreed that they were not going to wait for additional officers to 
arrive, these officers then began to discuss how they were going to approach the suspect 
in order to apprehend him. Officer #168 stated: 
I say to my partner, “Okay, I’ll pull in behind him and we’ll stop him here.”  And 
he says, “No, drive forward and let him walk into us.  We’ll take him.”. . . and as 
we stop, I say to my partner, “You take the commands so that the suspect’s only 
dealing with one person”. . . then we both basically – my partner and I - both 
basically leave the car simultaneously. 
 
 In this example, one can see that Officers #168 and #217 communicated about 
two important decisions: whether they were going to make contact with the (potentially 
armed) homicide suspect before additional officers arrive and how they were going to 
make contact with the suspect. This example provides a clear demonstration of how 
officers can use one another as sounding boards for courses of action they are 
considering. Once they had spotted the suspect, Officers #168 and #217 discussed the 
options they had available to them (i.e., waiting until back-up police units had arrived to 
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approach the suspect or attempting to make contact with him prior to other officers’ 
arrival) and were in agreement about the option they were going to take. Once they made 
the joint decision to contact the suspect before additional officers had arrived, they then 
communicated with one another about how they were going to approach and make verbal 
contact with the suspect. They discussed how they were going to approach the suspect in 
their undercover vehicle, where they would park and exit their car, and, once they left the 
car and made their way toward the suspect, who would be the one issuing verbal 
commands. 
 Another example of how officers used communication with one another to craft a 
plan was captured in Incident 7, which involved three officers in the sample. These 
officers were called to respond to a report of a suicidal subject armed with a gun at a local 
park. Officer #7, normally assigned to carry a rifle, decided to respond to the call because 
other officers had requested an officer with a rifle. Unfortunately, Officer #7’s rifle was 
being repaired at the time, but he had been temporarily assigned a shotgun and, as such, 
thought he could still be of some assistance to the officers on scene.  
 Once he arrived at the park, Officer #7 relied on communication with other 
officers who were already on scene to direct him where they needed him to go. He made 
it to the designated location and began talking with another officer who was already at 
the location about the situation and sought to develop a plan of action. Officer #7 
described that he and the other officer began talking about the type of ammunition he had 
in his shotgun and whether it was the best option given the large distance between 
himself and the armed suspect (approximately 45 yards). He explained: 
So I was talking to [another officer] about. . .I even had a discussion with him, I 
said, “Well”…cause we were about 45 yards out-somewhere around there, and 
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based on that I was like, “Hey” - cause he had his shotgun out too - and I said, 
“What do you have in there?” He goes, “Well, I’ve got the buckshot in there.” 
And I’m like, “Well,” I said, “It’s probably best if we do slugs here just because 
of distance, we don’t want that spread to get you know too far out to where we’re 
not in control.” So I said, “Hey man, I’ll take over, you know, covering him while 
you transition over to slugs and that way we might have a better way to resolve 
this if it if something needs to happen.” 
 
 
This example demonstrates how officers can use communication with one another 
to discuss possible situational outcomes (i.e., the potential that they would need to use 
deadly force) and plan for how they would handle a particular situation should it arise. 
Based on the information they had received (i.e., the suspect was armed, suicidal, and 
unresponsive to commands from other officers), these officers discussed the possibility 
that they may need to use deadly force and, if so, the best ammunition for their weapons 
would be one that provided more control over their shot, given the distance between them 
and the suspect.  
 Another officer involved in this incident, Officer #17, explained that upon his 
arrival on scene, he met up with two other officers and began talking to them about the 
possibility of having to use deadly force and, if so, how they would do this. He stated: 
Yes, we briefly state what positions we’re going to take. Um, if someone did 
decide to shoot, to make note of it somehow, say, “Gun!” or some [way] of letting 
the other one know that you’re about to fire, basically. Uh, can’t always be done, 
but if we can make that happen let’s make it happen. . . And I recall, our 
conversations were if [the suspect] were to pause long enough to pull that trigger, 
what we interpreted as an opportunity for him to fire upon us, then we have [to] 
react and have to be quicker at that reaction. So, we were really discussing what 
are we going. . .are we going to fire. Almost trying to validate our decision-
making is what I. . . remember about it. Are we all on the same page with this?  
You’re kind of looking for reassurance from your peers. 
 
 
Similar to Officer #7’s account, Officer #17 and the officers he was with took the 
time to discuss how this situation could potentially play out. They agreed that if the 
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armed man pointed his weapon in their direction and they felt the need to use deadly 
force, they would do their best to alert their fellow officers of their decision. Later in the 
encounter, the suspect began raising his gun in the direction of police officers, at which 
point two officers fired (Officers #7 and #17) and one held fire (Officer #24). 
In addition, these officers also conversed with one another about the dangers 
associated with waiting too long to shoot, thus giving the suspect more time to pull the 
trigger of his weapon and potentially harm or kill officers on scene. Officer #17’s 
narrative also highlights an important matter that may arise from communication with 
other officers: validation of one’s decision-making. By discussing potential situational 
outcomes and conditions under which they believe they should fire, these officers 
provided one another with valuable feedback about their individual concerns and 
considerations. It also leaves one to wonder: if an officer’s consideration to use deadly 
force is supported by other officers, does this factor into that officer’s decision to fire?  
 
OFFICERS’ DECISION-MAKING AND THE IMPACT OF OTHER OFFICERS 
 In their outline of the entry phase, Binder and Scharf (1983) assert that an 
officer’s decision-making at this point can be influenced by a number of factors, 
including the suspect’s behavior and demeanor, the officer’s perception of his or her 
safety, and the availability of cover and concealment. As previously discussed, findings 
from this study have suggested that officers’ decisions during this phase can be 
influenced by communication with other officers as it relates to their safety or the safety 
of other officers, providing one another with additional or updated information, or 
creating plans for how to move forward in the incident. Another interesting pattern that 
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emerged from the present analysis is that during the entry phase of encounters, officers’ 
decision-making can be influenced by the actions and/or decisions made by other officers 
on scene. Furthermore, the results from the analysis also revealed that upon arrival on 
scene, officers often receive instructions or commands from other officers, thus 
influencing the decisions they make in the entry phase and in subsequent phases of the 
encounter.  
 
Mimicking and Following the Behavior of Others 
 Thirteen (13) officers reported that the behaviors of other officers on scene 
influenced the decisions they made during the entry phase of their respective encounters. 
Often times, these officers engaged in “follow the leader” behavior. That is, they 
identified an officer on scene who they trusted, admired, or who held a higher rank than 
they did, and chose to emulate the behaviors made by this officer instead of making their 
own independent decisions.  
 A number of officers involved in Incident 20 engaged in this sort of mimicry, 
reporting that they selected their original deployment locations based on where they saw 
other officers congregating. These officers participated in the incident wherein officers – 
16 in total – were searching for a man who had fired shots at a fellow officer. Upon her 
arrival on the scene, Officer #32, a canine officer, spotted another officer nearby. She 
then made the decision to meet up with this other officer, explaining: 
As I’m going to one location to set up, I hear another officer setting up at another 
corner and I go over to that far corner. . .I think, right in that area, and just set up 
and see what the officer had. Because the officer had, I don’t know if he put it 
over the air. . .or if he told me, but at some point, I got the information from the 
officer that a female walking by stopped him, he was holding that corner, caught 
his attention and said, “Hey, I don’t know if  this is who you are looking for, but I 
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thought I saw somebody hiding in those bushes” and pointed to some bushes just 
a little ways from where the officer was. . .but that might have been the reason 
why I went to that point specifically because I had the dog at that point. [To] 
figure out what all we had. 
 
 
 Although she sounds unsure of the exact order of events, Officer #32 reported that 
she chose to set up in the area near the officer who had arrived on scene before her 
because she believed she could collect relevant information from him. One could argue 
that had she not come across this officer, Officer #32 would have continued to the 
original location at which she planned to arrive. 
 Another officer to arrive on scene soon after Officer #32 was Officer #29. He was 
a training officer at the time of the incident and had a trainee with him. When detailing 
his arrival on scene, Officer #29 explained how he selected the location where they 
eventually stopped: 
I’m driving, of course. I’m not going to let a rookie drive on this kind of call. I 
pull up facing. . .I guess that would be southbound. . .in the southbound lanes, 
against a curb. . .and I pulled up there because I saw two [police] cars parked right 
at the corner. . .squad cars with two cops standing there. Two or three. I think it 
was three. Yeah, it was three. At least three cops standing there, using the car as 
cover. 
 
 
 It appears that Officer #29 made the decision to stop his car and exit the vehicle 
with his trainee at this location because it was where other officers had also decided to 
stop. He does not clarify specifically what drove this decision to join the other officers 
(e.g., to collect additional information from them, draft a search and apprehension plan, 
provide protection for other officers, etc.), but it is clear in the excerpt above that the 
presence of other officers influenced Officer #29’s decision to stop his vehicle where he 
did once he arrived at the location of the call. 
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 Officer #29’s trainee at the time was Officer #41. This officer engaged in this 
“follow the leader” behavior as well, but the source of his behavior is more clear cut. 
Officer #41 was a new officer and still completing his field training requirements when 
this incident occurred. In congruence with Officer #29’s account, Officer #41 shared that 
other officers warned him and his field training officer of the potential danger that 
loomed nearby. Soon after, the suspect jumped out of the bushes and fired on the officers 
and Officer #41 was forced to make quick decisions, saying: 
I remember another officer down the street yelling, “He’s right there! He’s in the 
bushes!” Basically as soon as that happened, we kind of looked to our side, we 
see the bushes moving, and I think either simultaneous or very close after we both 
kind of jumped around to the opposite side of our car, so we put the car between 
us and the bushes, and then we heard. . .or I heard. . .gun shots almost a few 
seconds after the rustling in the bushes. . . I basically remember just doing what 
my [training officer] was doing. I knew he was pretty squared away. He was, you 
know, in the military and on the SWAT team so I kind of just tried to follow his 
lead. 
 
 
 In the above example, Officer #41 explained that he essentially followed his 
training officer’s lead when the suspect’s bullets started flying in their direction. He made 
it clear that this decision was based on what he knew about his trainer’s experience: he 
was a military veteran and served on the department’s SWAT team. While Officer #41 
does not explicitly say so, it can be assumed that because of his trainee status, this type of 
encounter – and what to do under such conditions – was very unfamiliar to him. 
Therefore, he made the decision to mimic his trainer’s actions by seeking cover behind 
their vehicle and later pursuing the suspect on foot. 
 Officers #32, #29, and #41 were some of the first officers to arrive on scene, and, 
when ambushed by gunfire from the suspect, chased the suspect down the street on which 
he fled. As Officers #32, #29, #41, and others were pursuing the suspect, additional 
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officers were continuing to arrive at the scene. One of these officers, Officer #39, arrived 
on scene just in time to see other officers congregating around the downed suspect. He 
explained: 
. . .the next thing I heard was that there was shots fired again. . . I was coming up 
onto the corner I believe. . .or I must not have been quite there, because they said, 
“Shots fired” and then um. . .they said that an officer had been hit. I don’t 
remember exactly what he said. . . .and at that point, I had just hit the corner and 
everybody was running down to where [the suspect] was at. . . I got out of my car, 
stopped, and took cover behind a tree. 
 
 
 This officer’s arrival on scene coincided with his observation of multiple officers 
running in the same direction and gathering around the suspect who had been hit by 
police gunfire and dropped to the ground. Officer #39 saw the other officers’ behavior 
and made the decision to follow suit by exiting his vehicle, running to where the other 
officers were, and taking cover behind a nearby tree (which is what some of the other 
officers had done). In this case, it appears that the other officers’ behavior served as a cue 
for Officer #39; he observed their actions and simply followed suit.  
 While such mirroring behavior on the part of officers may appear to be sound and 
logical, there were instances captured in the interviews suggesting that in a few cases, 
officers willingly put their safety at risk by following the lead of other officers on scene. 
Continuing with examples from Incident 20, Officer #29’s explanation of his actions 
shortly after arriving on scene and meeting with additional officers fell into this category. 
On his way to the location, Officer #29 stated that he heard a second broadcast reporting 
that the suspect was believed to be hiding in the bushes on the corner of two nearby 
streets. As previously mentioned, Officer #29 and his training officer pulled into the 
neighborhood where the original “shots fired” call had been made and decided to stop at 
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a location where they spotted other officers standing near a squad car. Upon exiting his 
car, Officer #29 described his behavior as mimicking that of the other officers, but he was 
soon warned by one of the other officers that he needed to take cover, as the suspect was 
believed to be in the shrubbery close by. Officer #29 explained: 
There were four cops there. . .one of the cops there yells at me, “Hey, those are 
the bushes right there. Get cover!” And it didn’t really sink in because all four of 
them were standing straight up behind the trunks or engine compartments. And if 
they were so worried about it, why didn’t they crouch down? So it didn’t really 
sink in, but I said, “Ok.” 
 
 
 What is interesting about Officer #29’s decision to exit the vehicle without being 
outwardly concerned for his safety was that he had heard the broadcast reporting that the 
suspect had been spotted nearby the location where he stopped. He had this information, 
yet still made the decision to exit his vehicle without immediately seeking cover because 
that is what he had observed his fellow officers doing. Soon after another officer had 
warned Officer #29 and his training officer to seek cover behind their vehicle, the suspect 
jumped out of the nearby shrubbery and fired shots at the officers. Luckily, Officer #29 
and his trainee were not struck by the suspect’s gunfire. 
 Another example of dangerous behavior was captured in the experience of Officer 
#54, who participated in Incident 26, the one in which he and three other officers 
attempted to take a wanted man into custody at a bail bonds office. Because of the 
location (i.e., a local business) and lack of violence toward police on the suspect’s record, 
these officers did not treat this task as they normally did. Officer #54 explained: 
So we were just going to go down there and pick him up. We weren’t doing it. . 
.like usually if we’re running a warrant on somebody’s house, we’d do it totally 
different. We’d have a detail. . .any time we do a warrant, we’re going to go out 
with our guns drawn already if we’re going to enter a house or going to a 
suspect’s door like that. Like I said, this one. . .I guess because it was a business 
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and the circumstances were just a little different, we were just going to try to kind 
of go in there and cool breeze the guy and just get him to, you know, I guess 
hoping he would cooperate with us. 
 
 
 Unfortunately, the suspect in this case did not cooperate with police. Once the 
officers entered the bail bondsman’s office and told the suspect he was under arrest, he 
stood up and began to withdraw a firearm from his waistband. Two of the officers 
decided to become involved in a physical altercation with the suspect (to hold his arm 
down to prevent him from pointing and shooting his weapon in the direction of officers) 
and eventually two officers fired at the suspect. Officer #54, however, held fire, as he was 
one of the officers who had been preoccupied with physically engaging the suspect.  
When asked during the interview if he had ever considered drawing his weapon 
prior to entering the bail bondsman’s officer, Officer #54 said, “I think I did,” but then 
quickly noted, “I know I recall no one else having theirs out.” Officer #54 did not expand 
on this, but it leads one to suspect that this officer would have made a different decision 
in regards to drawing his weapon upon entry into the bondman’s officer had his fellow 
officers decided to draw their weapons.  
These examples shed light on an influence that is unique to multiple officer 
shootings and critically important: the decisions made by other officers can impact the 
decisions made by individual officers because an individual officer may choose to base 
his or her decisions on the choices made by other officers on scene. In some of these 
cases, the officers made it known why they chose to follow the behavior of others (e.g., 
recognized another officer’s knowledge and experience, wanted to communicate with one 
another), but there may be other times when the reasons behind this mimicking behavior 
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is unknown. This is an important aspect of group behavior that future research on officer-
involved shootings with multiple officers present should address.  
 
Commands/Directions Issued by Other Officers 
 In addition to the findings reported above, the analysis also disclosed that the 
behavior and decisions of 11 officers during the entry phase of their respective incidents 
could be best understood as the execution of orders handed down by another officer on 
scene. In many of these instances, officers received directions, commands, and/or 
assignments from officers involved in the incident who held a superior position (e.g., 
senior officer, sergeant, lieutenant, district supervisor, etc.) compared to them at the time. 
Because of this, these officers engaged in individual decision-making during this phase, 
but some of the decisions they made were rooted in requests and commands made by 
another officer. 
 An example of this behavior was captured in Officer #113’s account of her 
participation in Incident 43, the incident in which two officers were confronted with a 
man armed with two deadly weapons. As Officer #113 initially began to approach the 
man, her training officer spotting something she did not: the man was armed with two 
knives. Officer #113 explained that her training officer immediately said, “He’s got a 
knife! He’s got a knife! Get back!” Once she heard this command from her training 
officer – and without actually seeing the deadly weapon herself – she “turned around and 
went back to. . .the rear of the car.” When asked why she followed these orders from her 
training officer without taking any time to confirm for herself that the suspect was in fact 
armed, she stated: “I just trusted what he saw enough that I ran back.” 
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 This instance is different from others because of the fact that Officer #113 was 
still in training and, as such, may have been more prone and open to taking directions 
and/or commands from other officers because of this. She does, however, report that she 
completely trusted what her field-training officer was relaying to her (i.e., that the suspect 
was armed with knives) and quickly followed the commands he gave her to retreat from 
the suspect and toward protective cover. Although this trainer-trainee dynamic was only 
captured in a few cases in the overall sample, two of these cases included officers in 
training who either followed the lead presented by their field-training officer or followed 
the instructions/commands issued by their field-training officer, thus eliminating 
independent decision-making during the entry phase. 
 A second example of this behavioral pattern was observed in the accounts of 
multiple officers involved in Incident 105, who, as previously mentioned, were searching 
for a man suspected of breaking into vehicles at a nearby construction site. Four officers 
in the sample participated in this incident, all of whom were members of a street crimes 
unit charged with investigating a string of car daytime break-ins near construction sites 
around town. When one of the team members broadcasted that he believed he had spotted 
the suspect, the other officers made their way to this location while their supervisor spoke 
with them over the radio and issued commands to team members to apprehend the 
suspect once he successfully entered the car. Officer #149 reported: “Our supervisor 
[said] to go ahead and take him off once he pops the van open. So he pops the van open, 
[another officer] calls it, [and] we start moving in.” 
 Officer #154, another member of the street crimes unit who was working this 
incident, reported hearing the same command from their supervisor, saying: “Our 
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supervisor was one of the vehicles kind of in the stack. And he’s like, ‘If he does that 
again or he stops, we’re just gonna take him right there.’”  A third officer, Officer #190, 
also shared a similar version of this command, stating:  
Another officer called out a vehicle and a subject that was acting kind of 
suspiciously, walking around and trying door handles on vehicles.  Ran the tag of 
the vehicle that he was driving.  Car came back stolen.  We began to follow it.  It 
pulled into a back alley, at which point the sergeant at the time said that if he pulls 
over back here, we're gonna go ahead and take him. 
 
 
 While some of the minor details are inconsistent, the command issued by their 
sergeant is clear: these officers were instructed to apprehend the man believed to be the 
suspect if he engaged in a certain behavior (which varied in each officers’ account). In 
this instance, these officers drove to the location where the suspect was reported (thus 
initiating the entry phase) and attempted to apprehend the suspect based on a command 
they had received from their supervisor. Therefore, the decision on each of their parts to 
exit their vehicles and attempt to take the suspect into physical custody26 was guided, and 
therefore influenced, by the directions issued to them by their sergeant. 
 In sum, the analysis of officers’ decision-making during the entry phase disclosed 
a number of key findings relevant to police shootings involving multiple officers. First, 
officers’ decision-making can be influenced by the mere presence of other officers. When 
other officers are present, officers may engage in communication with one another for a 
variety of different reasons. What transpires during this communication between officers 
can then have bearing on their decision-making during the entry phase, which can impact 
their behavior in subsequent phases of the encounter. In addition, the presence and 
actions of other officers on scene can impact the decisions made by individual officers 																																																								26	All of these officers entered the information exchange phase at this point because they issued commands 
(thus making verbal contact) to the suspect to exit his vehicle. 
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through mimicking. That is, officers may choose to engage in certain behaviors or make 
certain decisions because they witness other officers doing the same. Lastly, an individual 
officer’s decision-making during this phase can be influenced by commands issued by 
other officers. Although one may argue that officers are independent actors and as such 
have the ability to disregard directions and/or commands from a fellow officer, this may 
not always be the case (as observed in the examples noted above). To have a more 
complete understanding of how officers make decisions during Binder and Scharf’s 
second phase of high-risk encounters then, the aforementioned findings will need to be 
recognized as potential social influences on officer’s decision-making during the entry 
phase. 
 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
 Binder and Scharf state that this third phase of the violent police-citizen encounter 
begins when an officer initiates verbal or non-verbal contact with the suspect. When 
reading through Binder and Scharf’s summation of the information exchange phase, it is 
clear that they believe that dialogue between the officer and the suspect and the suspect’s 
behavior/demeanor plays a crucial role in whether an officer will decide to use deadly 
force during the final frame of the incident. Because this framework was primarily based 
on their analysis of single-officer incidents, however, Binder and Scharf do not 
acknowledge how the presence and actions of other officers on scene can impact the 
decisions made by an individual officer. Actions taken by other officers involved in the 
same incident can expand or restrict the options available to an individual officer. 
Furthermore, an officer may make the choice to execute a specific action based on the 
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actions of other officers. Lastly, having multiple officers involved in the same incident 
places officers in a situation wherein they may need to essentially act based upon the 
choices made by one another during certain points in the incident. 
 As mentioned in the fourth chapter, because Binder and Scharf were not explicit 
about the police actions that constitute “non-verbal” contact with the suspect, I did not 
attend to this matter in the present study. Therefore, officers were coded as entering this 
phase only if they made verbal contact with the suspect in their respective incident. Using 
these parameters, 36 officers in the sample entered the information exchange phase. 
Patterns pertaining to officers’ decision-making in this phase were observed, but because 
only 36 out of the 83 officers in the sample issued verbal commands during their incident, 
the patterns that emerged were present among just a subset of officers interviewed. 
Nevertheless, the findings from the analysis of these 36 interviews shed important light 
on the dynamics present in officer-involved shootings. 
 
OFFICERS’ DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DECISIONS MADE BY OTHER OFFICERS 
 Previous sections of this chapter demonstrated that the actions of other officers on 
scene impacted the choices made by individual officers in the anticipation and entry 
phase. The results of the analysis of decisions made by the 36 officers who entered the 
information exchange phase indicate this pattern holds during the information exchange 
phase of high-risk police-citizen encounters.  
 Safety continued to be a theme that was present among the officers interviewed 
and not just their own safety. While many of the officers interviewed reported being 
concerned about their own safety, six (6) officers who entered the information exchange 
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phase described how decisions they made at this point were made to preserve the safety 
of another officer. That is, they believed another officer on scene was in danger of being 
seriously injured or killed and made decisions and took actions to prevent this from 
occurring. Because Binder and Scharf limited their discussion of the role that safety 
concerns play to safety of self, this finding identifies a weakness in their model and is 
thus worthy of some detailed discussion. 
 One example of this concern for fellow officers’ safety comes from Officer 
#149’s description of his participation in Incident 105, the case in which a street crimes 
unit was attempting to catch an individual who had been breaking into vehicles near 
construction sites. Once the officers received a report from a fellow officer that he had 
spotted the suspect attempting to break into a car, Officer #149 and others converged on 
this location in their undercover vehicles. When the suspect saw multiple vehicles 
stopping where he was, Officer #149 believed the suspect “knew the jig was up.” The 
suspect ran back to his vehicle, jumped in the driver’s seat, and attempted to flee. Officer 
#149 explained that each officer had pulled up and parked their cars in such a way as to 
block the suspect’s vehicle, thus preventing him from fleeing in his car. 
 While officers were exiting their vehicles and issuing commands to the suspect to 
put his vehicle in park and slowly exit the car, Officer #149 noticed that another officer, 
Officer #166, had exited her car and somehow managed to get behind the suspect’s 
vehicle. This concerned Officer #149, as the suspect was still behind the wheel of his 
vehicle and could very well pose a threat to Officer #166 if he successfully put his 
vehicle in reverse. He explained: 
I don’t know how this happened but [Officer #166] is on her hands and knees 
behind his car. . .we’ve moved up to within maybe 10 feet or so of [the suspect’s] 
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car and we’ve been telling him the whole time, “Stop! Put your hands up!”. . .that 
kind of thing. And I look inside [to] sort of the cockpit area there and he’s trying 
to go from reverse to drive, from drive to reverse. And I see him doing it and I 
recognize that [Officer #166] is behind the car. Everything else he’d hit so far 
he’d totally destroyed. I felt like if he hit her with that car that she would be either 
crippled or killed. 
 
 
 In the example above, one can see how the actions of one officer can impact the 
considerations and decisions made by another officer. In this case, Officer #166 took a 
series of actions that placed her behind the vehicle of the suspect. At the same moment, 
Officer #149 was issuing commands to the suspect to stop attempting to flee, park his 
vehicle, and come out of the car with his hands up. He then looked into the suspect’s 
vehicle and could see that the suspect was not intending to comply. Instead, the suspect 
was continuing to try to move his car in order to escape. Officer #149 then had two pieces 
of information that impacted his decision-making at this point: he had a suspect who was 
non-compliant and attempting to flee in his vehicle and a fellow officer who had fallen 
down behind the suspect’s vehicle and could be seriously injured or killed if the suspect 
reversed. Officer #149 then made the decision to use deadly force, thus entering the final 
frame, and fired shots at the suspect to prevent him from striking Officer #166 with his 
car. 
 In this incident, Officer #149’s decision-making was impacted by his concern for 
Officer #166’s safety. Had Officer #166 not ended up behind the suspect’s car, it is 
possible that Officer #149 may have made a different series of decisions and taken 
different actions. For example, he may have taken more time to continue issuing 
commands to the suspect to exit the vehicle before deciding to shoot. In fact, had another 
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officer’s life not been in danger, Officer #149 might well have determined that deadly 
force was unnecessary and might never have shot.  
 Another example of how an officer’s concern for another officer’s safety 
influenced his decision-making during the information exchange phase was observed in 
Incident 118, in which two homicide detectives were searching for a man suspected of 
committing a recent homicide. After they had decided to make contact with the man prior 
to additional officers arriving, Officer #168 and his partner, Officer #217, drew their 
weapons and began to make their way toward the suspect. Both officers issued verbal 
commands to the suspect informing him who they were and that he was under arrest, but 
the suspect did not comply. Officer #168 explained: 
He’s looking directly at [my partner], but not doing anything, so I start yelling 
out, “Police, freeze.  Don’t move.  Police.” He looks at my partner. . .and then 
looks directly at me. He drops into a slight crouch, just gets a look of absolute 
rage on his face, baring his teeth. I kind of describe it as a war cry, just starts 
screaming.  He throws his hands out directly in front of him and starts running. 
 
 
 At this point, the suspect charges at Officer #168 and the two become engaged in 
a physical altercation. As Officer #168 stated: 
I’m trying to strong-arm [the suspect] off because he gets me, he gets to me and 
he’s reaching for the gun. . . and suddenly this picture started going off in my 
mind that I’m going to lose the gun and he’s going to kill me, which for some 
reason, didn’t bother me as much as the thought I had that he was going to 
ambush. . .he was going to take my gun and ambush and kill my partner.  This 
overwhelming fear, this deadly fear that he was going to kill my partner. 
 
 
 Officer #168 had issued commands to the suspect, but rather than complying, the 
suspect physically attacked him and attempted to take his service weapon. Rather than 
fearing for himself – and letting fear for himself and concern for his personal safety drive 
his decision-making – Officer #168 shared that he was more concerned for the safety of 
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his partner. His greatest fear at the time was that the suspect would take his weapon away 
and use it to kill Officer #217. This fear for the safety of his partner ultimately led Officer 
#168 to the decision to shoot the suspect. 
 These two examples demonstrate how an individual officer’s decision-making can 
be impacted by the presence and actions of other officers involved in the same incident. 
In single-officer shootings, the officer may worry about his or her safety, as well as the 
safety of citizens in the surrounding area. The findings from this analysis reveal that an 
individual officer may be concerned for the safety of other officers on scene, and as such, 
may make decisions in the information exchange phase with the goal of preserving or 
enhancing the safety of a fellow law enforcement officer. 
 In addition to safety, another pattern that emerged from the officers’ experiences 
in the information exchange phase was how the decisions made by other officers 
influenced the decisions made by an individual officer. Binder and Scharf theorize that 
decisions made by an officer can expand or constrict the options available to that officer 
later in the encounter. Perhaps just as important, findings from this analysis suggest that 
decisions made by other officers on scene have the ability to expand or constrict options 
available to an individual officer.  
 Six (6) of the 36 officers who entered the information exchange phase fell into 
this category. One of these officers was Officer #69 who participated in Incident 46, 
wherein he and a fellow officer responded to a call of shots fired at a nearby community 
center. Soon after seeing a deceased female on the ground (dead of an apparent shotgun 
wound to the chest), the officers saw the suspect – a man walking inside the building 
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carrying a shotgun. Both officers then issued verbal commands to the suspect. As Officer 
#69 stated: 
We had a verbal engagement [with the suspect] there for a very brief time. He 
said, “Don’t come in!” We said, “Put the shotgun down,” those kind of things. 
And then he turned and went through the second double doors into the facility. . . 
So, we went in. . . Mike was ahead of me. I was trying to broadcast radio to radio 
and we entered. 
 
 
 When reading through the entirety of Officer #69’s account, it is apparent that he 
and Officer #104 operated as a team throughout the encounter, with Officer #104 taking 
the lead position (i.e., serving as the first officer to enter the building) and Officer #69 
following close behind. Because Officer #104 took what Officer #69 referred to as “the 
point position,” Officer #69 was the secondary officer. He and Officer #104 never 
conversed about who would broadcast the incident updates on the radio, but rather 
Officer #69 took it upon himself to complete this task.  
 Later in his interview, Officer #69 was asked by the interviewer whether, once 
they entered the community center, he had been essentially “playing off the lead” of 
Officer #104 during the incident. Officer #69 agreed that he viewed Officer #104 as the 
primary officer during the call, stating, “He was the point, yeah. I would use more of a 
military term. He’s the point.” Although he does not explicitly state the reason why he 
made the decision to take up the broadcasting duties during the information exchange 
phase, it appears that this decision was influenced by his partner’s decision to take the 
lead position during entry and Officer #69’s interpretation that he was the secondary 
officer and thus in charge of broadcasting information to other officers via the radio. 
 A similar example was found in Officer #92’s account of his experience in 
Incident 69. This was the previously mentioned incident in which two officers responded 
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to a report of a man armed with a gun. Both officers eventually observed an individual 
who matched the description of the armed man. Officer #92, who was driving the squad 
car, pulled up near the man, put the spotlight in his direction, and issued commands to 
him to stop so they could speak with him. The suspect then took off on foot down the 
street and Officer #92’s partner gave chase. He explained: 
[Officer #106] is in the passenger side and she, of course, knows we’re going 
tactical, so she’s like out of the car before I even hit park, you know? And so she, 
in my mind now, [Officer #106] and I worked together enough that. . .we were 
pretty in sync as far as our tactics go. . .and so I know at this point she’s contact. 
She’s running after the guy to make contact. I’m going to be cover. I’m her 
bodyguard. And so I get the car in park, come around the front of the car, and then 
I come up with my gun and chasing after the guy. 
 
 
 As Officer #92 explained, his perception of his job at this point is based on the 
behavior of (and decision made by) his partner, Officer #106. His partner chose to 
quickly jump out of the car and chase after the fleeing suspect on foot before Officer #92, 
the driver of their vehicle, could park the car. Because his partner left the car first, Officer 
#92 became the second officer in the pursuit by default, but his interpretation of this 
position then dictates his decision to draw his weapon at this point of the encounter. He 
stated above that because his partner is the contact officer (i.e., the officer who will make 
physical contact with the suspect and apprehend him), he is “her cover” and he is “her 
bodyguard.” He believed it was his job as the secondary officer to protect her, therefore 
leading him to make the decision to draw his weapon as he exited the car and pursued the 
fleeing suspect on foot. 
 Another officer in the sample whose decisions during this phase were impacted by 
decisions made by a fellow officer on scene was Officer #118. He, along with another 
officer (Officer #117), was involved in Incident 88, the incident in which officers were 
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tasked with completing a welfare check at an apartment complex, only to be confronted 
by an armed, non-compliant man. Upon seeing that the man was armed, Officer #118 
explained that both officers drew their weapons at this time, as this was “just a normal 
reaction” when dealing with an armed individual. Both officers began issuing commands 
to the individual to drop his weapon, but the man refused, instead yelling at officers to get 
out of his apartment. At this point, Officer #118 stated that the other officer used OC 
spray against the suspect, but was unsure why his partner officer did this, saying: “I don’t 
know what made him decide to do this. . .I don’t know. . .but he had taken his mace out 
and he discharged it at this guy.”  
 According to Officer #118, as the suspect was attempting to wipe the spray from 
his eyes (and still armed with the knife), Officer #117 moved closer to the suspect with 
the intent to look at the suspect and assess how badly the spray had affected him and 
whether they would be able to apprehend him. The suspect then began moving forward 
toward Officer #117 and swinging his knife in the officer’s direction. Officer #118, who 
had somehow ended up on the other side of the suspect, recognized that the armed man 
now posed a deadly threat to the other officer and, because of the minimal amount of 
space available for maneuvering in the small apartment, Officer #118 thought Officer 
#117 was going to have to make a decision, explaining: 
I took one step towards [the armed man] with the intention of grabbing him and it 
only took one step and I realized that [Officer #117] wasn’t going to have a 
choice - he was going to have to shoot him because he didn’t have the room and I 
didn’t have the time to get to him before he got to [Officer #117]. So I 
immediately, and everything started going through my head really quick, I go, 
okay [Officer #117] is gonna shoot him and I’m down range of this bullet. I said, 
this bullet [is] gonna go through [the suspect] and from that point I don’t know 
where it’s gonna go because, I mean, if you’ve ever watched a bullet travel 
through a body, it doesn’t go straight through. 
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 Because of his placement behind the suspect and in the line of Officer #117’s fire, 
Officer #118 was concerned that if Officer #117 was going to fire his weapon at the 
suspect – and he was very confident that he was – his partner’s bullet could pass through 
the suspect’s body and potentially strike him. Officer #118 explained that his partner 
officer was very close to the suspect (at “point blank range” in his words), so he felt there 
was a strong possibility that the suspect’s body would not stop Officer #117’s bullet, thus 
putting him in danger. To prepare for this possibility and working off of Officer #117’s 
behavior, Officer #118 quickly moved positions, saying: 
I immediately start thinking what do I do, so I just, I just went to the right side 
wall and I just put myself face, in front of it, and I just held myself as close to that 
wall as I could because, and I got there just about the time the first shot went off.  
 
 
 In this instance, Officer #118 was working off of a decision he believed his fellow 
officer was about to make. These officers did not engage in communication with one 
another during this point, leaving each officer to make a different set of decisions. This, 
however, did not mean that their decision-making and subsequent behaviors were not 
intertwined. Based on the totality of circumstances, Officer #118 was confident that 
Officer #117 would make the decision to use deadly force and to fire shots at the armed 
man. Because he was concerned that this decision could have dire consequences for him, 
Officer #118 made the quick decision to move out of the officer’s line of fire and behind 
a nearby wall to protect himself from ricocheting police gunfire. During his interview, 
Officer #118 attributes much of what happened to Officer #117’s decision to use OC 
spray against the suspect, stating: 
I think the biggest mistake that happened that day, is probably one of your next 
questions, biggest mistake that happened that day was [Officer #117] deploying 
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the mace. . .that gave [the suspect] no other choice but to attack.  If he had not 
been. . .if the mace had not been deployed, I still think we could have talked this 
guy down. 
 
 
 Officer #118 believed that if his partner officer had not made the choice to use 
OC spray against the armed man, they could have diffused the situation and possibly 
coaxed the man to drop the knife without having to use deadly force. Instead, Officer 
#118 was forced to work off of the decision Officer #117 made, which dictated his 
movement within the apartment, toward the suspect, and eventually away from the 
suspect to avoid being struck by his partner’s rounds. In sum, Officer #118’s experience 
in this incident highlights how an officer’s decisions can impact another officer’s 
decisions and can limit the number of options available to all officers on scene. 
 
SUMMARY 
 The incident-level analysis of the participating officers’ interviews yielded 
important information as it pertains to Binder and Scharf’s deadly force decision-making 
framework. The results suggest that the mere presence of and/or decisions made by 
officers have the potential to impact decisions made by other officers in the anticipation, 
entry, and information exchange phases of the encounter. Furthermore, when such 
instances occur in early phases of the incident, they can impact officers’ decision-making 
and limit or increase the options available to them in subsequent phases. 
 First, officers can impact another officer’s decision to become involved in an 
incident. If the request to respond to an incident is made by another officer whom the 
individual officer admires or knows on a personal level, he or she may be more likely to 
decide to become involved. In addition, an officer may not always have a choice 
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regarding whether to become involved in an incident. Aside from being assigned to a call 
by dispatchers, an officer may be directed to a specific incident by a superior. While it 
can be argued that there is some independent decision-making on the part of the officer to 
follow through with such orders, it is also logical to conclude that it is second nature for 
an officer to follow directions from a superior without challenge.  
 Second, officers can impact the decisions made by other officers through the use 
of communication. The results from the analysis revealed that officers in the sample 
communicated with one another throughout the anticipation, entry, and information 
exchange phases. Reasons for this communication included: providing other officers with 
updated information about the situation and/or the suspect involved, confirming their 
decisions with other officers, maintaining and/or preserving the safety of other officers, 
and drafting plans regarding how to best handle the incident at hand. These findings show 
that when other officers are present and involved in the same encounter, officers will 
utilize one another as a source of information and confirmation for their decision-making. 
Furthermore, these findings also highlight that officers can be just as concerned for the 
safety of another officer as they can be for their personal safety. Just as Binder and Scharf 
asserted that an officer’s concern for his or her safety can impact his or her decision-
making, an officer’s concern for the safety of a fellow officer (or bystanders) can impact 
his or her decision-making as well. 
 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the results from the analysis demonstrated 
that officers’ decision-making and behavior can inadvertently impact the decisions made 
by other officers on scene. In the entry phase, for example, officers were found to be 
mimicking the behaviors and decisions made by other officers involved in the same 
202		
incident, thus following the lead of other officers on scene. Furthermore, it was 
discovered that decisions and actions undertaken by an officer in the information 
exchange phase can impact (i.e., limit) the options available to other officers involved in 
the same incident. Both of these findings demonstrate that the decisions, behaviors, and 
actions of officers involved in the same incident can influence and shape the decisions 
made by other officers. Therefore, to provide scholars with a more comprehensive deadly 
force decision-making framework through which to assess how officers make decisions 
during an officer-involved shooting, Binder and Scharf’s framework should be amended 
to accommodate the aforementioned findings from the multi-officer incident analysis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION  
 This study was designed to contribute to what is known about police use of deadly 
force by empirically assessing Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf’s more than three-decade 
old deadly force decision-making framework. Scharf and Binder (1983) developed their 
framework based on information developed through interviews of police officers who 
shot citizens and other officers who held fire in situations in which they arguably could 
have used deadly force. By analyzing a new sample of police officers across the United 
States who had been involved in police shootings – both shooters and officers who held 
fire - this study assessed the extent to which Binder and Scharf’s decision-making 
framework accounts for how officers who make different choices about deadly force in 
the same incident come to make these choices. 
 The data used in this analysis also lent itself to a new assessment of police officer 
decision-making as it relates to the use of deadly force. Past studies designed to 
understand how an officer makes the decision to shoot or hold fire focused on police 
officers as individual actors and have primarily relied on data collected from incidents 
involving only a single officer. Many violent police-citizen encounters, however, involve 
multiple officers. Because previous work has largely viewed individual officers as 
isolated from their colleagues, little is known regarding how the presence and actions of 
other officers impact the decisions made by officers on scene related to officers’ use of 
deadly force.  
 To assess the utility of the Binder and Scharf decision-making framework for 
violent police-citizen encounters in which multiple officers were involved, the author 
relied on qualitative data collected from interviews with 83 police officers from law 
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enforcement agencies across the U.S. These 83 officers were selected from the larger 
sample of 218 officers who were interviewed during a federally-funded study of officer-
involved shootings because they a) were present at incidents in which at least two officers 
were present and b) at least one officer involved fired at least one shot and at least one 
officer held fire. By limiting the subsample used in this analysis to officers meeting these 
criteria, the author was able to answer the following questions: 1). Do the decision-
making processes of officers who made different choices in the same incident follow the 
deadly force decision-making framework proposed by Binder and Scharf? 2). Given the 
same situation, do differences in how police officers move through the Binder and Scharf 
decision-making process account for why some officers shoot and some hold fire? 3). 
How does the presence of other officers affect the choices made by an individual officer 
during a deadly force incident? 
 This final chapter summarizes what the study found relating to these three 
questions and concludes the dissertation. After providing a brief review of key findings, 
the chapter offers some recommendations for policy and future research.  
 
THE BINDER AND SCHARF FRAMEWORK: NOT NEW, BUT IMPROVED 
 Binder and Scharf originally conceptualized their deadly force decision-making 
model to provide a framework for understanding how police officers come to use deadly 
force. They argue that officers’ decision-making in what they termed the “violent police-
citizen encounter” can be classified into four different phases: the anticipation, the entry 
and initial contact, the information exchange, and the final frame. They argue that all 
officers who find themselves in such high-risk encounters make decisions in each of 
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these phases, with the exception of the information exchange phase (which they note not 
all officers enter into because at times, these types of incidents can unfold rather quickly, 
preventing officers from having time to make contact with the suspect). Perhaps most 
importantly, they make the argument that at a certain point in the encounter, an officer is 
going to make the decision that deadly force is necessary and, if so, he or she will shoot, 
or an officer is going to make the decision that deadly force is not necessary and, if so, he 
or she will refrain from shooting. Once an officer reaches this point, he or she has entered 
the final frame phase. 
 Each of Binder and Scharf’s phases capture logical time points during high-risk 
incidents. For example, one would expect that when an officer is called to a scene, he or 
she will take the time to collect information about the situation and/or suspect he or she 
will be attending to prior to arriving at the location. It makes sense that, upon arrival, this 
officer would observe the scene, update his or her understanding of the situation at hand, 
and perhaps attempt to craft a plan to resolve the situation. This plan may require the 
officer to issue verbal commands to the suspect (e.g., “Drop your weapon,” “Put your 
hands up,” etc.). Finally, given the information the officer has paired with the suspect’s 
level of compliance, he or she may make a decision regarding whether deadly force is 
necessary and whether he or she should exercise this power.  
Thus, it makes sense that many of the 83 officers in the sample entered each phase 
and made at least one decision in each phase, just as Binder and Scharf asserted. For this 
to be a comprehensive framework through which to assess officers’ deadly force 
decision-making, however, it must encompass as many potential situational outcomes as 
possible. More specifically, while Binder and Scharf acknowledge that not every officer 
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involved in this type of incident will enter the information exchange phase, they do make 
the assumption that all officers will enter the anticipation, entry, and final frame phases.27 
The findings from this study indicate that this is not the case. To incorporate some of the 
findings that emerged from this study but which are not recognized in Binder and 
Scharf’s deadly force decision-making framework, an updated version of the framework 
including these new findings can be found below in Figure 3. A discussion of the new 
framework follows: 
 
 
Figure 3: Updated Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework (with 
findings from this study incorporated) 
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making process in the entry phase. Although this was the case only with a small number 
of officers in the sample (n=5), these cases demonstrate that not all officers begin their 
decision-making process in high-risk police-citizen encounters in the anticipation phase. 
Therefore, the updated model above in Figure 3 accounts for instances in which officers 
do begin their incident in the anticipation phase, but also cases in which officers are on 
the location of the incident when they make the decision to initiate the encounter, thus 
starting the police-citizen contact and decision-making process in the entry phase.   
The current analysis also highlighted liabilities relating to the information 
exchange phase. That is, not all officers issue verbal commands to suspects, thus forgoing 
the information exchange phase. Thirty (30) officers in the sample did not issue verbal 
commands because another officer involved in the incident had already initiated this type 
of exchange with the suspect. This finding demonstrates that when multiple officers are 
involved in a high-risk incident, not all officers will enter this phase, as it is often 
unnecessary (and discouraged) for all officers on scene to issue verbal commands to the 
citizen(s) involved.  
Moreover, results from the study revealed that 16 officers did not make a decision 
to fire or make a decision to hold fire, but rather never considered using deadly force in 
their respective incidents. As making a decision is the premise for entering the final 
frame phase, these findings suggest that not every officer in high-risk police-citizen 
encounters enter the last of Binder and Scharf’s phases. Binder and Scharf do recognize 
cases where an officer does not make a conscious decision to fire (i.e., their behavior is a 
reaction to the behavior/movement of the suspect), but as it stands now, their framework 
does not address cases in which an officer does not make a decision about the use of 
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deadly force and holds fire. For example, there were instances in which officers in the 
sample never considered whether to use deadly force because their attention was directed 
elsewhere on scene (e.g., scene organization/management, attending to a wounded 
officer). Therefore, this finding thus discloses another weakness in the Binder and Scharf 
framework. The adjusted deadly force decision-making framework depicted in Figure 3 
above accommodates for these various findings in the final frame phase by providing 
additional outcomes. That is, an officer can enter the final frame phase and make a 
conscious decision to fire or to hold fire, but he or she may also fail to enter the final 
frame phase by making an unconscious decision to fire or by forgoing the consideration 
of using deadly force altogether. 
In addition to assessing whether officers in the sample entered and made decisions 
in each of the four phases proposed by Binder and Scharf, this study also examined 
whether officers who shot and officers who held fire made different decisions in early 
phases and, if so, whether this accounts for their different actions relating to the use of 
deadly force. Scharf and Binder (1983) hypothesized that the reason why some officers 
choose to shoot and others choose to hold fire when confronted with similar situations is 
due to significant differences in their decision-making throughout the encounter. That is, 
decisions made by an officer who ultimately chose to fire in the final frame must be 
markedly different from decisions made by an officer who ultimately chose to hold fire, 
thus explaining the difference in outcomes between the two cases. 
The results from this study, however, suggest that officers, regardless of their 
decision during the final frame of the incident, make similar decisions and consider 
similar factors throughout the anticipation, entry, and information exchange phases of 
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encounters. Both shooters and witness officers used time during the anticipation phase to 
collect information about the situation and/or the suspect they would be facing prior to 
arriving on scene. Binder and Scharf identified a number of factors they believed impact 
officers’ decision-making during this initial phase, such as mode of information and 
believed accuracy of information. Both shooters and witness officers in the sample 
explained how the source of the information (e.g., dispatcher, citizen, fellow officer) 
played into their decision-making and, at times, explained how from whom they received 
information corresponded to how accurate they perceived the information to be.  
During the entry phase, and upon arrival at the scene of the incident, both shooters 
and witness officers in the sample continued to collect information about the situation 
and/or the suspect. A factor Binder and Scharf asserted to be particularly relevant to 
officers’ decision-making in this phase was their personal safety. Both shooters and 
witness officers shared that their personal safety led them to make certain decisions at 
this point that minimized their likelihood of being seriously injured or killed by the 
suspect (e.g., crafting and utilizing safe, tactical approaches when moving toward the 
scene or suspect, drawing their firearm, etc.).  
When officers entered the information exchange phase by making verbal contact 
with suspects, shooters and witness officers continued to engage in similar behaviors and 
make similar decisions. Both shooters and witness officers in the sample issued verbal 
commands to the suspect in their incidents and made similar interpretations of their 
suspect’s physical demeanor and verbal communications; both too described how this 
influenced their view of the situation and their consideration of possible outcomes. 
Interestingly, both shooters and witness officers considered possible situational scenarios 
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in which they would choose to shoot if such conditions arose. This demonstrates that 
some witness officers considered the possibility of shooting, but ultimately chose not to 
fire shots.  
In sum, these results suggest that contrary to what Binder and Scharf 
hypothesized, officers who shoot and officers who hold fire make very similar decisions 
and consider many of the same factors when making decisions in the first three phases of 
the encounter. If the difference in officers’ decision to use deadly force is not explained 
by a significant difference in their early decision-making, there must be other 
mechanisms at work. The findings from this study identify situational conditions and the 
presence and decisions made by other officers involved in the incident as potential 
explanations for the difference in decision-making in the final frame phase. 
 
THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF OTHER OFFICERS 
 If a significant difference in officers’ decision-making early in the encounter does 
not account for why some officers shoot and others hold fire, what does explain this 
difference?  The results from this analysis suggest that the involvement of multiple 
officers in a single incident can have a strong impact on individual officers’ decision-
making, primarily when it comes to the decision to use deadly force. The presence of 
multiple officers may also explain why not every officer in the same incident had to make 
a decision regarding whether to use deadly force. Although Binder and Scharf were 
unable to consider the impact of other officers on officers’ decision-making in their 
original model, the results from this analysis demonstrate that other officers can influence 
officers’ decision-making and actions during a high-risk police-citizen encounter that 
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involves multiple officers. To outline how these findings can be incorporated into the 
Binder and Scharf framework, Figure 4 below depicts both the factors said to impact 
officers’ decision-making in each of the four phases as identified in Binder and Scharf’s 
original framework, as well as the new factors identified in this analysis. The discussion 
that follows will describe the additions to the framework as they pertain to each of the 
four phases: 
 
Figure 4: Updated Binder and Scharf Deadly Force Decision-Making Framework 
(incorporating additional social influences from this study) 
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incident. Furthermore, an officer may be directed to respond to a specific incident by a 
superior, leaving that officer relatively little choice in whether he or she attends to the 
call. As such, “mode of involvement” should be included as a possible factor influencing 
officers’ decision-making during the anticipation phase of the high-risk police-citizen 
encounter. 
 Once officers arrived on scene and began the entry phase, they continued to 
utilize communication with one another to formulate plans, preserve their personal safety 
and the safety of other officers, and confirm their assessment of the situation and options 
to resolve it with other officers. These findings are important contributions to Binder and 
Scharf’s framework, as the factors they identified as determining officers’ behavior were 
rooted in a focus on officers as independent actors. For example, while Binder and Scharf 
argue that safety is a concern for an officer during the entry phase and explain how this 
concern may impact his or her decision-making at this point during the incident, they do 
not pay mind to how an officer’s concern for the safety of other officers can affect their 
decision-making. The results of this study suggest that officers are just as concerned for 
the safety of their fellow officers as they are for their own safety.  
 Another interesting finding that arose from the current analysis was that officers’ 
decisions and behaviors can be mimicked by other officers involved in the same incident 
and this behavior was observed in the entry, information exchange, and final frame 
phases of the encounters analyzed. For example, if one or multiple officers are 
approaching a scene in a certain way, other officers involved may mirror this same 
behavior. If one or more officers decide to address a situation in a certain manner, other 
officers – regardless of whether they agree – may be more likely to follow this behavior 
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because others are engaging in it. This suggests that other officers have the ability to 
influence the decisions and behaviors of other officers involved in the same incident 
perhaps without even knowing they are doing so.28  
 Furthermore, the presence and actions of officers involved in the same incident 
can directly impact the decisions and behaviors made by other officers during the final 
frame phase. This study disclosed that some officers made the decision to hold fire 
because another officer on scene had already fired shots and eliminated the threat posed 
by the suspect. In some cases, officers chose to hold fire because another officer was in 
his or her line of fire. Others reported that they never considered shooting because they 
were attending to other on-scene matters (e.g., scene management/organization, tending 
to an injured officer), but were arguably able to do so because other officers were there to 
address the threat posed by the suspect. As such, the presence of or actions by other 
officers can have a strong influence on how officers behave during high-risk encounters 
and should be recognized as factors that can influence officers’ decision-making during 
the entry, information exchange, and final frame phases. 
 Lastly, results from the analysis suggest that an officers’ perception of his or her 
role or an officers’ assigned role during an incident can influence their decisions and 
actions throughout a high-risk police-citizen encounter involving multiple officers. In a 
few cases observed in the study, the presence of additional officers allowed for officers 
(e.g., shift supervisors, sergeants, and lieutenants) to focus their attention on other aspects 
of the event, such as scene organization and management, therefore eliminating their 
need to make a decision regarding the use of deadly force. In addition, an officer’s 																																																								28	More specifically, results from this study disclosed that officers who held a ranked position, had 
received some type of specialized training (e.g., SWAT training), and/or had more years on the job, were 
the officers whose behavior others were likely to mirror. 
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assignment during a high-risk police-citizen encounter may influence his or her actions 
throughout the encounter. The presence of multiple officers allows leaders to designate 
specific tasks to each officer with the goal of bringing the incident to a close and, as such, 
the use of deadly force by an individual officer may be more or less likely depending on 
that officer’s assignment (e.g., lethal coverage, TASER deployment, crisis negotiator, 
etc.).  Based on the results of the analysis then, “perceived or assigned roles” should be 
noted as factors influencing officers’ decision-making during the entry, information 
exchange, and final frame phases. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
  Police officers are provided with the authority to make decisions that can result in 
the death of another human being, yet we still know relatively little about how officers 
come to the decision to pull the trigger or hold fire. Using Binder and Scharf’s deadly 
force decision-making framework to guide the analysis, the overall goal of this study was 
to produce findings that could, in some way, contribute to what is known about decision-
making among officers involved in police shootings. The results from the analysis 
revealed new findings relative to Binder and Scharf’s framework and what is known 
about officers’ decision-making in encounters that involved multiple officers and which 
concluded in police gunfire. It is the hope of the author that these findings can inform 
understanding of deadly force decision-making and can be used to influence police 
officer training and future data collection efforts regarding police use of deadly force. 
 One of the major findings from this study is that an officer’s decision-making 
process can be influenced (advertently or inadvertently) by other officers involved in the 
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same incident. Decisions made by officers on scene may expand or limit the options 
available to other officers or may cause officers to make decisions they would not have 
otherwise not made had they been the only officer involved in the incident. In addition, 
the presence of multiple officers can allow individual officers to adopt social roles during 
an incident that they arguably could not have otherwise held if they were the only officer 
present at the scene. The fifth chapter of the dissertation highlighted how some officers in 
the sample were able to attend to other issues during the incident (e.g., scene 
management/organization, tending to an injured officer) because they knew they had 
other officers present on scene who could attend to the suspect. These represent instances 
that are specific to multi-officer shootings, and because multi-officer shootings are a 
possibility, these findings should be represented in police training. 
 These findings can be incorporated into law enforcement training in a number of 
different ways. First, all officers should be reminded that officer-involved shootings may 
involve more than one officer. Because of this, officers should be cognizant of the fact 
that their behaviors and decisions during high-risk incidents can impact other officers 
who are involved. Instead of viewing this as an individual decision-making process that 
concludes in a single officer making a decision to fire or hold fire, officers should be 
trained to consider how their independent decision-making process could impact and 
influence other officers’ decision-making processes as well.  
 It is possible that the belief that a potentially violent police-citizen contact will 
only involve a single officer is unintentionally perpetuated in department training. If 
officers are completing simulation and scenario-based training as individuals, this may 
inadvertently encourage officers to assume that should they find themselves in a high-risk 
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encounter, they will be the only officer involved. As this is not the case, police 
departments should use scenario-based training with multiple officers to expose them to 
the possibility that high-risk incidents can involve more than one law enforcement 
official. By requiring multiple officers to run through deadly force scenarios together, 
officers can learn how their decisions impact the decisions made by and options available 
to others and vice versa. This type of training exercise would give officers first-hand 
experience with group communication and decision-making, which is a skill that may 
benefit them should they find themselves in this type of incident with other officers.  
 Another way in which police departments can benefit from the findings of this 
study relates to how they conduct post-shooting interviews with officers involved in 
incidents wherein shots are fired by the police. It is common procedure across police 
departments to interview officers shortly after a police-citizen encounter in which they 
fired shots to collect facts about the incident from both officers who discharged their 
weapons and witness officers. This allows investigative officials from the police 
department to gather information about the incident from the officer’s point of view to 
determine whether a reasonable officer would have made similar decisions given the 
circumstances. Investigators do not, however, typically collect detailed information about 
each decision made by the officer throughout the incident, nor do they probe the officer 
about why he or she made the decisions they made during their deadly force encounter. 
The level of change in post-shooting interview procedure would vary from 
department to department (depending on how they conduct this process), but such change 
can be accomplished and should be encouraged. To guide this proposed change in 
interview protocol, police departments could use the Binder and Scharf four-phase 
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framework to guide the questions they ask participating officers regarding the decisions 
they made throughout the incident in question. Appendix C presents some ideas about the 
topics to be covered by the interviewer. It should be noted that post-shooting 
investigators may already cover many of the topics covered in the proposed line of 
questioning. The purpose of the proposed interview guide, however, is to provide a 
template that serves as a starting point to obtaining more information about officers’ 
decision-making during high-risk police-citizen encounters.   
 These alterations in the post-shooting interviews of police officers could provide 
police departments with information pertinent to understanding officers’ decision-making 
during violent police-citizen encounters. This additional information could most certainly 
be used by police departments when crafting training opportunities for their officers. 
And, should departments be so inclined to share these data with scholars, this information 
could be collectively analyzed with the purpose of enhancing our understanding of the 
decision-making processes completed by officers in this type of rare incident. 
 In conclusion, to adequately inform deadly force training and policy, police 
officials and scholars need to have a more comprehensive understanding of how an 
officer makes the choice to discharge his or her weapon, makes the choice to hold fire, or 
makes no choice regarding the use of deadly force at all. The results from this study 
provided insight into police shootings that involved multiple officers in which 
participating officers made different decisions relating to their use of deadly force, but 
additional data and work are needed to continue to expand our knowledge and 
understanding of this type of rare, but life-threatening, police-citizen encounter. As 
scholars and police continue to pursue this avenue of research, we can work together to 
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ensure that law enforcement officials are equipped with sufficient decision-making skills, 
are cognizant of how their decisions can impact the decisions made by others, and how 
the decisions they make throughout critical incidents, such as high-risk police-citizen 
encounters, relate to the outcome of the incident. Understanding officers’ decision-
making processes can lead to training improvements, better prepared officers, and safer 
situational outcomes for law enforcement officials and citizens alike. 
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